Guide to the Secure Configuration of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9

with profile Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) - STIC for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 - Intermediate
This profile defines a baseline that aligns with the "Intermediate" configuration of the CCN-STIC-610A22 Guide issued by the National Cryptological Center of Spain in 2022-10. The CCN-STIC-610A22 guide includes hardening settings for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 at basic, intermediate, and advanced levels.
The SCAP Security Guide Project
https://www.open-scap.org/security-policies/scap-security-guide
This guide presents a catalog of security-relevant configuration settings for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9. It is a rendering of content structured in the eXtensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF) in order to support security automation. The SCAP content is is available in the scap-security-guide package which is developed at https://www.open-scap.org/security-policies/scap-security-guide.

Providing system administrators with such guidance informs them how to securely configure systems under their control in a variety of network roles. Policy makers and baseline creators can use this catalog of settings, with its associated references to higher-level security control catalogs, in order to assist them in security baseline creation. This guide is a catalog, not a checklist, and satisfaction of every item is not likely to be possible or sensible in many operational scenarios. However, the XCCDF format enables granular selection and adjustment of settings, and their association with OVAL and OCIL content provides an automated checking capability. Transformations of this document, and its associated automated checking content, are capable of providing baselines that meet a diverse set of policy objectives. Some example XCCDF Profiles, which are selections of items that form checklists and can be used as baselines, are available with this guide. They can be processed, in an automated fashion, with tools that support the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP). The DISA STIG, which provides required settings for US Department of Defense systems, is one example of a baseline created from this guidance.
Do not attempt to implement any of the settings in this guide without first testing them in a non-operational environment. The creators of this guidance assume no responsibility whatsoever for its use by other parties, and makes no guarantees, expressed or implied, about its quality, reliability, or any other characteristic.

Profile Information

Profile TitleCentro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) - STIC for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 - Intermediate
Profile IDxccdf_org.ssgproject.content_profile_ccn_intermediate

CPE Platforms

  • cpe:/o:redhat:enterprise_linux:9

Revision History

Current version: 0.1.76

  • draft (as of 2024-12-21)

Table of Contents

  1. System Settings
    1. Installing and Maintaining Software
    2. Account and Access Control
    3. GRUB2 bootloader configuration
    4. Network Configuration and Firewalls
    5. File Permissions and Masks
    6. SELinux
  2. Services
    1. DNS Server
    2. FTP Server
    3. IMAP and POP3 Server
    4. Network Time Protocol
    5. Obsolete Services
    6. Proxy Server
    7. SNMP Server
    8. SSH Server
    9. USBGuard daemon
  3. System Accounting with auditd
    1. Configure auditd Rules for Comprehensive Auditing
    2. Configure auditd Data Retention

Checklist

Group   Guide to the Secure Configuration of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9   Group contains 61 groups and 128 rules
Group   System Settings   Group contains 36 groups and 78 rules
[ref]   Contains rules that check correct system settings.
Group   Installing and Maintaining Software   Group contains 7 groups and 12 rules
[ref]   The following sections contain information on security-relevant choices during the initial operating system installation process and the setup of software updates.
Group   System and Software Integrity   Group contains 1 group and 2 rules
[ref]   System and software integrity can be gained by installing antivirus, increasing system encryption strength with FIPS, verifying installed software, enabling SELinux, installing an Intrusion Prevention System, etc. However, installing or enabling integrity checking tools cannot prevent intrusions, but they can detect that an intrusion may have occurred. Requirements for integrity checking may be highly dependent on the environment in which the system will be used. Snapshot-based approaches such as AIDE may induce considerable overhead in the presence of frequent software updates.
Group   System Cryptographic Policies   Group contains 2 rules
[ref]   Linux has the capability to centrally configure cryptographic polices. The command update-crypto-policies is used to set the policy applicable for the various cryptographic back-ends, such as SSL/TLS libraries. The configured cryptographic policies will be the default policy used by these backends unless the application user configures them otherwise. When the system has been configured to use the centralized cryptographic policies, the administrator is assured that any application that utilizes the supported backends will follow a policy that adheres to the configured profile. Currently the supported backends are:
  • GnuTLS library
  • OpenSSL library
  • NSS library
  • OpenJDK
  • Libkrb5
  • BIND
  • OpenSSH
Applications and languages which rely on any of these backends will follow the system policies as well. Examples are apache httpd, nginx, php, and others.

Rule   Configure System Cryptography Policy   [ref]

To configure the system cryptography policy to use ciphers only from the DEFAULT policy, run the following command: 
$ sudo update-crypto-policies --set DEFAULT
The rule checks if settings for selected crypto policy are configured as expected. Configuration files in the /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends are either symlinks to correct files provided by Crypto-policies package or they are regular files in case crypto policy customizations are applied. Crypto policies may be customized by crypto policy modules, in which case it is delimited from the base policy using a colon.
Warning:  The system needs to be rebooted for these changes to take effect.
Warning:  System Crypto Modules must be provided by a vendor that undergoes FIPS-140 certifications. FIPS-140 is applicable to all Federal agencies that use cryptographic-based security systems to protect sensitive information in computer and telecommunication systems (including voice systems) as defined in Section 5131 of the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-106. This standard shall be used in designing and implementing cryptographic modules that Federal departments and agencies operate or are operated for them under contract. See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf To meet this, the system has to have cryptographic software provided by a vendor that has undergone this certification. This means providing documentation, test results, design information, and independent third party review by an accredited lab. While open source software is capable of meeting this, it does not meet FIPS-140 unless the vendor submits to this process.
Rationale:
Centralized cryptographic policies simplify applying secure ciphers across an operating system and the applications that run on that operating system. Use of weak or untested encryption algorithms undermines the purposes of utilizing encryption to protect data.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_configure_crypto_policy
Identifiers:

CCE-83450-7

References:
disaCCI-000068, CCI-003123, CCI-002450, CCI-000877, CCI-002418, CCI-001453, CCI-002890
hipaa164.308(a)(4)(i), 164.308(b)(1), 164.308(b)(3), 164.312(e)(1), 164.312(e)(2)(ii)
ism1446
nerc-cipCIP-003-8 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R7.1
nistAC-17(a), AC-17(2), CM-6(a), MA-4(6), SC-13, SC-12(2), SC-12(3)
osppFCS_COP.1(1), FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(3), FCS_COP.1(4), FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.2, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1
os-srgSRG-OS-000396-GPOS-00176, SRG-OS-000393-GPOS-00173, SRG-OS-000394-GPOS-00174
ccnA.5.SEC-RHEL4
cis1.6.1
pcidss42.2.7, 2.2
stigidRHEL-09-671010, RHEL-09-672030, RHEL-09-672045
stigrefSV-258230r958408_rule, SV-258238r991554_rule, SV-258241r1017572_rule


var_system_crypto_policy='DEFAULT'


stderr_of_call=$(update-crypto-policies --set ${var_system_crypto_policy} 2>&1 > /dev/null)
rc=$?

if test "$rc" = 127; then
	echo "$stderr_of_call" >&2
	echo "Make sure that the script is installed on the remediated system." >&2
	echo "See output of the 'dnf provides update-crypto-policies' command" >&2
	echo "to see what package to (re)install" >&2

	false  # end with an error code
elif test "$rc" != 0; then
	echo "Error invoking the update-crypto-policies script: $stderr_of_call" >&2
	false  # end with an error code
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    systemd:
      units:
        - name: configure-crypto-policy.service
          enabled: true
          contents: |
            [Unit]
            Before=kubelet.service
            [Service]
            Type=oneshot
            ExecStart=update-crypto-policies --set {{.var_system_crypto_policy}}
            RemainAfterExit=yes
            [Install]
            WantedBy=multi-user.target

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: XCCDF Value var_system_crypto_policy # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_system_crypto_policy: !!str DEFAULT
  tags:
    - always

- name: Configure System Cryptography Policy
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/crypto-policies/config
    regexp: ^(?!#)(\S+)$
    line: '{{ var_system_crypto_policy }}'
    create: true
  tags:
  - CCE-83450-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-671010
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-672030
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-672045
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-13
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.7
  - configure_crypto_policy
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Verify that Crypto Policy is Set (runtime)
  command: /usr/bin/update-crypto-policies --set {{ var_system_crypto_policy }}
  tags:
  - CCE-83450-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-671010
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-672030
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-672045
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-12(3)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-13
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.7
  - configure_crypto_policy
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Configure SSH to use System Crypto Policy   [ref]

Crypto Policies provide a centralized control over crypto algorithms usage of many packages. SSH is supported by crypto policy, but the SSH configuration may be set up to ignore it. To check that Crypto Policies settings are configured correctly, ensure that the CRYPTO_POLICY variable is either commented or not set at all in the /etc/sysconfig/sshd.
Rationale:
Overriding the system crypto policy makes the behavior of the SSH service violate expectations, and makes system configuration more fragmented.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_configure_ssh_crypto_policy
Identifiers:

CCE-83445-7

References:
disaCCI-001453
hipaa164.308(a)(4)(i), 164.308(b)(1), 164.308(b)(3), 164.312(e)(1), 164.312(e)(2)(ii)
nerc-cipCIP-003-8 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R7.1
nistAC-17(a), AC-17(2), CM-6(a), MA-4(6), SC-13
osppFCS_SSH_EXT.1, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1, FCS_SSHC_EXT.1
pcidssReq-2.2
os-srgSRG-OS-000250-GPOS-00093
ccnA.5.SEC-RHEL6
cis1.6.2
pcidss42.2.7, 2.2


SSH_CONF="/etc/sysconfig/sshd"

sed -i "/^\s*CRYPTO_POLICY.*$/Id" $SSH_CONF

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Configure SSH to use System Crypto Policy
  lineinfile:
    dest: /etc/sysconfig/sshd
    state: absent
    regexp: (?i)^\s*CRYPTO_POLICY.*$
  tags:
  - CCE-83445-7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(2)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-MA-4(6)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-13
  - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.7
  - configure_ssh_crypto_policy
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
Group   GNOME Desktop Environment   Group contains 3 groups and 7 rules
[ref]   GNOME is a graphical desktop environment bundled with many Linux distributions that allow users to easily interact with the operating system graphically rather than textually. The GNOME Graphical Display Manager (GDM) provides login, logout, and user switching contexts as well as display server management.

GNOME is developed by the GNOME Project and is considered the default Red Hat Graphical environment.

For more information on GNOME and the GNOME Project, see https://www.gnome.org.
Group   Configure GNOME Login Screen   Group contains 1 rule

Rule   Disable the GNOME3 Login User List   [ref]

In the default graphical environment, users logging directly into the system are greeted with a login screen that displays all known users. This functionality should be disabled by setting disable-user-list to true.

To disable, add or edit disable-user-list to /etc/dconf/db/distro.d/00-security-settings. For example: 
[org/gnome/login-screen]
disable-user-list=true
Once the setting has been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/distro.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: 
/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list
After the settings have been set, run dconf update.
Rationale:
Leaving the user list enabled is a security risk since it allows anyone with physical access to the system to quickly enumerate known user accounts without logging in.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_gnome_disable_user_list
Identifiers:

CCE-88285-2

References:
disaCCI-000366
nistCM-6(a), AC-23
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
ccnA.11.SEC-RHEL9
cis1.8.3
stigidRHEL-09-271115
stigrefSV-258033r991589_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them.
# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain :
readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
                                | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|distro.d' | cut -d":" -f1)
DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/distro.d/00-security-settings"
DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/distro.d"

mkdir -p "${DBDIR}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ]
then
    if grep -q "^\\s*disable-user-list\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    then
        
        sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)disable-user-list(\s*=)/#\1disable-user-list\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    fi
fi

[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}"
if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
    printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/login-screen]" >> ${DCONFFILE}
fi

escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")"
if grep -q "^\\s*disable-user-list\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
        sed -i "s/\\s*disable-user-list\\s*=\\s*.*/disable-user-list=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}"
    else
        sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]|a\\disable-user-list=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}"
fi
dconf update
# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
            | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|distro.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1)
LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/distro.d/locks"

mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]]
then
    sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}"
fi

if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list$" /etc/dconf/db/distro.d/
then
    echo "/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list" >> "/etc/dconf/db/distro.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock"
fi
dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:unknown
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-88285-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271115
  - NIST-800-53-AC-23
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - dconf_gnome_disable_user_list
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Disable the GNOME3 Login User List
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dconf/db/distro.d/00-security-settings
    section: org/gnome/login-screen
    option: disable-user-list
    value: 'true'
    no_extra_spaces: true
    create: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-88285-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271115
  - NIST-800-53-AC-23
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - dconf_gnome_disable_user_list
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 disablement of Login User List
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/dconf/db/distro.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock
    regexp: ^/org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list$
    line: /org/gnome/login-screen/disable-user-list
    create: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-88285-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271115
  - NIST-800-53-AC-23
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - dconf_gnome_disable_user_list
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Dconf Update
  command: dconf update
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-88285-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271115
  - NIST-800-53-AC-23
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - dconf_gnome_disable_user_list
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy
Group   GNOME Media Settings   Group contains 3 rules
[ref]   GNOME media settings that apply to the graphical interface.

Rule   Disable GNOME3 Automounting   [ref]

The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, will mount devices and removable media (such as DVDs, CDs and USB flash drives) whenever they are inserted into the system. To disable automount within GNOME3, add or set automount to false in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: 
[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling]
automount=false
Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: 
/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount
After the settings have been set, run dconf update.
Rationale:
Disabling automatic mounting in GNOME3 can prevent the introduction of malware via removable media. It will, however, also prevent desktop users from legitimate use of removable media.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_gnome_disable_automount
Identifiers:

CCE-87734-0

References:
cis-csc12, 16
cobit5APO13.01, DSS01.04, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.03
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000366, CCI-000778, CCI-001958
isa-62443-20094.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.AC-3, PR.AC-6
os-srgSRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059, SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
ccnA.11.SEC-RHEL12
cis1.8.6, 1.8.7
pcidss43.4.2, 3.4

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them.
# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain :
readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
                                | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1)
DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings"
DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d"

mkdir -p "${DBDIR}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ]
then
    if grep -q "^\\s*automount\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    then
        
        sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)automount(\s*=)/#\1automount\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    fi
fi

[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}"
if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
    printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling]" >> ${DCONFFILE}
fi

escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "false")"
if grep -q "^\\s*automount\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
        sed -i "s/\\s*automount\\s*=\\s*.*/automount=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}"
    else
        sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]|a\\automount=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}"
fi
dconf update
# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
            | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1)
LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks"

mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]]
then
    sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}"
fi

if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/
then
    echo "/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock"
fi
dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:unknown
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-87734-0
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2
  - dconf_gnome_disable_automount
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Disable GNOME3 Automounting - automount
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings
    section: org/gnome/desktop/media-handling
    option: automount
    value: 'false'
    create: true
    no_extra_spaces: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-87734-0
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2
  - dconf_gnome_disable_automount
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 Automounting - automount
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock
    regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount$
    line: /org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount
    create: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-87734-0
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2
  - dconf_gnome_disable_automount
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Dconf Update
  command: dconf update
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-87734-0
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2
  - dconf_gnome_disable_automount
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

Rule   Disable GNOME3 Automount Opening   [ref]

The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, will mount devices and removable media (such as DVDs, CDs and USB flash drives) whenever they are inserted into the system. To disable automount-open within GNOME3, add or set automount-open to false in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: 
[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling]
automount-open=false
Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: 
/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open
After the settings have been set, run dconf update.
Rationale:
Automatically mounting file systems permits easy introduction of unknown devices, thereby facilitating malicious activity. Disabling automatic mounting in GNOME3 can prevent the introduction of malware via removable media. It will, however, also prevent desktop users from legitimate use of removable media.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_gnome_disable_automount_open
Identifiers:

CCE-90128-0

References:
cis-csc12, 16
cobit5APO13.01, DSS01.04, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.03
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000778, CCI-000366, CCI-001958
isa-62443-20094.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.AC-3, PR.AC-6
os-srgSRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059, SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
ccnA.11.SEC-RHEL12
cis1.8.6, 1.8.7
pcidss43.4.2, 3.4
stigidRHEL-09-271020, RHEL-09-271025
stigrefSV-258014r958498_rule, SV-258015r958498_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them.
# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain :
readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
                                | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1)
DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings"
DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d"

mkdir -p "${DBDIR}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ]
then
    if grep -q "^\\s*automount-open\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    then
        
        sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)automount-open(\s*=)/#\1automount-open\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    fi
fi

[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}"
if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
    printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling]" >> ${DCONFFILE}
fi

escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "false")"
if grep -q "^\\s*automount-open\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
        sed -i "s/\\s*automount-open\\s*=\\s*.*/automount-open=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}"
    else
        sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]|a\\automount-open=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}"
fi
dconf update
# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
            | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1)
LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks"

mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]]
then
    sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}"
fi

if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/
then
    echo "/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock"
fi
dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:unknown
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-90128-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271020
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2
  - dconf_gnome_disable_automount_open
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Disable GNOME3 Automounting - automount-open
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings
    section: org/gnome/desktop/media-handling
    option: automount-open
    value: 'false'
    create: true
    no_extra_spaces: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-90128-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271020
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2
  - dconf_gnome_disable_automount_open
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 Automounting - automount-open
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock
    regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open$
    line: /org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/automount-open
    create: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-90128-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271020
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2
  - dconf_gnome_disable_automount_open
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Dconf Update
  command: dconf update
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-90128-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271020
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2
  - dconf_gnome_disable_automount_open
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

Rule   Disable GNOME3 Automount running   [ref]

The system's default desktop environment, GNOME3, will mount devices and removable media (such as DVDs, CDs and USB flash drives) whenever they are inserted into the system. To disable autorun-never within GNOME3, add or set autorun-never to true in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: 
[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling]
autorun-never=true
Once the settings have been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: 
/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never
After the settings have been set, run dconf update.
Rationale:
Automatically mounting file systems permits easy introduction of unknown devices, thereby facilitating malicious activity. Disabling automatic mount running in GNOME3 can prevent the introduction of malware via removable media. It will, however, also prevent desktop users from legitimate use of removable media.
Severity: 
low
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_gnome_disable_autorun
Identifiers:

CCE-90257-7

References:
cis-csc12, 16
cobit5APO13.01, DSS01.04, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.03
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000366, CCI-001764, CCI-001958, CCI-000778
isa-62443-20094.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.AC-3, PR.AC-6
os-srgSRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059, SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
ccnA.11.SEC-RHEL12
cis1.8.8, 1.8.9
stigidRHEL-09-271030, RHEL-09-271035
stigrefSV-258016r958804_rule, SV-258017r958498_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them.
# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain :
readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
                                | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1)
DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings"
DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d"

mkdir -p "${DBDIR}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ]
then
    if grep -q "^\\s*autorun-never\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    then
        
        sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)autorun-never(\s*=)/#\1autorun-never\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    fi
fi

[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}"
if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
    printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling]" >> ${DCONFFILE}
fi

escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")"
if grep -q "^\\s*autorun-never\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
        sed -i "s/\\s*autorun-never\\s*=\\s*.*/autorun-never=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}"
    else
        sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/media-handling\\]|a\\autorun-never=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}"
fi
dconf update
# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
            | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1)
LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks"

mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]]
then
    sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}"
fi

if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never$" /etc/dconf/db/local.d/
then
    echo "/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never" >> "/etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock"
fi
dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:unknown
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-90257-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271030
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271035
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - dconf_gnome_disable_autorun
  - low_complexity
  - low_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Disable GNOME3 Automounting - autorun-never
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings
    section: org/gnome/desktop/media-handling
    option: autorun-never
    value: 'true'
    create: true
    no_extra_spaces: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-90257-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271030
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271035
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - dconf_gnome_disable_autorun
  - low_complexity
  - low_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME3 Automounting - autorun-never
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock
    regexp: ^/org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never$
    line: /org/gnome/desktop/media-handling/autorun-never
    create: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-90257-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271030
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271035
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - dconf_gnome_disable_autorun
  - low_complexity
  - low_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Dconf Update
  command: dconf update
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-90257-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271030
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271035
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - dconf_gnome_disable_autorun
  - low_complexity
  - low_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy
Group   Configure GNOME Screen Locking   Group contains 2 rules
[ref]   In the default GNOME3 desktop, the screen can be locked by selecting the user name in the far right corner of the main panel and selecting Lock.

The following sections detail commands to enforce idle activation of the screensaver, screen locking, a blank-screen screensaver, and an idle activation time.

Because users should be trained to lock the screen when they step away from the computer, the automatic locking feature is only meant as a backup.

The root account can be screen-locked; however, the root account should never be used to log into an X Windows environment and should only be used to for direct login via console in emergency circumstances.

For more information about enforcing preferences in the GNOME3 environment using the DConf configuration system, see http://wiki.gnome.org/dconf and the man page dconf(1).

Rule   Set GNOME3 Screensaver Inactivity Timeout   [ref]

The idle time-out value for inactivity in the GNOME3 desktop is configured via the idle-delay setting must be set under an appropriate configuration file(s) in the /etc/dconf/db/local.d directory and locked in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/locks directory to prevent user modification.

For example, to configure the system for a 15 minute delay, add the following to /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings: 
[org/gnome/desktop/session]
idle-delay=uint32 900
Rationale:
A session time-out lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not logout because of the temporary nature of the absence. Rather than relying on the user to manually lock their operating system session prior to vacating the vicinity, GNOME3 can be configured to identify when a user's session has idled and take action to initiate a session lock.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_delay
Identifiers:

CCE-86510-5

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 15, 16
cjis5.5.5
cobit5DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10
cui3.1.10
disaCCI-000057, CCI-000060
isa-62443-20094.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9
iso27001-2013A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3
nistAC-11(a), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.AC-7
pcidssReq-8.1.8
os-srgSRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010, SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012
ccnA.11.SEC-RHEL7
cis1.8.4
pcidss48.2.8, 8.2
stigidRHEL-09-271065
stigrefSV-258023r958402_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

inactivity_timeout_value='300'


# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them.
# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain :
readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/session\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
                                | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1)
DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings"
DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d"

mkdir -p "${DBDIR}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ]
then
    if grep -q "^\\s*idle-delay\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    then
        
        sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)idle-delay(\s*=)/#\1idle-delay\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    fi
fi

[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}"
if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/session\\]" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
    printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/session]" >> ${DCONFFILE}
fi

escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "uint32 ${inactivity_timeout_value}")"
if grep -q "^\\s*idle-delay\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
        sed -i "s/\\s*idle-delay\\s*=\\s*.*/idle-delay=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}"
    else
        sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/session\\]|a\\idle-delay=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}"
fi
dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:unknown
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-86510-5
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271065
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_delay
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value inactivity_timeout_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    inactivity_timeout_value: !!str 300
  tags:
    - always

- name: Set GNOME3 Screensaver Inactivity Timeout
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings
    section: org/gnome/desktop/session
    option: idle-delay
    value: uint32 {{ inactivity_timeout_value }}
    create: true
    no_extra_spaces: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-86510-5
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271065
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_delay
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Dconf Update
  command: dconf update
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-86510-5
  - CJIS-5.5.5
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271065
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_idle_delay
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

Rule   Set GNOME3 Screensaver Lock Delay After Activation Period   [ref]

To activate the locking delay of the screensaver in the GNOME3 desktop when the screensaver is activated, add or set lock-delay to uint32 0 in /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings. For example: 
[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]
lock-delay=uint32 0
After the settings have been set, run dconf update.
Rationale:
A session lock is a temporary action taken when a user stops work and moves away from the immediate physical vicinity of the information system but does not want to logout because of the temporary nature of the absense.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_delay
Identifiers:

CCE-86954-5

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 15, 16
cobit5DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10
cui3.1.10
disaCCI-000057
isa-62443-20094.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9
iso27001-2013A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3
nistAC-11(a), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.AC-7
pcidssReq-8.1.8
os-srgSRG-OS-000029-GPOS-00010, SRG-OS-000031-GPOS-00012
ccnA.11.SEC-RHEL7
cis1.8.4
pcidss48.2.8, 8.2
stigidRHEL-09-271075
stigrefSV-258025r958402_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

var_screensaver_lock_delay='0'


# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them.
# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain :
readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
                                | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|local.d' | cut -d":" -f1)
DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings"
DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/local.d"

mkdir -p "${DBDIR}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ]
then
    if grep -q "^\\s*lock-delay\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    then
        
        sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)lock-delay(\s*=)/#\1lock-delay\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    fi
fi

[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}"
if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
    printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver]" >> ${DCONFFILE}
fi

escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "uint32 ${var_screensaver_lock_delay}")"
if grep -q "^\\s*lock-delay\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
        sed -i "s/\\s*lock-delay\\s*=\\s*.*/lock-delay=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}"
    else
        sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/desktop/screensaver\\]|a\\lock-delay=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}"
fi
dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:unknown
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-86954-5
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271075
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_delay
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value var_screensaver_lock_delay # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_screensaver_lock_delay: !!str 0
  tags:
    - always

- name: Set GNOME3 Screensaver Lock Delay After Activation Period
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dconf/db/local.d/00-security-settings
    section: org/gnome/desktop/screensaver
    option: lock-delay
    value: uint32 {{ var_screensaver_lock_delay }}
    create: true
    no_extra_spaces: true
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-86954-5
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271075
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_delay
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Dconf Update
  command: dconf update
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-86954-5
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271075
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.10
  - NIST-800-53-AC-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8
  - dconf_gnome_screensaver_lock_delay
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

Rule   Make sure that the dconf databases are up-to-date with regards to respective keyfiles   [ref]

By default, DConf uses a binary database as a data backend. The system-level database is compiled from keyfiles in the /etc/dconf/db/ directory by the 
dconf update
command. More specifically, content present in the following directories: 
/etc/dconf/db/distro.d
/etc/dconf/db/local.d
Rationale:
Unlike text-based keyfiles, the binary database is impossible to check by OVAL. Therefore, in order to evaluate dconf configuration, both have to be true at the same time - configuration files have to be compliant, and the database needs to be more recent than those keyfiles, which gives confidence that it reflects them.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_db_up_to_date
Identifiers:

CCE-87295-2

References:
disaCCI-000366
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(A)
pcidssReq-6.2
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
ccnreload_dconf_db
cisreload_dconf_db
pcidss48.2.8, 8.2
stigidRHEL-09-271090
stigrefSV-258028r991589_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm && { rpm --quiet -q kernel; }; then

dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:unknown
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-87295-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271090
  - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8
  - dconf_db_up_to_date
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Run dconf update
  ansible.builtin.command:
    cmd: dconf update
  when:
  - '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-87295-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271090
  - PCI-DSS-Req-6.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8
  - dconf_db_up_to_date
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy
Group   Sudo   Group contains 3 rules
[ref]   Sudo, which stands for "su 'do'", provides the ability to delegate authority to certain users, groups of users, or system administrators. When configured for system users and/or groups, Sudo can allow a user or group to execute privileged commands that normally only root is allowed to execute.

For more information on Sudo and addition Sudo configuration options, see https://www.sudo.ws.

Rule   Ensure Only Users Logged In To Real tty Can Execute Sudo - sudo use_pty   [ref]

The sudo use_pty tag, when specified, will only execute sudo commands from users logged in to a real tty. This should be enabled by making sure that the use_pty tag exists in /etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/.
Rationale:
Requiring that sudo commands be run in a pseudo-terminal can prevent an attacker from retaining access to the user's terminal after the main program has finished executing.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sudo_add_use_pty
Identifiers:

CCE-83538-9

References:
pcidssReq-10.2.5
anssiR39
ccnA.5.SEC-RHEL1
cis5.2.2
pcidss42.2.6, 2.2

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q sudo; then

if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then
    cp /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.bak
    if ! grep -P '^[\s]*Defaults[\s]*\buse_pty\b.*$' /etc/sudoers; then
        # sudoers file doesn't define Option use_pty
        echo "Defaults use_pty" >> /etc/sudoers
    fi
    
    # Check validity of sudoers and cleanup bak
    if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then
        rm -f /etc/sudoers.bak
    else
        echo "Fail to validate remediated /etc/sudoers, reverting to original file."
        mv /etc/sudoers.bak /etc/sudoers
        false
    fi
else
    echo "Skipping remediation, /etc/sudoers failed to validate"
    false
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83538-9
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sudo_add_use_pty

- name: Ensure use_pty is enabled in /etc/sudoers
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/sudoers
    regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults.*\buse_pty\b.*$
    line: Defaults use_pty
    validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s
  when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83538-9
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sudo_add_use_pty

Rule   Ensure Users Re-Authenticate for Privilege Escalation - sudo   [ref]

The sudo NOPASSWD and !authenticate option, when specified, allows a user to execute commands using sudo without having to authenticate. This should be disabled by making sure that NOPASSWD and/or !authenticate do not exist in /etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/."
Rationale:
Without re-authentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they do not have authorization.

When operating systems provide the capability to escalate a functional capability, it is critical that the user re-authenticate.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sudo_require_authentication
Identifiers:

CCE-83543-9

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 15, 16, 5
cobit5DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.10
disaCCI-002038, CCI-004895
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9
iso27001-2013A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3
nistIA-11, CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.AC-1, PR.AC-7
os-srgSRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00156
ccnA.5.SEC-RHEL2
cis5.2.4
pcidss42.2.6, 2.2

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict

for f in /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/* ; do
  if [ ! -e "$f" ] ; then
    continue
  fi
  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      # comment out "NOPASSWD" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i "s/^${entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"

    /usr/sbin/visudo -cf $f &> /dev/null || echo "Fail to validate $f with visudo"
  fi
done

for f in /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/* ; do
  if [ ! -e "$f" ] ; then
    continue
  fi
  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]+\!authenticate.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      # comment out "!authenticate" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i "s/^${entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"

    /usr/sbin/visudo -cf $f &> /dev/null || echo "Fail to validate $f with visudo"
  fi
done

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Find /etc/sudoers.d/ files
  ansible.builtin.find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sudoers.d/
  register: sudoers
  tags:
  - CCE-83543-9
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-11
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sudo_require_authentication

- name: Remove lines containing NOPASSWD from sudoers files
  ansible.builtin.replace:
    regexp: (^(?!#).*[\s]+NOPASSWD[\s]*\:.*$)
    replace: '# \g<1>'
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s
  with_items:
  - path: /etc/sudoers
  - '{{ sudoers.files }}'
  tags:
  - CCE-83543-9
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-11
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sudo_require_authentication

- name: Find /etc/sudoers.d/ files
  ansible.builtin.find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sudoers.d/
  register: sudoers
  tags:
  - CCE-83543-9
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-11
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sudo_require_authentication

- name: Remove lines containing !authenticate from sudoers files
  ansible.builtin.replace:
    regexp: (^(?!#).*[\s]+\!authenticate.*$)
    replace: '# \g<1>'
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s
  with_items:
  - path: /etc/sudoers
  - '{{ sudoers.files }}'
  tags:
  - CCE-83543-9
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-11
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sudo_require_authentication

Rule   Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command   [ref]

The sudo timestamp_timeout tag sets the amount of time sudo password prompt waits. The default timestamp_timeout value is 5 minutes. The timestamp_timeout should be configured by making sure that the timestamp_timeout tag exists in /etc/sudoers configuration file or any sudo configuration snippets in /etc/sudoers.d/. If the value is set to an integer less than 0, the user's time stamp will not expire and the user will not have to re-authenticate for privileged actions until the user's session is terminated.
Rationale:
Without re-authentication, users may access resources or perform tasks for which they do not have authorization.

When operating systems provide the capability to escalate a functional capability, it is critical that the user re-authenticate.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sudo_require_reauthentication
Identifiers:

CCE-90029-0

References:
disaCCI-004895
nistIA-11
os-srgSRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00156, SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00157, SRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00158
ccnA.5.SEC-RHEL2
cis5.2.5, 5.2.6
pcidss42.2.6, 2.2
stigidRHEL-09-432015
stigrefSV-258084r1015094_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q sudo; then

var_sudo_timestamp_timeout='5'


if grep -Px '^[\s]*Defaults.*timestamp_timeout[\s]*=.*' /etc/sudoers.d/*; then
    find /etc/sudoers.d/ -type f -exec sed -Ei "/^[[:blank:]]*Defaults.*timestamp_timeout[[:blank:]]*=.*/d" {} \;
fi

if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then
    cp /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.bak
    if ! grep -P '^[\s]*Defaults.*timestamp_timeout[\s]*=[\s]*[-]?\w+.*$' /etc/sudoers; then
        # sudoers file doesn't define Option timestamp_timeout
        echo "Defaults timestamp_timeout=${var_sudo_timestamp_timeout}" >> /etc/sudoers
    else
        # sudoers file defines Option timestamp_timeout, remediate wrong values if present
        if grep -qP "^[\s]*Defaults\s.*\btimestamp_timeout[\s]*=[\s]*(?!${var_sudo_timestamp_timeout}\b)[-]?\w+\b.*$" /etc/sudoers; then
            sed -Ei "s/(^[[:blank:]]*Defaults.*timestamp_timeout[[:blank:]]*=)[[:blank:]]*[-]?\w+(.*$)/\1${var_sudo_timestamp_timeout}\2/" /etc/sudoers
        fi
    fi
    
    # Check validity of sudoers and cleanup bak
    if /usr/sbin/visudo -qcf /etc/sudoers; then
        rm -f /etc/sudoers.bak
    else
        echo "Fail to validate remediated /etc/sudoers, reverting to original file."
        mv /etc/sudoers.bak /etc/sudoers
        false
    fi
else
    echo "Skipping remediation, /etc/sudoers failed to validate"
    false
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-90029-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-432015
  - NIST-800-53-IA-11
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sudo_require_reauthentication
- name: XCCDF Value var_sudo_timestamp_timeout # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_sudo_timestamp_timeout: !!str 5
  tags:
    - always

- name: Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command - Find /etc/sudoers.d/*
    files containing 'Defaults timestamp_timeout'
  ansible.builtin.find:
    path: /etc/sudoers.d
    patterns: '*'
    contains: ^[\s]*Defaults\s.*\btimestamp_timeout[\s]*=.*
  register: sudoers_d_defaults_timestamp_timeout
  when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-90029-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-432015
  - NIST-800-53-IA-11
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sudo_require_reauthentication

- name: Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command - Remove 'Defaults timestamp_timeout'
    from /etc/sudoers.d/* files
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults\s.*\btimestamp_timeout[\s]*=.*
    state: absent
  with_items: '{{ sudoers_d_defaults_timestamp_timeout.files }}'
  when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-90029-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-432015
  - NIST-800-53-IA-11
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sudo_require_reauthentication

- name: Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command - Ensure timestamp_timeout
    has the appropriate value in /etc/sudoers
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    path: /etc/sudoers
    regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults\s(.*)\btimestamp_timeout[\s]*=[\s]*[-]?\w+\b(.*)$
    line: Defaults \1timestamp_timeout={{ var_sudo_timestamp_timeout }}\2
    validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s
    backrefs: true
  register: edit_sudoers_timestamp_timeout_option
  when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-90029-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-432015
  - NIST-800-53-IA-11
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sudo_require_reauthentication

- name: Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command - Enable timestamp_timeout
    option with correct value in /etc/sudoers
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    path: /etc/sudoers
    line: Defaults timestamp_timeout={{ var_sudo_timestamp_timeout }}
    validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s
  when:
  - '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - |
    edit_sudoers_timestamp_timeout_option is defined and not edit_sudoers_timestamp_timeout_option.changed
  tags:
  - CCE-90029-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-432015
  - NIST-800-53-IA-11
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sudo_require_reauthentication

- name: Require Re-Authentication When Using the sudo Command - Remove timestamp_timeout
    wrong values in /etc/sudoers
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    path: /etc/sudoers
    regexp: ^[\s]*Defaults\s.*\btimestamp_timeout[\s]*=[\s]*(?!{{ var_sudo_timestamp_timeout
      }}\b)[-]?\w+\b.*$
    state: absent
    validate: /usr/sbin/visudo -cf %s
  when: '"sudo" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-90029-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-432015
  - NIST-800-53-IA-11
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sudo_require_reauthentication
Group   Account and Access Control   Group contains 10 groups and 23 rules
[ref]   In traditional Unix security, if an attacker gains shell access to a certain login account, they can perform any action or access any file to which that account has access. Therefore, making it more difficult for unauthorized people to gain shell access to accounts, particularly to privileged accounts, is a necessary part of securing a system. This section introduces mechanisms for restricting access to accounts under Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9.
Group   Warning Banners for System Accesses   Group contains 1 group and 5 rules
[ref]   Each system should expose as little information about itself as possible.

System banners, which are typically displayed just before a login prompt, give out information about the service or the host's operating system. This might include the distribution name and the system kernel version, and the particular version of a network service. This information can assist intruders in gaining access to the system as it can reveal whether the system is running vulnerable software. Most network services can be configured to limit what information is displayed.

Many organizations implement security policies that require a system banner provide notice of the system's ownership, provide warning to unauthorized users, and remind authorized users of their consent to monitoring.
Group   Implement a GUI Warning Banner   Group contains 2 rules

Rule   Enable GNOME3 Login Warning Banner   [ref]

In the default graphical environment, displaying a login warning banner in the GNOME Display Manager's login screen can be enabled on the login screen by setting banner-message-enable to true.

To enable, add or edit banner-message-enable to /etc/dconf/db/distro.d/00-security-settings. For example: 
[org/gnome/login-screen]
banner-message-enable=true
Once the setting has been added, add a lock to /etc/dconf/db/distro.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock to prevent user modification. For example: 
/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable
After the settings have been set, run dconf update. The banner text must also be set.
Rationale:
Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.

For U.S. Government systems, system use notifications are required only for access via login interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_dconf_gnome_banner_enabled
Identifiers:

CCE-87599-7

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 15, 16
cobit5DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10
cui3.1.9
disaCCI-001387, CCI-001384, CCI-000048, CCI-001386, CCI-001388, CCI-001385
isa-62443-20094.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9
iso27001-2013A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3
nistAC-8(a), AC-8(b), AC-8(c)
nist-csfPR.AC-7
os-srgSRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006, SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088
ccnA.11.SEC-RHEL4
cis1.8.2
stigidRHEL-09-271010, RHEL-09-271015
stigrefSV-258012r1014855_rule, SV-258013r958390_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q gdm; then

# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
# If files contain ibus or distro, ignore them.
# The assignment assumes that individual filenames don't contain :
readarray -t SETTINGSFILES < <(grep -r "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
                                | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|distro.d' | cut -d":" -f1)
DCONFFILE="/etc/dconf/db/distro.d/00-security-settings"
DBDIR="/etc/dconf/db/distro.d"

mkdir -p "${DBDIR}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [ "${#SETTINGSFILES[@]}" -ne 0 ]
then
    if grep -q "^\\s*banner-message-enable\\s*=" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    then
        
        sed -Ei "s/(^\s*)banner-message-enable(\s*=)/#\1banner-message-enable\2/g" "${SETTINGSFILES[@]}"
    fi
fi

[ ! -z "${DCONFFILE}" ] && echo "" >> "${DCONFFILE}"
if ! grep -q "\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
    printf '%s\n' "[org/gnome/login-screen]" >> ${DCONFFILE}
fi

escaped_value="$(sed -e 's/\\/\\\\/g' <<< "true")"
if grep -q "^\\s*banner-message-enable\\s*=" "${DCONFFILE}"
then
        sed -i "s/\\s*banner-message-enable\\s*=\\s*.*/banner-message-enable=${escaped_value}/g" "${DCONFFILE}"
    else
        sed -i "\\|\\[org/gnome/login-screen\\]|a\\banner-message-enable=${escaped_value}" "${DCONFFILE}"
fi
dconf update
# Check for setting in any of the DConf db directories
LOCKFILES=$(grep -r "^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$" "/etc/dconf/db/" \
            | grep -v 'distro\|ibus\|distro.d' | grep ":" | cut -d":" -f1)
LOCKSFOLDER="/etc/dconf/db/distro.d/locks"

mkdir -p "${LOCKSFOLDER}"

# Comment out the configurations in databases different from the target one
if [[ ! -z "${LOCKFILES}" ]]
then
    sed -i -E "s|^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$|#&|" "${LOCKFILES[@]}"
fi

if ! grep -qr "^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$" /etc/dconf/db/distro.d/
then
    echo "/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable" >> "/etc/dconf/db/distro.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock"
fi
dconf update

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:unknown
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-87599-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271010
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.9
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c)
  - dconf_gnome_banner_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Enable GNOME3 Login Warning Banner
  ini_file:
    dest: /etc/dconf/db/distro.d/00-security-settings
    section: org/gnome/login-screen
    option: banner-message-enable
    value: 'true'
    create: true
    no_extra_spaces: true
  when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-87599-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271010
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.9
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c)
  - dconf_gnome_banner_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Prevent user modification of GNOME banner-message-enabled
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/dconf/db/distro.d/locks/00-security-settings-lock
    regexp: ^/org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable$
    line: /org/gnome/login-screen/banner-message-enable
    create: true
  when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-87599-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271010
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.9
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c)
  - dconf_gnome_banner_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

- name: Dconf Update
  command: dconf update
  when: '"gdm" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-87599-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271010
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-271015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.9
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c)
  - dconf_gnome_banner_enabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

Rule   Modify the System Login Banner   [ref]

To configure the system login banner edit /etc/issue. Replace the default text with a message compliant with the local site policy or a legal disclaimer. The DoD required text is either:

You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only. By using this IS (which includes any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions:
-The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations.
-At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS.
-Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose.
-This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access controls) to protect USG interests -- not for your personal benefit or privacy.
-Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of privileged communications, or work product, related to personal representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and confidential. See User Agreement for details.

OR:

I've read & consent to terms in IS user agreem't.
Rationale:
Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.

System use notifications are required only for access via login interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_banner_etc_issue
Identifiers:

CCE-83557-9

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 15, 16
cobit5DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10
cui3.1.9
disaCCI-001387, CCI-001384, CCI-000048, CCI-001386, CCI-001388, CCI-001385
isa-62443-20094.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9
iso27001-2013A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3
nistAC-8(a), AC-8(c)
nist-csfPR.AC-7
os-srgSRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006, SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088
ccnA.11.SEC-RHEL4
stigidRHEL-09-211020
stigrefSV-257779r958390_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

login_banner_text='^(Authorized[\s\n]+users[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.|^(?!.*(\\|fedora|rhel|sle|ubuntu)).*)$'


# Multiple regexes transform the banner regex into a usable banner
# 0 - Remove anchors around the banner text
login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/^\^\(.*\)\$$/\1/g')
# 1 - Keep only the first banners if there are multiple
#    (dod_banners contains the long and short banner)
login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/^(\(.*\.\)|.*)$/\1/g')
# 2 - Add spaces ' '. (Transforms regex for "space or newline" into a " ")
login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/\[\\s\\n\]+/ /g')
# 3 - Adds newlines. (Transforms "(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\n)+)" into "\n")
login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\\\n)+)/\n/g')
# 4 - Remove any leftover backslash. (From any parethesis in the banner, for example).
login_banner_text=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | sed 's/\\//g')
formatted=$(echo "$login_banner_text" | fold -sw 80)
cat <<EOF >/etc/issue
$formatted
EOF

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
metadata:
  labels:
    machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: master
    machineconfiguration.openshift.io/role: worker
  name: 75-banner-etc-issue
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,You%20are%20accessing%20a%20U.S.%20Government%20%28USG%29%20Information%20System%20%28IS%29%20that%20is%20%0Aprovided%20for%20USG-authorized%20use%20only.%20By%20using%20this%20IS%20%28which%20includes%20any%20%0Adevice%20attached%20to%20this%20IS%29%2C%20you%20consent%20to%20the%20following%20conditions%3A%0A%0A-The%20USG%20routinely%20intercepts%20and%20monitors%20communications%20on%20this%20IS%20for%20%0Apurposes%20including%2C%20but%20not%20limited%20to%2C%20penetration%20testing%2C%20COMSEC%20monitoring%2C%20%0Anetwork%20operations%20and%20defense%2C%20personnel%20misconduct%20%28PM%29%2C%20law%20enforcement%20%0A%28LE%29%2C%20and%20counterintelligence%20%28CI%29%20investigations.%0A%0A-At%20any%20time%2C%20the%20USG%20may%20inspect%20and%20seize%20data%20stored%20on%20this%20IS.%0A%0A-Communications%20using%2C%20or%20data%20stored%20on%2C%20this%20IS%20are%20not%20private%2C%20are%20subject%20%0Ato%20routine%20monitoring%2C%20interception%2C%20and%20search%2C%20and%20may%20be%20disclosed%20or%20used%20%0Afor%20any%20USG-authorized%20purpose.%0A%0A-This%20IS%20includes%20security%20measures%20%28e.g.%2C%20authentication%20and%20access%20controls%29%20%0Ato%20protect%20USG%20interests--not%20for%20your%20personal%20benefit%20or%20privacy.%0A%0A-Notwithstanding%20the%20above%2C%20using%20this%20IS%20does%20not%20constitute%20consent%20to%20PM%2C%20LE%20%0Aor%20CI%20investigative%20searching%20or%20monitoring%20of%20the%20content%20of%20privileged%20%0Acommunications%2C%20or%20work%20product%2C%20related%20to%20personal%20representation%20or%20services%20%0Aby%20attorneys%2C%20psychotherapists%2C%20or%20clergy%2C%20and%20their%20assistants.%20Such%20%0Acommunications%20and%20work%20product%20are%20private%20and%20confidential.%20See%20User%20%0AAgreement%20for%20details.
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/issue.d/legal-notice
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:unknown
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83557-9
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-211020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.9
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c)
  - banner_etc_issue
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value login_banner_text # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    login_banner_text: !!str ^(Authorized[\s\n]+users[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.|^(?!.*(\\|fedora|rhel|sle|ubuntu)).*)$
  tags:
    - always

- name: Modify the System Login Banner - Ensure Correct Banner
  copy:
    dest: /etc/issue
    content: '{{ login_banner_text | regex_replace("^\^(.*)\$$", "\1") | regex_replace("^\((.*\.)\|.*\)$",
      "\1") | regex_replace("\[\\s\\n\]\+"," ") | regex_replace("\(\?:\[\\n\]\+\|\(\?:\\\\n\)\+\)",
      "\n") | regex_replace("\\", "") | wordwrap() }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83557-9
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-211020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.9
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c)
  - banner_etc_issue
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

Rule   Modify the System Login Banner for Remote Connections   [ref]

To configure the system login banner edit /etc/issue.net. Replace the default text with a message compliant with the local site policy or a legal disclaimer. The DoD required text is either:

You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only. By using this IS (which includes any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions:
-The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations.
-At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS.
-Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose.
-This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access controls) to protect USG interests -- not for your personal benefit or privacy.
-Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of privileged communications, or work product, related to personal representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and confidential. See User Agreement for details.

OR:

I've read & consent to terms in IS user agreem't.
Rationale:
Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.

System use notifications are required only for access via login interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_banner_etc_issue_net
Identifiers:

CCE-86148-4

References:
disaCCI-000048, CCI-001384, CCI-001385, CCI-001386, CCI-001387, CCI-001388
os-srgSRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006, SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088
ccnA.11.SEC-RHEL4

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

remote_login_banner_text='^(Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.|^(?!.*(\\|fedora|rhel|sle|ubuntu)).*)$'


# Multiple regexes transform the banner regex into a usable banner
# 0 - Remove anchors around the banner text
remote_login_banner_text=$(echo "$remote_login_banner_text" | sed 's/^\^\(.*\)\$$/\1/g')
# 1 - Keep only the first banners if there are multiple
#    (dod_banners contains the long and short banner)
remote_login_banner_text=$(echo "$remote_login_banner_text" | sed 's/^(\(.*\.\)|.*)$/\1/g')
# 2 - Add spaces ' '. (Transforms regex for "space or newline" into a " ")
remote_login_banner_text=$(echo "$remote_login_banner_text" | sed 's/\[\\s\\n\]+/ /g')
# 3 - Adds newlines. (Transforms "(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\n)+)" into "\n")
remote_login_banner_text=$(echo "$remote_login_banner_text" | sed 's/(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\\\n)+)/\n/g')
# 4 - Remove any leftover backslash. (From any parethesis in the banner, for example).
remote_login_banner_text=$(echo "$remote_login_banner_text" | sed 's/\\//g')
formatted=$(echo "$remote_login_banner_text" | fold -sw 80)

cat <<EOF >/etc/issue.net
$formatted
EOF

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:unknown
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-86148-4
  - banner_etc_issue_net
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value remote_login_banner_text # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    remote_login_banner_text: !!str ^(Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.|^(?!.*(\\|fedora|rhel|sle|ubuntu)).*)$
  tags:
    - always

- name: Modify the System Login Banner for Remote Connections - ensure correct banner
  copy:
    dest: /etc/issue.net
    content: '{{ remote_login_banner_text | regex_replace("^\^(.*)\$$", "\1") | regex_replace("^\((.*\.)\|.*\)$",
      "\1") | regex_replace("\[\\s\\n\]\+"," ") | regex_replace("\(\?:\[\\n\]\+\|\(\?:\\\\n\)\+\)",
      "\n") | regex_replace("\\", "") | wordwrap() }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86148-4
  - banner_etc_issue_net
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy

Rule   Modify the System Message of the Day Banner   [ref]

To configure the system message banner edit /etc/motd. Replace the default text with a message compliant with the local site policy or a legal disclaimer. The DoD required text is either:

You are accessing a U.S. Government (USG) Information System (IS) that is provided for USG-authorized use only. By using this IS (which includes any device attached to this IS), you consent to the following conditions:
-The USG routinely intercepts and monitors communications on this IS for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personnel misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations.
-At any time, the USG may inspect and seize data stored on this IS.
-Communications using, or data stored on, this IS are not private, are subject to routine monitoring, interception, and search, and may be disclosed or used for any USG-authorized purpose.
-This IS includes security measures (e.g., authentication and access controls) to protect USG interests -- not for your personal benefit or privacy.
-Notwithstanding the above, using this IS does not constitute consent to PM, LE or CI investigative searching or monitoring of the content of privileged communications, or work product, related to personal representation or services by attorneys, psychotherapists, or clergy, and their assistants. Such communications and work product are private and confidential. See User Agreement for details.

OR:

I've read & consent to terms in IS user agreem't.
Rationale:
Display of a standardized and approved use notification before granting access to the operating system ensures privacy and security notification verbiage used is consistent with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance.

System use notifications are required only for access via login interfaces with human users and are not required when such human interfaces do not exist.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_banner_etc_motd
Identifiers:

CCE-83559-5

References:
ccnA.11.SEC-RHEL4

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

motd_banner_text='^(Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.|^(?!.*(\\|fedora|rhel|sle|ubuntu)).*)$'


# Multiple regexes transform the banner regex into a usable banner
# 0 - Remove anchors around the banner text
motd_banner_text=$(echo "$motd_banner_text" | sed 's/^\^\(.*\)\$$/\1/g')
# 1 - Keep only the first banners if there are multiple
#    (dod_banners contains the long and short banner)
motd_banner_text=$(echo "$motd_banner_text" | sed 's/^(\(.*\.\)|.*)$/\1/g')
# 2 - Add spaces ' '. (Transforms regex for "space or newline" into a " ")
motd_banner_text=$(echo "$motd_banner_text" | sed 's/\[\\s\\n\]+/ /g')
# 3 - Adds newlines. (Transforms "(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\n)+)" into "\n")
motd_banner_text=$(echo "$motd_banner_text" | sed 's/(?:\[\\n\]+|(?:\\\\n)+)/\n/g')
# 4 - Remove any leftover backslash. (From any parethesis in the banner, for example).
motd_banner_text=$(echo "$motd_banner_text" | sed 's/\\//g')
formatted=$(echo "$motd_banner_text" | fold -sw 80)

cat <<EOF >/etc/motd
$formatted
EOF

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:unknown
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83559-5
  - banner_etc_motd
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value motd_banner_text # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    motd_banner_text: !!str ^(Authorized[\s\n]+uses[\s\n]+only\.[\s\n]+All[\s\n]+activity[\s\n]+may[\s\n]+be[\s\n]+monitored[\s\n]+and[\s\n]+reported\.|^(?!.*(\\|fedora|rhel|sle|ubuntu)).*)$
  tags:
    - always

- name: Modify the System Message of the Day Banner - ensure correct banner
  copy:
    dest: /etc/motd
    content: '{{ motd_banner_text | regex_replace("^\^(.*)\$$", "\1") | regex_replace("^\((.*\.)\|.*\)$",
      "\1") | regex_replace("\[\\s\\n\]\+"," ") | regex_replace("\(\?:\[\\n\]\+\|\(\?:\\\\n\)\+\)",
      "\n") | regex_replace("\\", "") | wordwrap() }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83559-5
  - banner_etc_motd
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - unknown_strategy
Group   Protect Accounts by Configuring PAM   Group contains 3 groups and 6 rules
[ref]   PAM, or Pluggable Authentication Modules, is a system which implements modular authentication for Linux programs. PAM provides a flexible and configurable architecture for authentication, and it should be configured to minimize exposure to unnecessary risk. This section contains guidance on how to accomplish that.

PAM is implemented as a set of shared objects which are loaded and invoked whenever an application wishes to authenticate a user. Typically, the application must be running as root in order to take advantage of PAM, because PAM's modules often need to be able to access sensitive stores of account information, such as /etc/shadow. Traditional privileged network listeners (e.g. sshd) or SUID programs (e.g. sudo) already meet this requirement. An SUID root application, userhelper, is provided so that programs which are not SUID or privileged themselves can still take advantage of PAM.

PAM looks in the directory /etc/pam.d for application-specific configuration information. For instance, if the program login attempts to authenticate a user, then PAM's libraries follow the instructions in the file /etc/pam.d/login to determine what actions should be taken.

One very important file in /etc/pam.d is /etc/pam.d/system-auth. This file, which is included by many other PAM configuration files, defines 'default' system authentication measures. Modifying this file is a good way to make far-reaching authentication changes, for instance when implementing a centralized authentication service.
Warning:  Be careful when making changes to PAM's configuration files. The syntax for these files is complex, and modifications can have unexpected consequences. The default configurations shipped with applications should be sufficient for most users.
Warning:  Running authconfig or system-config-authentication will re-write the PAM configuration files, destroying any manually made changes and replacing them with a series of system defaults. One reference to the configuration file syntax can be found at https://fossies.org/linux/Linux-PAM-docs/doc/sag/Linux-PAM_SAG.pdf.
Group   Set Password Quality Requirements   Group contains 1 group and 3 rules
[ref]   The default pam_pwquality PAM module provides strength checking for passwords. It performs a number of checks, such as making sure passwords are not similar to dictionary words, are of at least a certain length, are not the previous password reversed, and are not simply a change of case from the previous password. It can also require passwords to be in certain character classes. The pam_pwquality module is the preferred way of configuring password requirements.

The man pages pam_pwquality(8) provide information on the capabilities and configuration of each.
Group   Set Password Quality Requirements with pam_pwquality   Group contains 3 rules
[ref]   The pam_pwquality PAM module can be configured to meet requirements for a variety of policies.

For example, to configure pam_pwquality to require at least one uppercase character, lowercase character, digit, and other (special) character, make sure that pam_pwquality exists in /etc/pam.d/system-auth: 
password    requisite     pam_pwquality.so try_first_pass local_users_only retry=3 authtok_type=
If no such line exists, add one as the first line of the password section in /etc/pam.d/system-auth. Next, modify the settings in /etc/security/pwquality.conf to match the following: 
difok = 4
minlen = 14
dcredit = -1
ucredit = -1
lcredit = -1
ocredit = -1
maxrepeat = 3
The arguments can be modified to ensure compliance with your organization's security policy. Discussion of each parameter follows.

Rule   Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories   [ref]

The pam_pwquality module's minclass parameter controls requirements for usage of different character classes, or types, of character that must exist in a password before it is considered valid. For example, setting this value to three (3) requires that any password must have characters from at least three different categories in order to be approved. The default value is zero (0), meaning there are no required classes. There are four categories available: 
* Upper-case characters
* Lower-case characters
* Digits
* Special characters (for example, punctuation)
Modify the minclass setting in /etc/security/pwquality.conf entry to require 4 differing categories of characters when changing passwords.
Rationale:
Use of a complex password helps to increase the time and resources required to compromise the password. Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks.

Password complexity is one factor of several that determines how long it takes to crack a password. The more complex the password, the greater the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.

Requiring a minimum number of character categories makes password guessing attacks more difficult by ensuring a larger search space.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_password_pam_minclass
Identifiers:

CCE-83563-7

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 15, 16, 5
cobit5DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.10
disaCCI-004066
isa-62443-20094.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1
ism0421, 0422, 0431, 0974, 1173, 1401, 1504, 1505, 1546, 1557, 1558, 1559, 1560, 1561
iso27001-2013A.18.1.4, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3
nistIA-5(c), IA-5(1)(a), CM-6(a), IA-5(4)
nist-csfPR.AC-1, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7
os-srgSRG-OS-000072-GPOS-00040
anssiR68
ccnA.11.SEC-RHEL3
cis5.3.3.2.3
stigidRHEL-09-611130
stigrefSV-258115r1015114_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q pam; then

var_password_pam_minclass='4'








# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^minclass")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_minclass"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^minclass\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^minclass\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
else
    if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
    fi
    cce="CCE-83563-7"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83563-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611130
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - accounts_password_pam_minclass
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_minclass # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_password_pam_minclass: !!str 4
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Different Categories -
    Ensure PAM variable minclass is set accordingly
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    create: true
    dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf
    regexp: ^#?\s*minclass
    line: minclass = {{ var_password_pam_minclass }}
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83563-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611130
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - accounts_password_pam_minclass
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length   [ref]

The pam_pwquality module's minlen parameter controls requirements for minimum characters required in a password. Add minlen=14 after pam_pwquality to set minimum password length requirements.
Rationale:
The shorter the password, the lower the number of possible combinations that need to be tested before the password is compromised.
Password complexity, or strength, is a measure of the effectiveness of a password in resisting attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks. Password length is one factor of several that helps to determine strength and how long it takes to crack a password. Use of more characters in a password helps to exponentially increase the time and/or resources required to compromise the password.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_password_pam_minlen
Identifiers:

CCE-83579-3

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 15, 16, 5
cjis5.6.2.1.1
cobit5DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.10
disaCCI-004066
isa-62443-20094.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1
ism0421, 0422, 0431, 0974, 1173, 1401, 1504, 1505, 1546, 1557, 1558, 1559, 1560, 1561
iso27001-2013A.18.1.4, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3
nistIA-5(c), IA-5(1)(a), CM-6(a), IA-5(4)
nist-csfPR.AC-1, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7
osppFMT_SMF_EXT.1
pcidssReq-8.2.3
os-srgSRG-OS-000078-GPOS-00046
anssiR31, R68
ccnA.11.SEC-RHEL3
cis5.3.3.2.2
pcidss48.3.6, 8.3
stigidRHEL-09-611090
stigrefSV-258107r1015107_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q pam; then

var_password_pam_minlen='14'








# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^minlen")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_minlen"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^minlen\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^minlen\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
else
    if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
    fi
    cce="CCE-83579-3"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83579-3
  - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611090
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6
  - accounts_password_pam_minlen
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_minlen # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_password_pam_minlen: !!str 14
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Minimum Length - Ensure PAM variable
    minlen is set accordingly
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    create: true
    dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf
    regexp: ^#?\s*minlen
    line: minlen = {{ var_password_pam_minlen }}
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83579-3
  - CJIS-5.6.2.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611090
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.6
  - accounts_password_pam_minlen
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted Per-Session   [ref]

To configure the number of retry prompts that are permitted per-session: Edit the /etc/security/pwquality.conf to include retry=3 , or a lower value if site policy is more restrictive. The DoD requirement is a maximum of 3 prompts per session.
Rationale:
Setting the password retry prompts that are permitted on a per-session basis to a low value requires some software, such as SSH, to re-connect. This can slow down and draw additional attention to some types of password-guessing attacks. Note that this is different from account lockout, which is provided by the pam_faillock module.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_password_pam_retry
Identifiers:

CCE-83569-4

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 15, 16, 3, 5, 9
cjis5.5.3
cobit5BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.10
disaCCI-004066
isa-62443-20094.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.18.1.4, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3
nistCM-6(a), AC-7(a), IA-5(4)
nist-csfPR.AC-1, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, PR.IP-1
os-srgSRG-OS-000069-GPOS-00037, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR68
ccnA.11.SEC-RHEL3
stigidRHEL-09-611010
stigrefSV-258091r1015097_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q pam; then

var_password_pam_retry='3'


# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^retry")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_pam_retry"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^retry\\>" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^retry\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
else
    if [[ -s "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
    fi
    cce="CCE-83569-4"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/security/pwquality.conf" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/security/pwquality.conf"
fi
	
		if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/password-auth" ] ; then
    PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/password-auth"
    if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
        
        if ! authselect check; then
        echo "
        authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
        This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
        It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available.
        In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended."
        exit 1
        fi

        CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }')
        # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features.
        if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then
            ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }')
            authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE
            CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening"
            
            authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
            authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE
            for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do
                authselect enable-feature $feature;
            done
            
            authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
        fi
        PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/password-auth")
        PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME"

        authselect apply-changes -b
    fi
    
if grep -qP "^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwquality.so\s.*\bretry\b" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then
    sed -i -E --follow-symlinks "s/(.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bretry\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
fi
    if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
        
        authselect apply-changes -b
    fi
else
    echo "/etc/pam.d/password-auth was not found" >&2
fi
	
		if [ -e "/etc/pam.d/system-auth" ] ; then
    PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth"
    if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
        
        if ! authselect check; then
        echo "
        authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
        This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
        It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available.
        In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended."
        exit 1
        fi

        CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }')
        # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features.
        if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then
            ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }')
            authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE
            CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening"
            
            authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
            authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE
            for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do
                authselect enable-feature $feature;
            done
            
            authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
        fi
        PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "/etc/pam.d/system-auth")
        PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME"

        authselect apply-changes -b
    fi
    
if grep -qP "^\s*password\s.*\bpam_pwquality.so\s.*\bretry\b" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then
    sed -i -E --follow-symlinks "s/(.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bretry\b=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
fi
    if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
        
        authselect apply-changes -b
    fi
else
    echo "/etc/pam.d/system-auth was not found" >&2
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83569-4
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611010
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - accounts_password_pam_retry
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
- name: XCCDF Value var_password_pam_retry # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_password_pam_retry: !!str 3
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure PAM variable retry is set accordingly
  ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
    create: true
    dest: /etc/security/pwquality.conf
    regexp: ^\s*retry
    line: retry = {{ var_password_pam_retry }}
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83569-4
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611010
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - accounts_password_pam_retry
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted
    Per-Session - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth file is present
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth
  register: result_pam_file_present
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83569-4
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611010
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - accounts_password_pam_retry
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted
    Per-Session - Check the proper remediation for the system
  block:

  - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
      Permitted Per-Session - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact
    ansible.builtin.set_fact:
      pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth

  - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
      Permitted Per-Session - Check if system relies on authselect tool
    ansible.builtin.stat:
      path: /usr/bin/authselect
    register: result_authselect_present

  - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
      Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect
      is present
    block:

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Check integrity of authselect current profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect check
      register: result_authselect_check_cmd
      changed_when: false
      failed_when: false

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Informative message based on the authselect integrity
        check result
      ansible.builtin.assert:
        that:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0
        fail_msg:
        - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
        - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was
          not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
        - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
          is available.
        - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific
          demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended.
        success_msg:
        - authselect integrity check passed

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Get authselect current profile
      ansible.builtin.shell:
        cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }'
      register: result_authselect_profile
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/")

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local
        fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/")

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Get authselect current features to also enable them
        in the custom profile
      ansible.builtin.shell:
        cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
      register: result_authselect_features
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Check if any custom profile with the same name was
        already created
      ansible.builtin.stat:
        path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}
      register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current
        profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile
          }}
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }}
      register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }}
      loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}'
      register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_features is not skipped
      - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the
        custom authselect profile
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path
          | basename }}
    when:
    - result_authselect_present.stat.exists

  - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
      Permitted Per-Session - Define a fact for control already filtered in case filters
      are used
    ansible.builtin.set_fact:
      pam_module_control: ''

  - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
      Permitted Per-Session - Ensure the "retry" option from "pam_pwquality.so" is
      not present in {{ pam_file_path }}
    ansible.builtin.replace:
      dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
      regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bretry\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*)
      replace: \1\2
    register: result_pam_option_removal

  - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
      Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
    when:
    - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
    - result_pam_option_removal is changed
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CCE-83569-4
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611010
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - accounts_password_pam_retry
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted
    Per-Session - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file is present
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
  register: result_pam_file_present
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83569-4
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611010
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - accounts_password_pam_retry
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts Permitted
    Per-Session - Check the proper remediation for the system
  block:

  - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
      Permitted Per-Session - Define the PAM file to be edited as a local fact
    ansible.builtin.set_fact:
      pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth

  - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
      Permitted Per-Session - Check if system relies on authselect tool
    ansible.builtin.stat:
      path: /usr/bin/authselect
    register: result_authselect_present

  - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
      Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect custom profile is used if authselect
      is present
    block:

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Check integrity of authselect current profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect check
      register: result_authselect_check_cmd
      changed_when: false
      failed_when: false

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Informative message based on the authselect integrity
        check result
      ansible.builtin.assert:
        that:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0
        fail_msg:
        - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
        - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was
          not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
        - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
          is available.
        - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific
          demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended.
        success_msg:
        - authselect integrity check passed

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Get authselect current profile
      ansible.builtin.shell:
        cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }'
      register: result_authselect_profile
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Define the current authselect profile as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/")

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Define the new authselect custom profile as a local
        fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/")

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Get authselect current features to also enable them
        in the custom profile
      ansible.builtin.shell:
        cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
      register: result_authselect_features
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Check if any custom profile with the same name was
        already created
      ansible.builtin.stat:
        path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}
      register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Create an authselect custom profile based on the current
        profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile
          }}
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Ensure the authselect custom profile is selected
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }}
      register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Restore the authselect features in the custom profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }}
      loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}'
      register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_features is not skipped
      - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped

    - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
        Permitted Per-Session - Change the PAM file to be edited according to the
        custom authselect profile
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path
          | basename }}
    when:
    - result_authselect_present.stat.exists

  - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
      Permitted Per-Session - Define a fact for control already filtered in case filters
      are used
    ansible.builtin.set_fact:
      pam_module_control: ''

  - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
      Permitted Per-Session - Ensure the "retry" option from "pam_pwquality.so" is
      not present in {{ pam_file_path }}
    ansible.builtin.replace:
      dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
      regexp: (.*password.*pam_pwquality.so.*)\bretry\b=?[0-9a-zA-Z]*(.*)
      replace: \1\2
    register: result_pam_option_removal

  - name: Ensure PAM Enforces Password Requirements - Authentication Retry Prompts
      Permitted Per-Session - Ensure authselect changes are applied
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
    when:
    - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
    - result_pam_option_removal is changed
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CCE-83569-4
  - CJIS-5.5.3
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611010
  - NIST-800-53-AC-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(4)
  - accounts_password_pam_retry
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
Group   Set Password Hashing Algorithm   Group contains 3 rules
[ref]   The system's default algorithm for storing password hashes in /etc/shadow is SHA-512. This can be configured in several locations.

Rule   Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/login.defs   [ref]

In /etc/login.defs, add or update the following line to ensure the system will use SHA512 as the hashing algorithm: 
ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512
Rationale:
Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard method for protecting passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. Passwords that are encrypted with a weak algorithm are no more protected than if they are kept in plain text.

Using a stronger hashing algorithm makes password cracking attacks more difficult.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_set_password_hashing_algorithm_logindefs
Identifiers:

CCE-90590-1

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 15, 16, 5
cjis5.6.2.2
cobit5DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.10
cui3.13.11
disaCCI-004062
isa-62443-20094.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1
ism0418, 1055, 1402
iso27001-2013A.18.1.4, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3
nistIA-5(c), IA-5(1)(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.AC-1, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7
pcidssReq-8.2.1
os-srgSRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041
ccnA.19.SEC-RHEL3
cis5.4.1.4
pcidss48.3.2, 8.3
stigidRHEL-09-611140
stigrefSV-258117r1015116_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q shadow-utils; then

var_password_hashing_algorithm='SHA512'


# Allow multiple algorithms, but choose the first one for remediation
#
var_password_hashing_algorithm="$(echo $var_password_hashing_algorithm | cut -d \| -f 1)"

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^ENCRYPT_METHOD")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_password_hashing_algorithm"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^ENCRYPT_METHOD\\>" "/etc/login.defs"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^ENCRYPT_METHOD\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "/etc/login.defs"
else
    if [[ -s "/etc/login.defs" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "/etc/login.defs" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "/etc/login.defs"
    fi
    cce="CCE-90590-1"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "/etc/login.defs" >> "/etc/login.defs"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "/etc/login.defs"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-90590-1
  - CJIS-5.6.2.2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611140
  - NIST-800-171-3.13.11
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - set_password_hashing_algorithm_logindefs
- name: XCCDF Value var_password_hashing_algorithm # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_password_hashing_algorithm: !!str SHA512
  tags:
    - always

- name: Set Password Hashing Algorithm in /etc/login.defs
  lineinfile:
    dest: /etc/login.defs
    regexp: ^#?ENCRYPT_METHOD
    line: ENCRYPT_METHOD {{ var_password_hashing_algorithm.split('|')[0] }}
    state: present
    create: true
  when: '"shadow-utils" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-90590-1
  - CJIS-5.6.2.2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611140
  - NIST-800-171-3.13.11
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - set_password_hashing_algorithm_logindefs

Rule   Set PAM''s Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth   [ref]

The PAM system service can be configured to only store encrypted representations of passwords. In /etc/pam.d/password-auth, the password section of the file controls which PAM modules to execute during a password change. Set the pam_unix.so module in the password section to include the option sha512 and no other hashing algorithms as shown below: 
password    sufficient    pam_unix.so sha512
          other arguments...

This will help ensure that new passwords for local users will be stored using the sha512 algorithm.
Warning:  The hashing algorithms to be used with pam_unix.so are defined with independent module options. There are at least 7 possible algorithms and likely more algorithms will be introduced along the time. Due the the number of options and its possible combinations, the use of multiple hashing algorithm options may bring unexpected behaviors to the system. For this reason the check will pass only when one hashing algorithm option is defined and is aligned to the "var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam" variable. The remediation will ensure the correct option and remove any other extra hashing algorithm option.
Rationale:
Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard method for protecting passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. Passwords that are encrypted with a weak algorithm are no more protected than if they are kept in plain text.

This setting ensures user and group account administration utilities are configured to store only encrypted representations of passwords. Additionally, the crypt_style configuration option in /etc/libuser.conf ensures the use of a strong hashing algorithm that makes password cracking attacks more difficult.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth
Identifiers:

CCE-85946-2

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 15, 16, 5
cjis5.6.2.2
cobit5DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.10
cui3.13.11
disaCCI-004062
isa-62443-20094.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1
ism0418, 1055, 1402
iso27001-2013A.18.1.4, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3
nistIA-5(c), IA-5(1)(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.AC-1, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7
pcidssReq-8.2.1
os-srgSRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041, SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061
ccnA.19.SEC-RHEL3
cis5.3.3.4.3
stigidRHEL-09-671025
stigrefSV-258233r1015136_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q pam; then

var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam='sha512'

PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/password-auth"

if [ -e "$PAM_FILE_PATH" ] ; then
    PAM_FILE_PATH="$PAM_FILE_PATH"
    if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
        
        if ! authselect check; then
        echo "
        authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
        This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
        It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available.
        In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended."
        exit 1
        fi

        CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }')
        # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features.
        if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then
            ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }')
            authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE
            CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening"
            
            authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
            authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE
            for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do
                authselect enable-feature $feature;
            done
            
            authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
        fi
        PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$PAM_FILE_PATH")
        PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME"

        authselect apply-changes -b
    fi
    

        if ! grep -qP "^\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then
            # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module.
            if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then
                # The control is updated only if one single line matches.
                sed -i -E --follow-symlinks "s/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*)/\1sufficient \2/" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
            else
                echo "password    sufficient    pam_unix.so" >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
            fi
        fi
        # Check the option
        if ! grep -qP "^\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\s$var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam\b" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then
            sed -i -E --follow-symlinks "/\s*password\s+sufficient\s+pam_unix.so.*/ s/$/ $var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam/" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
        fi
    if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
        
        authselect apply-changes -b
    fi
else
    echo "$PAM_FILE_PATH was not found" >&2
fi

# Ensure only the correct hashing algorithm option is used.
declare -a HASHING_ALGORITHMS_OPTIONS=("sha512" "yescrypt" "gost_yescrypt" "blowfish" "sha256" "md5" "bigcrypt")

for hash_option in "${HASHING_ALGORITHMS_OPTIONS[@]}"; do
  if [ "$hash_option" != "$var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam" ]; then
    if grep -qP "^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s+.*\b$hash_option\b" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then
      if [ -e "$PAM_FILE_PATH" ] ; then
    PAM_FILE_PATH="$PAM_FILE_PATH"
    if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
        
        if ! authselect check; then
        echo "
        authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
        This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
        It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available.
        In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended."
        exit 1
        fi

        CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }')
        # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features.
        if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then
            ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }')
            authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE
            CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening"
            
            authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
            authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE
            for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do
                authselect enable-feature $feature;
            done
            
            authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
        fi
        PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$PAM_FILE_PATH")
        PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME"

        authselect apply-changes -b
    fi
    
if grep -qP "^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s.*\b$hash_option\b" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then
    sed -i -E --follow-symlinks "s/(.*password.*.*.*pam_unix.so.*)\s$hash_option=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
fi
    if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
        
        authselect apply-changes -b
    fi
else
    echo "$PAM_FILE_PATH was not found" >&2
fi
    fi
  fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-85946-2
  - CJIS-5.6.2.2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-671025
  - NIST-800-171-3.13.11
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth
- name: XCCDF Value var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam: !!str sha512
  tags:
    - always

- name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    file is present
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth
  register: result_pam_file_present
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-85946-2
  - CJIS-5.6.2.2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-671025
  - NIST-800-171-3.13.11
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth

- name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check the proper remediation
    for the system
  block:

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Define the PAM file
      to be edited as a local fact
    ansible.builtin.set_fact:
      pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if system relies
      on authselect tool
    ansible.builtin.stat:
      path: /usr/bin/authselect
    register: result_authselect_present

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect
      custom profile is used if authselect is present
    block:

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check integrity
        of authselect current profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect check
      register: result_authselect_check_cmd
      changed_when: false
      failed_when: false

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Informative message
        based on the authselect integrity check result
      ansible.builtin.assert:
        that:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0
        fail_msg:
        - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
        - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was
          not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
        - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
          is available.
        - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific
          demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended.
        success_msg:
        - authselect integrity check passed

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Get authselect
        current profile
      ansible.builtin.shell:
        cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }'
      register: result_authselect_profile
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Define the current
        authselect profile as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/")

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Define the new
        authselect custom profile as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/")

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Get authselect
        current features to also enable them in the custom profile
      ansible.builtin.shell:
        cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
      register: result_authselect_features
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if any custom
        profile with the same name was already created
      ansible.builtin.stat:
        path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}
      register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Create an authselect
        custom profile based on the current profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile
          }}
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect
        changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure the authselect
        custom profile is selected
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }}
      register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Restore the authselect
        features in the custom profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }}
      loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}'
      register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_features is not skipped
      - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect
        changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Change the PAM
        file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path
          | basename }}
    when:
    - result_authselect_present.stat.exists

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Define a fact for
      control already filtered in case filters are used
    ansible.builtin.set_fact:
      pam_module_control: sufficient

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if expected
      PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }}
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
      regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ pam_module_control | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*
      state: absent
    check_mode: true
    changed_when: false
    register: result_pam_line_present

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Include or update
      the PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }}
    block:

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if required
        PAM module line is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control
      ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
        path: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
        regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s*
        state: absent
      check_mode: true
      changed_when: false
      register: result_pam_line_other_control_present

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure the correct
        control for the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }}
      ansible.builtin.replace:
        dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
        regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*)
        replace: \1{{ pam_module_control }} \2
      register: result_pam_module_edit
      when:
      - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure the required
        PAM module line is included in {{ pam_file_path }}
      ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
        dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
        line: password    {{ pam_module_control }}    pam_unix.so
      register: result_pam_module_add
      when:
      - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found
        > 1

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect
        changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
      when:
      - result_authselect_present is defined
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
      - |-
        (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed)
         or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed)
    when:
    - result_pam_line_present.found is defined
    - result_pam_line_present.found == 0

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Define a fact for
      control already filtered in case filters are used
    ansible.builtin.set_fact:
      pam_module_control: sufficient

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if the required
      PAM module option is present in {{ pam_file_path }}
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
      regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ pam_module_control | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\s{{
        var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam }}\b
      state: absent
    check_mode: true
    changed_when: false
    register: result_pam_module_set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth_option_present

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure the "{{ var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam
      }}" PAM option for "pam_unix.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }}
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
      backrefs: true
      regexp: ^(\s*password\s+{{ pam_module_control | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so.*)
      line: \1 {{ var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam }}
      state: present
    register: result_pam_set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth_add
    when:
    - result_pam_module_set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth_option_present.found
      == 0

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect
      changes are applied
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
    when:
    - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
    - |-
      (result_pam_set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth_add is defined and result_pam_set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth_add.changed)
       or (result_pam_set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth_edit is defined and result_pam_set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth_edit.changed)
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CCE-85946-2
  - CJIS-5.6.2.2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-671025
  - NIST-800-171-3.13.11
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth

- name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    File is Present
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth
  register: result_pam_file_present
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-85946-2
  - CJIS-5.6.2.2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-671025
  - NIST-800-171-3.13.11
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth

- name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check The Proper Remediation
    For The System
  block:

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Define the PAM file
      to be edited as a local fact
    ansible.builtin.set_fact:
      pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/password-auth

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if system relies
      on authselect tool
    ansible.builtin.stat:
      path: /usr/bin/authselect
    register: result_authselect_present

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect
      custom profile is used if authselect is present
    block:

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check integrity
        of authselect current profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect check
      register: result_authselect_check_cmd
      changed_when: false
      failed_when: false

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Informative message
        based on the authselect integrity check result
      ansible.builtin.assert:
        that:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0
        fail_msg:
        - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
        - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was
          not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
        - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
          is available.
        - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific
          demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended.
        success_msg:
        - authselect integrity check passed

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Get authselect
        current profile
      ansible.builtin.shell:
        cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }'
      register: result_authselect_profile
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Define the current
        authselect profile as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/")

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Define the new
        authselect custom profile as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/")

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Get authselect
        current features to also enable them in the custom profile
      ansible.builtin.shell:
        cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
      register: result_authselect_features
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Check if any custom
        profile with the same name was already created
      ansible.builtin.stat:
        path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}
      register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Create an authselect
        custom profile based on the current profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile
          }}
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect
        changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure the authselect
        custom profile is selected
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }}
      register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Restore the authselect
        features in the custom profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }}
      loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}'
      register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_features is not skipped
      - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect
        changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Change the PAM
        file to be edited according to the custom authselect profile
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path
          | basename }}
    when:
    - result_authselect_present.stat.exists

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure That Only
      the Correct Hashing Algorithm Option For pam_unix.so Is Used in /etc/pam.d/password-auth
    ansible.builtin.replace:
      dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
      regexp: (^\s*password.*pam_unix\.so.*)\b{{ item }}\b\s*(.*)
      replace: \1\2
    when: item != var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam
    loop:
    - sha512
    - yescrypt
    - gost_yescrypt
    - blowfish
    - sha256
    - md5
    - bigcrypt
    register: result_pam_hashing_options_removal

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - password-auth - Ensure authselect
      changes are applied
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
    when:
    - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
    - result_pam_hashing_options_removal is changed
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CCE-85946-2
  - CJIS-5.6.2.2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-671025
  - NIST-800-171-3.13.11
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - set_password_hashing_algorithm_passwordauth

Rule   Set PAM''s Password Hashing Algorithm   [ref]

The PAM system service can be configured to only store encrypted representations of passwords. In "/etc/pam.d/system-auth", the password section of the file controls which PAM modules to execute during a password change. Set the pam_unix.so module in the password section to include the option sha512 and no other hashing algorithms as shown below: 
password    sufficient    pam_unix.so sha512
          other arguments...

This will help ensure that new passwords for local users will be stored using the sha512 algorithm.
Warning:  The hashing algorithms to be used with pam_unix.so are defined with independent module options. There are at least 7 possible algorithms and likely more algorithms will be introduced along the time. Due the the number of options and its possible combinations, the use of multiple hashing algorithm options may bring unexpected behaviors to the system. For this reason the check will pass only when one hashing algorithm option is defined and is aligned to the "var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam" variable. The remediation will ensure the correct option and remove any other extra hashing algorithm option.
Rationale:
Passwords need to be protected at all times, and encryption is the standard method for protecting passwords. If passwords are not encrypted, they can be plainly read (i.e., clear text) and easily compromised. Passwords that are encrypted with a weak algorithm are no more protected than if they are kept in plain text.

This setting ensures user and group account administration utilities are configured to store only encrypted representations of passwords. Additionally, the crypt_style configuration option in /etc/libuser.conf ensures the use of a strong hashing algorithm that makes password cracking attacks more difficult.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth
Identifiers:

CCE-83581-9

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 15, 16, 5
cjis5.6.2.2
cobit5DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.10
cui3.13.11
disaCCI-000196, CCI-000803, CCI-004062
isa-62443-20094.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1
ism0418, 1055, 1402
iso27001-2013A.18.1.4, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3
nistIA-5(c), IA-5(1)(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.AC-1, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7
pcidssReq-8.2.1
os-srgSRG-OS-000073-GPOS-00041, SRG-OS-000120-GPOS-00061
anssiR68
ccnA.19.SEC-RHEL3
cis5.3.3.4.3
pcidss48.3.2, 8.3

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q pam; then

var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam='sha512'


PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/pam.d/system-auth"
CONTROL="sufficient"

if [ -e "$PAM_FILE_PATH" ] ; then
    PAM_FILE_PATH="$PAM_FILE_PATH"
    if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
        
        if ! authselect check; then
        echo "
        authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
        This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
        It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available.
        In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended."
        exit 1
        fi

        CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }')
        # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features.
        if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then
            ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }')
            authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE
            CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening"
            
            authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
            authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE
            for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do
                authselect enable-feature $feature;
            done
            
            authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
        fi
        PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$PAM_FILE_PATH")
        PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME"

        authselect apply-changes -b
    fi
    

        if ! grep -qP "^\s*password\s+\$CONTROL\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then
            # Line matching group + control + module was not found. Check group + module.
            if [ "$(grep -cP '^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s*' "$PAM_FILE_PATH")" -eq 1 ]; then
                # The control is updated only if one single line matches.
                sed -i -E --follow-symlinks "s/^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*)/\1$CONTROL \2/" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
            else
                echo "password    $CONTROL    pam_unix.so" >> "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
            fi
        fi
        # Check the option
        if ! grep -qP "^\s*password\s+\$CONTROL\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\s$var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam\b" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then
            sed -i -E --follow-symlinks "/\s*password\s+\$CONTROL\s+pam_unix.so.*/ s/$/ $var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam/" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
        fi
    if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
        
        authselect apply-changes -b
    fi
else
    echo "$PAM_FILE_PATH was not found" >&2
fi

# Ensure only the correct hashing algorithm option is used.
declare -a HASHING_ALGORITHMS_OPTIONS=("sha512" "yescrypt" "gost_yescrypt" "blowfish" "sha256" "md5" "bigcrypt")

for hash_option in "${HASHING_ALGORITHMS_OPTIONS[@]}"; do
  if [ "$hash_option" != "$var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam" ]; then
    if grep -qP "^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s+.*\b$hash_option\b" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then
      if [ -e "$PAM_FILE_PATH" ] ; then
    PAM_FILE_PATH="$PAM_FILE_PATH"
    if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
        
        if ! authselect check; then
        echo "
        authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
        This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
        It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool is available.
        In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended."
        exit 1
        fi

        CURRENT_PROFILE=$(authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }')
        # If not already in use, a custom profile is created preserving the enabled features.
        if [[ ! $CURRENT_PROFILE == custom/* ]]; then
            ENABLED_FEATURES=$(authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }')
            authselect create-profile hardening -b $CURRENT_PROFILE
            CURRENT_PROFILE="custom/hardening"
            
            authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
            authselect select $CURRENT_PROFILE
            for feature in $ENABLED_FEATURES; do
                authselect enable-feature $feature;
            done
            
            authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
        fi
        PAM_FILE_NAME=$(basename "$PAM_FILE_PATH")
        PAM_FILE_PATH="/etc/authselect/$CURRENT_PROFILE/$PAM_FILE_NAME"

        authselect apply-changes -b
    fi
    
if grep -qP "^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s.*\b$hash_option\b" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"; then
    sed -i -E --follow-symlinks "s/(.*password.*.*.*pam_unix.so.*)\s$hash_option=?[[:alnum:]]*(.*)/\1\2/g" "$PAM_FILE_PATH"
fi
    if [ -f /usr/bin/authselect ]; then
        
        authselect apply-changes -b
    fi
else
    echo "$PAM_FILE_PATH was not found" >&2
fi
    fi
  fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83581-9
  - CJIS-5.6.2.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.13.11
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth
- name: XCCDF Value var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam: !!str sha512
  tags:
    - always

- name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth file
    is present
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
  register: result_pam_file_present
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83581-9
  - CJIS-5.6.2.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.13.11
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth

- name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check the proper remediation for the
    system
  block:

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Define the PAM file to be edited
      as a local fact
    ansible.builtin.set_fact:
      pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if system relies on authselect
      tool
    ansible.builtin.stat:
      path: /usr/bin/authselect
    register: result_authselect_present

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect custom profile
      is used if authselect is present
    block:

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check integrity of authselect current
        profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect check
      register: result_authselect_check_cmd
      changed_when: false
      failed_when: false

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Informative message based on the
        authselect integrity check result
      ansible.builtin.assert:
        that:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0
        fail_msg:
        - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
        - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was
          not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
        - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
          is available.
        - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific
          demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended.
        success_msg:
        - authselect integrity check passed

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Get authselect current profile
      ansible.builtin.shell:
        cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }'
      register: result_authselect_profile
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Define the current authselect profile
        as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/")

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Define the new authselect custom
        profile as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/")

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Get authselect current features
        to also enable them in the custom profile
      ansible.builtin.shell:
        cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
      register: result_authselect_features
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if any custom profile with
        the same name was already created
      ansible.builtin.stat:
        path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}
      register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Create an authselect custom profile
        based on the current profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile
          }}
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure the authselect custom profile
        is selected
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }}
      register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Restore the authselect features
        in the custom profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }}
      loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}'
      register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_features is not skipped
      - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Change the PAM file to be edited
        according to the custom authselect profile
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path
          | basename }}
    when:
    - result_authselect_present.stat.exists

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Define a fact for control already
      filtered in case filters are used
    ansible.builtin.set_fact:
      pam_module_control: sufficient

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if expected PAM module line
      is present in {{ pam_file_path }}
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
      regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ pam_module_control | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*
      state: absent
    check_mode: true
    changed_when: false
    register: result_pam_line_present

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Include or update the PAM module
      line in {{ pam_file_path }}
    block:

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if required PAM module line
        is present in {{ pam_file_path }} with different control
      ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
        path: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
        regexp: ^\s*password\s+.*\s+pam_unix.so\s*
        state: absent
      check_mode: true
      changed_when: false
      register: result_pam_line_other_control_present

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure the correct control for
        the required PAM module line in {{ pam_file_path }}
      ansible.builtin.replace:
        dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
        regexp: ^(\s*password\s+).*(\bpam_unix.so.*)
        replace: \1{{ pam_module_control }} \2
      register: result_pam_module_edit
      when:
      - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 1

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure the required PAM module
        line is included in {{ pam_file_path }}
      ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
        dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
        line: password    {{ pam_module_control }}    pam_unix.so
      register: result_pam_module_add
      when:
      - result_pam_line_other_control_present.found == 0 or result_pam_line_other_control_present.found
        > 1

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
      when:
      - result_authselect_present is defined
      - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
      - |-
        (result_pam_module_add is defined and result_pam_module_add.changed)
         or (result_pam_module_edit is defined and result_pam_module_edit.changed)
    when:
    - result_pam_line_present.found is defined
    - result_pam_line_present.found == 0

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Define a fact for control already
      filtered in case filters are used
    ansible.builtin.set_fact:
      pam_module_control: sufficient

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if the required PAM module
      option is present in {{ pam_file_path }}
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
      regexp: ^\s*password\s+{{ pam_module_control | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so\s*.*\s{{
        var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam }}\b
      state: absent
    check_mode: true
    changed_when: false
    register: result_pam_module_set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth_option_present

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure the "{{ var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam
      }}" PAM option for "pam_unix.so" is included in {{ pam_file_path }}
    ansible.builtin.lineinfile:
      path: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
      backrefs: true
      regexp: ^(\s*password\s+{{ pam_module_control | regex_escape() }}\s+pam_unix.so.*)
      line: \1 {{ var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam }}
      state: present
    register: result_pam_set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth_add
    when:
    - result_pam_module_set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth_option_present.found
      == 0

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect changes are applied
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
    when:
    - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
    - |-
      (result_pam_set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth_add is defined and result_pam_set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth_add.changed)
       or (result_pam_set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth_edit is defined and result_pam_set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth_edit.changed)
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CCE-83581-9
  - CJIS-5.6.2.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.13.11
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth

- name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if /etc/pam.d/system-auth File
    is Present
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
  register: result_pam_file_present
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83581-9
  - CJIS-5.6.2.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.13.11
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth

- name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check The Proper Remediation For The
    System
  block:

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Define the PAM file to be edited
      as a local fact
    ansible.builtin.set_fact:
      pam_file_path: /etc/pam.d/system-auth

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if system relies on authselect
      tool
    ansible.builtin.stat:
      path: /usr/bin/authselect
    register: result_authselect_present

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect custom profile
      is used if authselect is present
    block:

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check integrity of authselect current
        profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect check
      register: result_authselect_check_cmd
      changed_when: false
      failed_when: false

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Informative message based on the
        authselect integrity check result
      ansible.builtin.assert:
        that:
        - result_authselect_check_cmd.rc == 0
        fail_msg:
        - authselect integrity check failed. Remediation aborted!
        - This remediation could not be applied because an authselect profile was
          not selected or the selected profile is not intact.
        - It is not recommended to manually edit the PAM files when authselect tool
          is available.
        - In cases where the default authselect profile does not cover a specific
          demand, a custom authselect profile is recommended.
        success_msg:
        - authselect integrity check passed

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Get authselect current profile
      ansible.builtin.shell:
        cmd: authselect current -r | awk '{ print $1 }'
      register: result_authselect_profile
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Define the current authselect profile
        as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        authselect_custom_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_profile.stdout is match("custom/")

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Define the new authselect custom
        profile as a local fact
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        authselect_current_profile: '{{ result_authselect_profile.stdout }}'
        authselect_custom_profile: custom/hardening
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_profile.stdout is not match("custom/")

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Get authselect current features
        to also enable them in the custom profile
      ansible.builtin.shell:
        cmd: authselect current | tail -n+3 | awk '{ print $2 }'
      register: result_authselect_features
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Check if any custom profile with
        the same name was already created
      ansible.builtin.stat:
        path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}
      register: result_authselect_custom_profile_present
      changed_when: false
      when:
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Create an authselect custom profile
        based on the current profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect create-profile hardening -b {{ authselect_current_profile
          }}
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - not result_authselect_custom_profile_present.stat.exists

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=before-hardening-custom-profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure the authselect custom profile
        is selected
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect select {{ authselect_custom_profile }}
      register: result_pam_authselect_select_profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - authselect_current_profile is not match("custom/")
      - authselect_custom_profile is not match(authselect_current_profile)

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Restore the authselect features
        in the custom profile
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect enable-feature {{ item }}
      loop: '{{ result_authselect_features.stdout_lines }}'
      register: result_pam_authselect_restore_features
      when:
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_authselect_features is not skipped
      - result_pam_authselect_select_profile is not skipped

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect changes are applied
      ansible.builtin.command:
        cmd: authselect apply-changes -b --backup=after-hardening-custom-profile
      when:
      - result_authselect_check_cmd is success
      - result_authselect_profile is not skipped
      - result_pam_authselect_restore_features is not skipped

    - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Change the PAM file to be edited
        according to the custom authselect profile
      ansible.builtin.set_fact:
        pam_file_path: /etc/authselect/{{ authselect_custom_profile }}/{{ pam_file_path
          | basename }}
    when:
    - result_authselect_present.stat.exists

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure That Only the Correct Hashing
      Algorithm Option For pam_unix.so Is Used in /etc/pam.d/system-auth
    ansible.builtin.replace:
      dest: '{{ pam_file_path }}'
      regexp: (^\s*password.*pam_unix\.so.*)\b{{ item }}\b\s*(.*)
      replace: \1\2
    when: item != var_password_hashing_algorithm_pam
    loop:
    - sha512
    - yescrypt
    - gost_yescrypt
    - blowfish
    - sha256
    - md5
    - bigcrypt
    register: result_pam_hashing_options_removal

  - name: Set PAM's Password Hashing Algorithm - Ensure authselect changes are applied
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: authselect apply-changes -b
    when:
    - result_authselect_present.stat.exists
    - result_pam_hashing_options_removal is changed
  when:
  - '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_pam_file_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CCE-83581-9
  - CJIS-5.6.2.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.13.11
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(c)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.2
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - set_password_hashing_algorithm_systemauth
Group   Protect Accounts by Restricting Password-Based Login   Group contains 3 groups and 11 rules
[ref]   Conventionally, Unix shell accounts are accessed by providing a username and password to a login program, which tests these values for correctness using the /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow files. Password-based login is vulnerable to guessing of weak passwords, and to sniffing and man-in-the-middle attacks against passwords entered over a network or at an insecure console. Therefore, mechanisms for accessing accounts by entering usernames and passwords should be restricted to those which are operationally necessary.
Group   Set Password Expiration Parameters   Group contains 6 rules
[ref]   The file /etc/login.defs controls several password-related settings. Programs such as passwd, su, and login consult /etc/login.defs to determine behavior with regard to password aging, expiration warnings, and length. See the man page login.defs(5) for more information.

Users should be forced to change their passwords, in order to decrease the utility of compromised passwords. However, the need to change passwords often should be balanced against the risk that users will reuse or write down passwords if forced to change them too often. Forcing password changes every 90-360 days, depending on the environment, is recommended. Set the appropriate value as PASS_MAX_DAYS and apply it to existing accounts with the -M flag.

The PASS_MIN_DAYS (-m) setting prevents password changes for 7 days after the first change, to discourage password cycling. If you use this setting, train users to contact an administrator for an emergency password change in case a new password becomes compromised. The PASS_WARN_AGE (-W) setting gives users 7 days of warnings at login time that their passwords are about to expire.

For example, for each existing human user USER, expiration parameters could be adjusted to a 180 day maximum password age, 7 day minimum password age, and 7 day warning period with the following command: 
$ sudo chage -M 180 -m 7 -W 7 USER

Rule   Set Existing Passwords Maximum Age   [ref]

Configure non-compliant accounts to enforce a 45-day maximum password lifetime restriction by running the following command: 
$ sudo chage -M 45
          USER
Rationale:
Any password, no matter how complex, can eventually be cracked. Therefore, passwords need to be changed periodically. If the operating system does not limit the lifetime of passwords and force users to change their passwords, there is the risk that the operating system passwords could be compromised.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_password_set_max_life_existing
Identifiers:

CCE-86031-2

References:
disaCCI-004066
nistIA-5(f), IA-5(1)(d), CM-6(a)
os-srgSRG-OS-000076-GPOS-00044
ccnA.5.SEC-RHEL5
cis5.4.1.1
pcidss48.3.9, 8.3
stigidRHEL-09-411015
stigrefSV-258042r1015091_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict

var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs='45'


while IFS= read -r i; do
    
    chage -M $var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs $i

done <   <(awk -v var="$var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs" -F: '(/^[^:]+:[^!*]/ && ($5 > var || $5 == "")) {print $1}' /etc/shadow)

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs: !!str 45
  tags:
    - always

- name: Collect users with not correct maximum time period between password changes
  ansible.builtin.command:
    cmd: awk -F':' '(/^[^:]+:[^!*]/ && ($5 > {{ var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs
      }} || $5 == "")) {print $1}' /etc/shadow
  register: user_names
  tags:
  - CCE-86031-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-411015
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f)
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9
  - accounts_password_set_max_life_existing
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Change the maximum time period between password changes
  ansible.builtin.user:
    user: '{{ item }}'
    password_expire_max: '{{ var_accounts_maximum_age_login_defs }}'
  with_items: '{{ user_names.stdout_lines }}'
  when: user_names.stdout_lines | length > 0
  tags:
  - CCE-86031-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-411015
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f)
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9
  - accounts_password_set_max_life_existing
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Set Existing Passwords Minimum Age   [ref]

Configure non-compliant accounts to enforce a 24 hours/1 day minimum password lifetime by running the following command: 
$ sudo chage -m 1 USER
Rationale:
Enforcing a minimum password lifetime helps to prevent repeated password changes to defeat the password reuse or history enforcement requirement. If users are allowed to immediately and continually change their password, the password could be repeatedly changed in a short period of time to defeat the organization's policy regarding password reuse.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_password_set_min_life_existing
Identifiers:

CCE-89069-9

References:
disaCCI-004066
nistIA-5(f), IA-5(1)(d), CM-6(a)
os-srgSRG-OS-000075-GPOS-00043
ccnA.5.SEC-RHEL5
cis5.4.1.2
stigidRHEL-09-611080
stigrefSV-258105r1015105_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict

var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs='2'


while IFS= read -r i; do
    
    chage -m $var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs $i

done <   <(awk -v var="$var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs" -F: '(/^[^:]+:[^!*]/ && ($4 < var || $4 == "")) {print $1}' /etc/shadow)

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs: !!str 2
  tags:
    - always

- name: Collect users with not correct minimum time period between password changes
  command: |
    awk -F':' '(/^[^:]+:[^!*]/ && ($4 < {{ var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs }} || $4 == "")) {print $1}' /etc/shadow
  register: user_names
  tags:
  - CCE-89069-9
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611080
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f)
  - accounts_password_set_min_life_existing
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Change the minimum time period between password changes
  command: |
    chage -m {{ var_accounts_minimum_age_login_defs }} {{ item }}
  with_items: '{{ user_names.stdout_lines }}'
  when: user_names.stdout_lines | length > 0
  tags:
  - CCE-89069-9
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611080
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f)
  - accounts_password_set_min_life_existing
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Set Existing Passwords Warning Age   [ref]

To configure how many days prior to password expiration that a warning will be issued to users, run the command: 
$ sudo chage --warndays 10
          USER
The DoD requirement is 7, and CIS recommendation is no less than 7 days. This profile requirement is 10.
Rationale:
Providing an advance warning that a password will be expiring gives users time to think of a secure password. Users caught unaware may choose a simple password or write it down where it may be discovered.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_accounts_password_set_warn_age_existing
Identifiers:

CCE-86915-6

References:
disaCCI-000198
nistIA-5(f), IA-5(1)(d), CM-6(a)
ccnA.5.SEC-RHEL5
cis5.4.1.3
pcidss48.3.9, 8.3

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure

var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs='10'


while IFS= read -r i; do
    chage --warndays $var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs $i
done <   <(awk -v var="$var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs" -F: '(($6 < var || $6 == "") && $2 ~ /^\$/) {print $1}' /etc/shadow)

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: XCCDF Value var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs: !!str 10
  tags:
    - always

- name: Set Existing Passwords Warning Age - Collect Users With Incorrect Number of
    Days of Warning Before Password Expires
  ansible.builtin.command:
    cmd: awk -F':' '(($6 < {{ var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs }} || $6 ==
      "") && $2 ~ /^\$/) {print $1}' /etc/shadow
  register: result_pass_warn_age_user_names
  changed_when: false
  tags:
  - CCE-86915-6
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f)
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9
  - accounts_password_set_warn_age_existing
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Set Existing Passwords Warning Age - Ensure the Number of Days of Warning
    Before Password Expires
  ansible.builtin.command:
    cmd: chage --warndays {{ var_accounts_password_warn_age_login_defs }} {{ item
      }}
  with_items: '{{ result_pass_warn_age_user_names.stdout_lines }}'
  when: result_pass_warn_age_user_names is not skipped and result_pass_warn_age_user_names.stdout_lines
    | length > 0
  tags:
  - CCE-86915-6
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(d)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(f)
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.9
  - accounts_password_set_warn_age_existing
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
Group   Verify Proper Storage and Existence of Password Hashes   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   By default, password hashes for local accounts are stored in the second field (colon-separated) in /etc/shadow. This file should be readable only by processes running with root credentials, preventing users from casually accessing others' password hashes and attempting to crack them. However, it remains possible to misconfigure the system and store password hashes in world-readable files such as /etc/passwd, or to even store passwords themselves in plaintext on the system. Using system-provided tools for password change/creation should allow administrators to avoid such misconfiguration.

Rule   Ensure There Are No Accounts With Blank or Null Passwords   [ref]

Check the "/etc/shadow" file for blank passwords with the following command: 
$ sudo awk -F: '!$2 {print $1}' /etc/shadow
If the command returns any results, this is a finding. Configure all accounts on the system to have a password or lock the account with the following commands: Perform a password reset: 
$ sudo passwd [username]
Lock an account: 
$ sudo passwd -l [username]
Warning:  Note that this rule is not applicable for systems running within a container. Having user with empty password within a container is not considered a risk, because it should not be possible to directly login into a container anyway.
Rationale:
If an account has an empty password, anyone could log in and run commands with the privileges of that account. Accounts with empty passwords should never be used in operational environments.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_no_empty_passwords_etc_shadow
Identifiers:

CCE-85972-8

References:
disaCCI-000366
nistCM-6(b), CM-6.1(iv)
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
ccnA.6.SEC-RHEL4
cis7.2.2
pcidss42.2.2, 2.2
stigidRHEL-09-611155
stigrefSV-258120r991589_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

readarray -t users_with_empty_pass < <(sudo awk -F: '!$2 {print $1}' /etc/shadow)

for user_with_empty_pass in "${users_with_empty_pass[@]}"
do
    passwd -l $user_with_empty_pass
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-85972-8
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611155
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv)
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.2
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_empty_passwords_etc_shadow
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Collect users with no password
  command: |
    awk -F: '!$2 {print $1}' /etc/shadow
  register: users_nopasswd
  changed_when: false
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-85972-8
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611155
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv)
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.2
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_empty_passwords_etc_shadow
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Lock users with no password
  command: |
    passwd -l {{ item }}
  with_items: '{{ users_nopasswd.stdout_lines }}'
  when:
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - users_nopasswd is not skipped and users_nopasswd.stdout_lines | length > 0
  tags:
  - CCE-85972-8
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-611155
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv)
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.2
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_empty_passwords_etc_shadow
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
Group   Restrict Root Logins   Group contains 4 rules
[ref]   Direct root logins should be allowed only for emergency use. In normal situations, the administrator should access the system via a unique unprivileged account, and then use su or sudo to execute privileged commands. Discouraging administrators from accessing the root account directly ensures an audit trail in organizations with multiple administrators. Locking down the channels through which root can connect directly also reduces opportunities for password-guessing against the root account. The login program uses the file /etc/securetty to determine which interfaces should allow root logins. The virtual devices /dev/console and /dev/tty* represent the system consoles (accessible via the Ctrl-Alt-F1 through Ctrl-Alt-F6 keyboard sequences on a default installation). The default securetty file also contains /dev/vc/*. These are likely to be deprecated in most environments, but may be retained for compatibility. Root should also be prohibited from connecting via network protocols. Other sections of this document include guidance describing how to prevent root from logging in via SSH.

Rule   Ensure Authentication Required for Single User Mode   [ref]

Single user mode is used for recovery when the system detects an issue during boot or by manual selection from the bootloader.
Rationale:
Requiring authentication in single user mode prevents an unauthorized user from rebooting the system into single user to gain root privileges without credentials.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_ensure_root_password_configured
Identifiers:

CCE-87101-2

References:
ccnA.6.SEC-RHEL4
cis5.4.2.4
pcidss42.2.2, 2.2

Rule   Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked   [ref]

Some accounts are not associated with a human user of the system, and exist to perform some administrative functions. An attacker should not be able to log into these accounts.

System accounts are those user accounts with a user ID less than 1000. If any system account other than root, halt, sync, shutdown and nfsnobody has an unlocked password, disable it with the command: 
$ sudo usermod -L account
Rationale:
Disabling authentication for default system accounts makes it more difficult for attackers to make use of them to compromise a system.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts
Identifiers:

CCE-86113-8

References:
nerc-cipCIP-003-8 R5.1.1, CIP-003-8 R5.3, CIP-004-6 R2.3, CIP-007-3 R2.1, CIP-007-3 R2.2, CIP-007-3 R2.3, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.2
nistAC-6, CM-6(a)
ccnA.6.SEC-RHEL3
cis5.4.2.7
pcidss48.2.2, 8.2

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict

readarray -t systemaccounts < <(awk -F: \
  '($3 < 1000 && $3 != root && $3 != halt && $3 != sync && $3 != shutdown \
  && $3 != nfsnobody) { print $1 }' /etc/passwd)

for systemaccount in "${systemaccounts[@]}"; do
    usermod -L "$systemaccount"
done

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked - Get All Local Users From /etc/passwd
  ansible.builtin.getent:
    database: passwd
    split: ':'
  tags:
  - CCE-86113-8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.2
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked - Create local_users Variable From
    getent_passwd Facts
  ansible.builtin.set_fact:
    local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd | dict2items }}'
  tags:
  - CCE-86113-8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.2
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Ensure that System Accounts Are Locked - Lock System Accounts
  ansible.builtin.user:
    name: '{{ item.key }}'
    password_lock: true
  loop: '{{ local_users }}'
  when:
  - item.value[1]|int < 1000
  - item.key not in ['root', 'halt', 'sync', 'shutdown', 'nfsnobody']
  tags:
  - CCE-86113-8
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.2
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_password_auth_for_systemaccounts
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login   [ref]

Some accounts are not associated with a human user of the system, and exist to perform some administrative functions. Should an attacker be able to log into these accounts, they should not be granted access to a shell.

The login shell for each local account is stored in the last field of each line in /etc/passwd. System accounts are those user accounts with a user ID less than 1000. The user ID is stored in the third field. If any system account other than root has a login shell, disable it with the command: 
$ sudo usermod -s /sbin/nologin account
Warning:  Do not perform the steps in this section on the root account. Doing so might cause the system to become inaccessible.
Rationale:
Ensuring shells are not given to system accounts upon login makes it more difficult for attackers to make use of system accounts.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_no_shelllogin_for_systemaccounts
Identifiers:

CCE-83623-9

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 5, 7, 8
cobit5DSS01.03, DSS03.05, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.03
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 6.2
ism1491
iso27001-2013A.12.4.1, A.12.4.3, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistAC-6, CM-6(a), CM-6(b), CM-6.1(iv)
nist-csfDE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, PR.AC-1, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-6
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
ccnA.6.SEC-RHEL3
cis5.4.2.7
pcidss48.2.2, 8.2
stigidRHEL-09-411035
stigrefSV-258046r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict

readarray -t systemaccounts < <(awk -F: '($3 < 1000 && $3 != root \
  && $7 != "\/sbin\/shutdown" && $7 != "\/sbin\/halt" && $7 != "\/bin\/sync") \
  { print $1 }' /etc/passwd)

for systemaccount in "${systemaccounts[@]}"; do
    usermod -s /sbin/nologin "$systemaccount"
done

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login - Get All Local
    Users From /etc/passwd
  ansible.builtin.getent:
    database: passwd
    split: ':'
  tags:
  - CCE-83623-9
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-411035
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv)
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.2
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - no_shelllogin_for_systemaccounts
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login - Create local_users
    Variable From getent_passwd Facts
  ansible.builtin.set_fact:
    local_users: '{{ ansible_facts.getent_passwd | dict2items }}'
  tags:
  - CCE-83623-9
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-411035
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv)
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.2
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - no_shelllogin_for_systemaccounts
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Ensure that System Accounts Do Not Run a Shell Upon Login -  Disable Login
    Shell for System Accounts
  ansible.builtin.user:
    name: '{{ item.key }}'
    shell: /sbin/nologin
  loop: '{{ local_users }}'
  when:
  - item.key not in ['root']
  - item.value[1]|int < 1000
  - item.value[5] not in ['/sbin/shutdown', '/sbin/halt', '/bin/sync']
  tags:
  - CCE-83623-9
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-411035
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv)
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.2
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - no_shelllogin_for_systemaccounts
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Enforce usage of pam_wheel for su authentication   [ref]

To ensure that only users who are members of the wheel group can run commands with altered privileges through the su command, make sure that the following line exists in the file /etc/pam.d/su: 
auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid
Warning:  Members of "wheel" or GID 0 groups are checked by default if the group option is not set for pam_wheel.so module. Therefore, members of these groups should be manually checked or a different group should be informed according to the site policy.
Rationale:
The su program allows to run commands with a substitute user and group ID. It is commonly used to run commands as the root user. Limiting access to such command is considered a good security practice.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_use_pam_wheel_for_su
Identifiers:

CCE-90085-2

References:
disaCCI-002165, CCI-004895
osppFMT_SMF_EXT.1.1
os-srgSRG-OS-000373-GPOS-00156, SRG-OS-000312-GPOS-00123
ccnA.5.SEC-RHEL1
stigidRHEL-09-432035
stigrefSV-258088r1015096_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q pam; then

# uncomment the option if commented
sed '/^[[:space:]]*#[[:space:]]*auth[[:space:]]\+required[[:space:]]\+pam_wheel\.so[[:space:]]\+use_uid$/s/^[[:space:]]*#//' -i /etc/pam.d/su

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-90085-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-432035
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - use_pam_wheel_for_su

- name: Restrict usage of su command only to members of wheel group
  replace:
    path: /etc/pam.d/su
    regexp: ^[\s]*#[\s]*auth[\s]+required[\s]+pam_wheel\.so[\s]+use_uid$
    replace: auth             required        pam_wheel.so use_uid
  when: '"pam" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-90085-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-432035
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - use_pam_wheel_for_su

Rule   Enable authselect   [ref]

Configure user authentication setup to use the authselect tool. If authselect profile is selected, the rule will enable the sssd profile.
Warning:  If the sudo authselect select command returns an error informing that the chosen profile cannot be selected, it is probably because PAM files have already been modified by the administrator. If this is the case, in order to not overwrite the desired changes made by the administrator, the current PAM settings should be investigated before forcing the selection of the chosen authselect profile.
Rationale:
Authselect is a successor to authconfig. It is a tool to select system authentication and identity sources from a list of supported profiles instead of letting the administrator manually build the PAM stack. That way, it avoids potential breakage of configuration, as it ships several tested profiles that are well tested and supported to solve different use-cases.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_enable_authselect
Identifiers:

CCE-89732-2

References:
disaCCI-000213
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), 164.308(a)(7)(i), 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A), 164.310(a)(1), 164.310(a)(2)(i), 164.310(a)(2)(ii), 164.310(a)(2)(iii), 164.310(b), 164.310(c), 164.310(d)(1), 164.310(d)(2)(iii)
nistAC-3
osppFIA_UAU.1, FIA_AFL.1
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR31
ccnenable_authselect
cisenable_authselect
pcidss48.3.4, 8.3
stigidneeded_rules


var_authselect_profile='sssd'


authselect current

if test "$?" -ne 0; then
    authselect select "$var_authselect_profile"

    if test "$?" -ne 0; then
        if rpm --quiet --verify pam; then
            authselect select --force "$var_authselect_profile"
        else
	        echo "authselect is not used but files from the 'pam' package have been altered, so the authselect configuration won't be forced." >&2
        fi
    fi
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: XCCDF Value var_authselect_profile # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_authselect_profile: !!str sssd
  tags:
    - always

- name: Enable authselect - Check Current authselect Profile
  ansible.builtin.command:
    cmd: authselect current
  register: result_authselect_current
  changed_when: false
  failed_when: false
  tags:
  - CCE-89732-2
  - DISA-STIG-needed_rules
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4
  - configure_strategy
  - enable_authselect
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Enable authselect - Try to Select an authselect Profile
  ansible.builtin.command:
    cmd: authselect select "{{ var_authselect_profile }}"
  register: result_authselect_select
  changed_when: result_authselect_select.rc == 0
  failed_when: false
  when: result_authselect_current.rc != 0
  tags:
  - CCE-89732-2
  - DISA-STIG-needed_rules
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4
  - configure_strategy
  - enable_authselect
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Enable authselect - Verify If pam Has Been Altered
  ansible.builtin.command:
    cmd: rpm -qV pam
  register: result_altered_authselect
  changed_when: false
  failed_when: false
  when:
  - result_authselect_select is not skipped
  - result_authselect_select.rc != 0
  tags:
  - CCE-89732-2
  - DISA-STIG-needed_rules
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4
  - configure_strategy
  - enable_authselect
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Enable authselect - Informative Message Based on authselect Integrity Check
  ansible.builtin.assert:
    that:
    - result_authselect_current.rc == 0 or result_altered_authselect is skipped or
      result_altered_authselect.rc == 0
    fail_msg:
    - authselect is not used but files from the 'pam' package have been altered, so
      the authselect configuration won't be forced.
  tags:
  - CCE-89732-2
  - DISA-STIG-needed_rules
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4
  - configure_strategy
  - enable_authselect
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Enable authselect - Force authselect Profile Selection
  ansible.builtin.command:
    cmd: authselect select --force "{{ var_authselect_profile }}"
  when:
  - result_authselect_current.rc != 0
  - result_authselect_select.rc != 0
  - result_altered_authselect.rc == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-89732-2
  - DISA-STIG-needed_rules
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.3.4
  - configure_strategy
  - enable_authselect
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
Group   GRUB2 bootloader configuration   Group contains 1 group and 7 rules
[ref]   During the boot process, the boot loader is responsible for starting the execution of the kernel and passing options to it. The boot loader allows for the selection of different kernels - possibly on different partitions or media. The default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 boot loader for x86 systems is called GRUB2. Options it can pass to the kernel include single-user mode, which provides root access without any authentication, and the ability to disable SELinux. To prevent local users from modifying the boot parameters and endangering security, protect the boot loader configuration with a password and ensure its configuration file's permissions are set properly.
Group   Non-UEFI GRUB2 bootloader configuration   Group contains 7 rules
[ref]   Non-UEFI GRUB2 bootloader configuration

Rule   Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg Group Ownership   [ref]

The file /boot/grub2/grub.cfg should be group-owned by the root group to prevent destruction or modification of the file. To properly set the group owner of /boot/grub2/grub.cfg, run the command: 
$ sudo chgrp root /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
Rationale:
The root group is a highly-privileged group. Furthermore, the group-owner of this file should not have any access privileges anyway.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_file_groupowner_grub2_cfg
Identifiers:

CCE-83848-2

References:
cis-csc12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 5
cjis5.5.2.2
cobit5APO01.06, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, DSS06.02
cui3.4.5
disaCCI-000366
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), 164.308(a)(7)(i), 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A), 164.310(a)(1), 164.310(a)(2)(i), 164.310(a)(2)(ii), 164.310(a)(2)(iii), 164.310(b), 164.310(c), 164.310(d)(1), 164.310(d)(2)(iii)
isa-62443-20094.3.3.7.3
isa-62443-2013SR 2.1, SR 5.2
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistCM-6(a), AC-6(1)
nist-csfPR.AC-4, PR.DS-5
pcidssReq-7.1
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR29
ccnA.6.SEC-RHEL2
cis1.4.2
pcidss42.2.6, 2.2
stigidRHEL-09-212025
stigrefSV-257790r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { rpm --quiet -q kernel; }; then

chgrp 0 /boot/grub2/grub.cfg

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83848-2
  - CJIS-5.5.2.2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-212025
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_groupowner_grub2_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
  stat:
    path: /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
  register: file_exists
  when:
  - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83848-2
  - CJIS-5.5.2.2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-212025
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_groupowner_grub2_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
  file:
    path: /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
    group: '0'
  when:
  - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CCE-83848-2
  - CJIS-5.5.2.2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-212025
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_groupowner_grub2_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

Rule   Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg Group Ownership   [ref]

The file /boot/grub2/user.cfg should be group-owned by the root group to prevent reading or modification of the file. To properly set the group owner of /boot/grub2/user.cfg, run the command: 
$ sudo chgrp root /boot/grub2/user.cfg
Rationale:
The root group is a highly-privileged group. Furthermore, the group-owner of this file should not have any access privileges anyway. Non-root users who read the boot parameters may be able to identify weaknesses in security upon boot and be able to exploit them.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_file_groupowner_user_cfg
Identifiers:

CCE-86010-6

References:
cis-csc12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 5
cjis5.5.2.2
cobit5APO01.06, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, DSS06.02
cui3.4.5
disaCCI-000225
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), 164.308(a)(7)(i), 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A), 164.310(a)(1), 164.310(a)(2)(i), 164.310(a)(2)(ii), 164.310(a)(2)(iii), 164.310(b), 164.310(c), 164.310(d)(1), 164.310(d)(2)(iii)
isa-62443-20094.3.3.7.3
isa-62443-2013SR 2.1, SR 5.2
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistCM-6(a), AC-6(1)
nist-csfPR.AC-4, PR.DS-5
pcidssReq-7.1
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR29
ccnA.6.SEC-RHEL2
cis1.4.2
pcidss42.2.6, 2.2

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

chgrp 0 /boot/grub2/user.cfg

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-86010-6
  - CJIS-5.5.2.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_groupowner_user_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/user.cfg
  stat:
    path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg
  register: file_exists
  when:
  - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-86010-6
  - CJIS-5.5.2.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_groupowner_user_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure group owner 0 on /boot/grub2/user.cfg
  file:
    path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg
    group: '0'
  when:
  - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CCE-86010-6
  - CJIS-5.5.2.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_groupowner_user_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

Rule   Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg User Ownership   [ref]

The file /boot/grub2/grub.cfg should be owned by the root user to prevent destruction or modification of the file. To properly set the owner of /boot/grub2/grub.cfg, run the command: 
$ sudo chown root /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
Rationale:
Only root should be able to modify important boot parameters.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_file_owner_grub2_cfg
Identifiers:

CCE-83845-8

References:
cis-csc12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 5
cjis5.5.2.2
cobit5APO01.06, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, DSS06.02
cui3.4.5
disaCCI-000366
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), 164.308(a)(7)(i), 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A), 164.310(a)(1), 164.310(a)(2)(i), 164.310(a)(2)(ii), 164.310(a)(2)(iii), 164.310(b), 164.310(c), 164.310(d)(1), 164.310(d)(2)(iii)
isa-62443-20094.3.3.7.3
isa-62443-2013SR 2.1, SR 5.2
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistCM-6(a), AC-6(1)
nist-csfPR.AC-4, PR.DS-5
pcidssReq-7.1
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR29
ccnA.6.SEC-RHEL2
cis1.4.2
pcidss42.2.6, 2.2
stigidRHEL-09-212030
stigrefSV-257791r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { rpm --quiet -q kernel; }; then

chown 0 /boot/grub2/grub.cfg

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83845-8
  - CJIS-5.5.2.2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-212030
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_owner_grub2_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
  stat:
    path: /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
  register: file_exists
  when:
  - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83845-8
  - CJIS-5.5.2.2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-212030
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_owner_grub2_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure owner 0 on /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
  file:
    path: /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
    owner: '0'
  when:
  - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CCE-83845-8
  - CJIS-5.5.2.2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-212030
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_owner_grub2_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

Rule   Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg User Ownership   [ref]

The file /boot/grub2/user.cfg should be owned by the root user to prevent reading or modification of the file. To properly set the owner of /boot/grub2/user.cfg, run the command: 
$ sudo chown root /boot/grub2/user.cfg
Rationale:
Only root should be able to modify important boot parameters. Also, non-root users who read the boot parameters may be able to identify weaknesses in security upon boot and be able to exploit them.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_file_owner_user_cfg
Identifiers:

CCE-86016-3

References:
cis-csc12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 5
cjis5.5.2.2
cobit5APO01.06, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, DSS06.02
cui3.4.5
disaCCI-000225
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), 164.308(a)(7)(i), 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A), 164.310(a)(1), 164.310(a)(2)(i), 164.310(a)(2)(ii), 164.310(a)(2)(iii), 164.310(b), 164.310(c), 164.310(d)(1), 164.310(d)(2)(iii)
isa-62443-20094.3.3.7.3
isa-62443-2013SR 2.1, SR 5.2
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistCM-6(a), AC-6(1)
nist-csfPR.AC-4, PR.DS-5
pcidssReq-7.1
anssiR29
ccnA.6.SEC-RHEL2
cis1.4.2
pcidss42.2.6, 2.2

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

chown 0 /boot/grub2/user.cfg

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-86016-3
  - CJIS-5.5.2.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_owner_user_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/user.cfg
  stat:
    path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg
  register: file_exists
  when:
  - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-86016-3
  - CJIS-5.5.2.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_owner_user_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure owner 0 on /boot/grub2/user.cfg
  file:
    path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg
    owner: '0'
  when:
  - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CCE-86016-3
  - CJIS-5.5.2.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-7.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_owner_user_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

Rule   Verify /boot/grub2/grub.cfg Permissions   [ref]

File permissions for /boot/grub2/grub.cfg should be set to 600. To properly set the permissions of /boot/grub2/grub.cfg, run the command: 
$ sudo chmod 600 /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
Rationale:
Proper permissions ensure that only the root user can modify important boot parameters.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_file_permissions_grub2_cfg
Identifiers:

CCE-83846-6

References:
cis-csc12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 5
cobit5APO01.06, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, DSS06.02
cui3.4.5
disaCCI-000225
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), 164.308(a)(7)(i), 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A), 164.310(a)(1), 164.310(a)(2)(i), 164.310(a)(2)(ii), 164.310(a)(2)(iii), 164.310(b), 164.310(c), 164.310(d)(1), 164.310(d)(2)(iii)
isa-62443-20094.3.3.7.3
isa-62443-2013SR 2.1, SR 5.2
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistCM-6(a), AC-6(1)
nist-csfPR.AC-4, PR.DS-5
anssiR29
ccnA.6.SEC-RHEL2
cis1.4.2
pcidss42.2.6, 2.2

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { rpm --quiet -q kernel; }; then

chmod u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /boot/grub2/grub.cfg

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83846-6
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_permissions_grub2_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
  stat:
    path: /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
  register: file_exists
  when:
  - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83846-6
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_permissions_grub2_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
  file:
    path: /boot/grub2/grub.cfg
    mode: u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt
  when:
  - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CCE-83846-6
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_permissions_grub2_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

Rule   Verify /boot/grub2/user.cfg Permissions   [ref]

File permissions for /boot/grub2/user.cfg should be set to 600. To properly set the permissions of /boot/grub2/user.cfg, run the command: 
$ sudo chmod 600 /boot/grub2/user.cfg
Rationale:
Proper permissions ensure that only the root user can read or modify important boot parameters.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_file_permissions_user_cfg
Identifiers:

CCE-86025-4

References:
cis-csc12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 5
cobit5APO01.06, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, DSS06.02
cui3.4.5
disaCCI-000225
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), 164.308(a)(7)(i), 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A), 164.310(a)(1), 164.310(a)(2)(i), 164.310(a)(2)(ii), 164.310(a)(2)(iii), 164.310(b), 164.310(c), 164.310(d)(1), 164.310(d)(2)(iii)
isa-62443-20094.3.3.7.3
isa-62443-2013SR 2.1, SR 5.2
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistCM-6(a), AC-6(1)
nist-csfPR.AC-4, PR.DS-5
anssiR29
ccnA.6.SEC-RHEL2
cis1.4.2
pcidss42.2.6, 2.2

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if [ ! -d /sys/firmware/efi ] && rpm --quiet -q grub2-common && { [ ! -f /.dockerenv ] && [ ! -f /run/.containerenv ]; }; then

chmod u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt /boot/grub2/user.cfg

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-86025-4
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_permissions_user_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Test for existence /boot/grub2/user.cfg
  stat:
    path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg
  register: file_exists
  when:
  - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  tags:
  - CCE-86025-4
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_permissions_user_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure permission u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt on /boot/grub2/user.cfg
  file:
    path: /boot/grub2/user.cfg
    mode: u-xs,g-xwrs,o-xwrt
  when:
  - '"/boot/efi" not in ansible_mounts | map(attribute="mount") | list'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_virtualization_type not in ["docker", "lxc", "openvz", "podman", "container"]
  - file_exists.stat is defined and file_exists.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CCE-86025-4
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.5
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.6
  - configure_strategy
  - file_permissions_user_cfg
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

Rule   Set Boot Loader Password in grub2   [ref]

The grub2 boot loader should have a superuser account and password protection enabled to protect boot-time settings.

Since plaintext passwords are a security risk, generate a hash for the password by running the following command: 
# grub2-setpassword
When prompted, enter the password that was selected.

Warning:  To prevent hard-coded passwords, automatic remediation of this control is not available. Remediation must be automated as a component of machine provisioning, or followed manually as outlined above. Also, do NOT manually add the superuser account and password to the grub.cfg file as the grub2-mkconfig command overwrites this file.
Rationale:
Password protection on the boot loader configuration ensures users with physical access cannot trivially alter important bootloader settings. These include which kernel to use, and whether to enter single-user mode.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_grub2_password
Identifiers:

CCE-83849-0

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 5
cobit5DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.06, DSS06.10
cui3.4.5
disaCCI-000213
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B), 164.308(a)(7)(i), 164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A), 164.310(a)(1), 164.310(a)(2)(i), 164.310(a)(2)(ii), 164.310(a)(2)(iii), 164.310(b), 164.310(c), 164.310(d)(1), 164.310(d)(2)(iii)
isa-62443-20094.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7
iso27001-2013A.18.1.4, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistCM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.AC-1, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, PR.PT-3
os-srgSRG-OS-000080-GPOS-00048
anssiR5
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL7
cis1.4.1
stigidRHEL-09-212010
stigrefSV-257787r958472_rule
Group   Network Configuration and Firewalls   Group contains 9 groups and 28 rules
[ref]   Most systems must be connected to a network of some sort, and this brings with it the substantial risk of network attack. This section discusses the security impact of decisions about networking which must be made when configuring a system.

This section also discusses firewalls, network access controls, and other network security frameworks, which allow system-level rules to be written that can limit an attackers' ability to connect to your system. These rules can specify that network traffic should be allowed or denied from certain IP addresses, hosts, and networks. The rules can also specify which of the system's network services are available to particular hosts or networks.
Group   firewalld   Group contains 2 groups and 5 rules
[ref]   The dynamic firewall daemon firewalld provides a dynamically managed firewall with support for network “zones” to assign a level of trust to a network and its associated connections and interfaces. It has support for IPv4 and IPv6 firewall settings. It supports Ethernet bridges and has a separation of runtime and permanent configuration options. It also has an interface for services or applications to add firewall rules directly.
A graphical configuration tool, firewall-config, is used to configure firewalld, which in turn uses iptables tool to communicate with Netfilter in the kernel which implements packet filtering.
The firewall service provided by firewalld is dynamic rather than static because changes to the configuration can be made at anytime and are immediately implemented. There is no need to save or apply the changes. No unintended disruption of existing network connections occurs as no part of the firewall has to be reloaded.
Group   Inspect and Activate Default firewalld Rules   Group contains 2 rules
[ref]   Firewalls can be used to separate networks into different zones based on the level of trust the user has decided to place on the devices and traffic within that network. NetworkManager informs firewalld to which zone an interface belongs. An interface's assigned zone can be changed by NetworkManager or via the firewall-config tool.
The zone settings in /etc/firewalld/ are a range of preset settings which can be quickly applied to a network interface. These are the zones provided by firewalld sorted according to the default trust level of the zones from untrusted to trusted:
  • drop

    Any incoming network packets are dropped, there is no reply. Only outgoing network connections are possible.

  • block

    Any incoming network connections are rejected with an icmp-host-prohibited message for IPv4 and icmp6-adm-prohibited for IPv6. Only network connections initiated from within the system are possible.

  • public

    For use in public areas. You do not trust the other computers on the network to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.

  • external

    For use on external networks with masquerading enabled especially for routers. You do not trust the other computers on the network to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.

  • dmz

    For computers in your demilitarized zone that are publicly-accessible with limited access to your internal network. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.

  • work

    For use in work areas. You mostly trust the other computers on networks to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.

  • home

    For use in home areas. You mostly trust the other computers on networks to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.

  • internal

    For use on internal networks. You mostly trust the other computers on the networks to not harm your computer. Only selected incoming connections are accepted.

  • trusted

    All network connections are accepted.


It is possible to designate one of these zones to be the default zone. When interface connections are added to NetworkManager, they are assigned to the default zone. On installation, the default zone in firewalld is set to be the public zone.
To find out all the settings of a zone, for example the public zone, enter the following command as root: 
# firewall-cmd --zone=public --list-all
Example output of this command might look like the following: 
# firewall-cmd --zone=public --list-all
public
  interfaces:
  services: mdns dhcpv6-client ssh
  ports:
  forward-ports:
  icmp-blocks: source-quench
To view the network zones currently active, enter the following command as root: 
# firewall-cmd --get-service
The following listing displays the result of this command on common Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 system: 
# firewall-cmd --get-service
amanda-client bacula bacula-client dhcp dhcpv6 dhcpv6-client dns ftp
high-availability http https imaps ipp ipp-client ipsec kerberos kpasswd
ldap ldaps libvirt libvirt-tls mdns mountd ms-wbt mysql nfs ntp openvpn
pmcd pmproxy pmwebapi pmwebapis pop3s postgresql proxy-dhcp radius rpc-bind
samba samba-client smtp ssh telnet tftp tftp-client transmission-client
vnc-server wbem-https
Finally to view the network zones that will be active after the next firewalld service reload, enter the following command as root: 
# firewall-cmd --get-service --permanent

Rule   Install firewalld Package   [ref]

The firewalld package can be installed with the following command: 
$ sudo dnf install firewalld
Rationale:
"Firewalld" provides an easy and effective way to block/limit remote access to the system via ports, services, and protocols. Remote access services, such as those providing remote access to network devices and information systems, which lack automated control capabilities, increase risk and make remote user access management difficult at best. Remote access is access to DoD nonpublic information systems by an authorized user (or an information system) communicating through an external, non-organization-controlled network. Remote access methods include, for example, dial-up, broadband, and wireless. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 functionality (e.g., SSH) must be capable of taking enforcement action if the audit reveals unauthorized activity. Automated control of remote access sessions allows organizations to ensure ongoing compliance with remote access policies by enforcing connection rules of remote access applications on a variety of information system components (e.g., servers, workstations, notebook computers, smartphones, and tablets)."
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_firewalld_installed
Identifiers:

CCE-84021-5

References:
disaCCI-000382, CCI-000366, CCI-002314, CCI-002322
nistCM-6(a)
osppFMT_SMF_EXT.1
os-srgSRG-OS-000096-GPOS-00050, SRG-OS-000297-GPOS-00115, SRG-OS-000298-GPOS-00116, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00232
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL3
cis4.1.2
pcidss41.2.1, 1.2
stigidRHEL-09-251010
stigrefSV-257935r958480_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

if ! rpm -q --quiet "firewalld" ; then
    dnf install -y "firewalld"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable

package install firewalld



[[packages]]
name = "firewalld"
version = "*"

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84021-5
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-251010
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.1
  - enable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_firewalld_installed

- name: Ensure firewalld is installed
  package:
    name: firewalld
    state: present
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84021-5
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-251010
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.1
  - enable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_firewalld_installed

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable

dnf install firewalld

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable

package --add=firewalld

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
include install_firewalld

class install_firewalld {
  package { 'firewalld':
    ensure => 'installed',
  }
}

Rule   Verify firewalld Enabled   [ref]

The firewalld service can be enabled with the following command: 
$ sudo systemctl enable firewalld.service
Rationale:
Access control methods provide the ability to enhance system security posture by restricting services and known good IP addresses and address ranges. This prevents connections from unknown hosts and protocols.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_service_firewalld_enabled
Identifiers:

CCE-90833-5

References:
cis-csc11, 3, 9
cobit5BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05
cui3.1.3, 3.4.7
disaCCI-000382, CCI-000366, CCI-002314
isa-62443-20094.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4
nerc-cipCIP-003-8 R4, CIP-003-8 R5, CIP-004-6 R3
nistAC-4, CM-7(b), CA-3(5), SC-7(21), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.IP-1
osppFMT_SMF_EXT.1
os-srgSRG-OS-000096-GPOS-00050, SRG-OS-000297-GPOS-00115, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00231, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00232
bsiSYS.1.6.A5, SYS.1.6.A21
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL3
cis4.1.2
pcidss41.2.1, 1.2
stigidRHEL-09-251015
stigrefSV-257936r958480_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel && { rpm --quiet -q firewalld; }; then

SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl'
"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'firewalld.service'
"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'firewalld.service'
"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'firewalld.service'

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

service enable firewalld



[customizations.services]
enabled = ["firewalld"]

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-90833-5
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-251015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-4
  - NIST-800-53-CA-3(5)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.1
  - enable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - service_firewalld_enabled

- name: Verify firewalld Enabled - Enable service firewalld
  block:

  - name: Gather the package facts
    package_facts:
      manager: auto

  - name: Verify firewalld Enabled - Enable Service firewalld
    ansible.builtin.systemd:
      name: firewalld
      enabled: true
      state: started
      masked: false
    when:
    - '"firewalld" in ansible_facts.packages'
  when:
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"firewalld" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-90833-5
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-251015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.3
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-4
  - NIST-800-53-CA-3(5)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.1
  - enable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - service_firewalld_enabled

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
include enable_firewalld

class enable_firewalld {
  service {'firewalld':
    enable => true,
    ensure => 'running',
  }
}
Group   Strengthen the Default Ruleset   Group contains 3 rules
[ref]   The default rules can be strengthened. The system scripts that activate the firewall rules expect them to be defined in configuration files under the /etc/firewalld/services and /etc/firewalld/zones directories.

The following recommendations describe how to strengthen the default ruleset configuration file. An alternative to editing this configuration file is to create a shell script that makes calls to the firewall-cmd program to load in rules under the /etc/firewalld/services and /etc/firewalld/zones directories.

Instructions apply to both unless otherwise noted. Language and address conventions for regular firewalld rules are used throughout this section.
Warning:  The program firewall-config allows additional services to penetrate the default firewall rules and automatically adjusts the firewalld ruleset(s).

Rule   Configure Firewalld to Restrict Loopback Traffic   [ref]

Configure firewalld to restrict loopback traffic to the lo interface. The loopback traffic must be trusted by assigning the lo interface to the firewalld trusted zone. However, the loopback traffic must be restricted to the loopback interface as an anti-spoofing measure. To configure firewalld to restrict loopback traffic to the lo interface, run the following commands: 
sudo firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=trusted --add-rich-rule='rule family=ipv4 source address="127.0.0.1" destination not address="127.0.0.1" drop'
sudo firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=trusted --add-rich-rule='rule family=ipv6 source address="::1" destination not address="::1" drop'
To ensure firewalld settings are applied in runtime, run the following command: 
firewall-cmd --reload
Rationale:
Loopback traffic is generated between processes on machine and is typically critical to operation of the system. The loopback interface is the only place that loopback network traffic should be seen, all other interfaces should ignore traffic on this network as an anti-spoofing measure.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_firewalld_loopback_traffic_restricted
Identifiers:

CCE-86137-7

References:
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL3
cis4.2.2
pcidss41.4.1, 1.4

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

if ! rpm -q --quiet "firewalld" ; then
    dnf install -y "firewalld"
fi

ipv4_rule='rule family=ipv4 source address="127.0.0.1" destination not address="127.0.0.1" drop'
ipv6_rule='rule family=ipv6 source address="::1" destination not address="::1" drop'

if test "$(stat -c %d:%i /)" != "$(stat -c %d:%i /proc/1/root/.)" || [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" == "YES" ]]; then
    firewall-offline-cmd --zone=trusted --add-rich-rule="${ipv4_rule}"
    firewall-offline-cmd --zone=trusted --add-rich-rule="${ipv6_rule}"
elif systemctl is-active firewalld; then
    firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=trusted --add-rich-rule="${ipv4_rule}"
    firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=trusted --add-rich-rule="${ipv6_rule}"
    firewall-cmd --reload
else
    echo "
    firewalld service is not active. Remediation aborted!
    This remediation could not be applied because it depends on firewalld service running.
    The service is not started by this remediation in order to prevent connection issues."
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-86137-7
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.1
  - configure_strategy
  - firewalld_loopback_traffic_restricted
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Configure Firewalld to Restrict Loopback Traffic - Ensure firewalld Package
    is Installed
  ansible.builtin.package:
    name: '{{ item }}'
    state: present
  with_items:
  - firewalld
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86137-7
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.1
  - configure_strategy
  - firewalld_loopback_traffic_restricted
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Configure Firewalld to Restrict Loopback Traffic - Collect Facts About System
    Services
  ansible.builtin.service_facts: null
  register: result_services_states
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86137-7
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.1
  - configure_strategy
  - firewalld_loopback_traffic_restricted
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Configure Firewalld to Restrict Loopback Traffic - Remediation is Applicable
    if firewalld Service is Running
  block:

  - name: Configure Firewalld to Restrict Loopback Traffic - Ensure firewalld trusted
      Zone Restricts IPv4 Loopback Traffic
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=trusted --add-rich-rule='rule family=ipv4
        source address="127.0.0.1" destination not address="127.0.0.1" drop'
    register: result_trusted_ipv4_restriction
    changed_when:
    - '''ALREADY_ENABLED'' not in result_trusted_ipv4_restriction.stderr'

  - name: Configure Firewalld to Restrict Loopback Traffic - Ensure firewalld trusted
      Zone Restricts IPv6 Loopback Traffic
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=trusted --add-rich-rule='rule family=ipv6
        source address="::1" destination not address="::1" drop'
    register: result_trusted_ipv6_restriction
    changed_when:
    - '''ALREADY_ENABLED'' not in result_trusted_ipv6_restriction.stderr'

  - name: Configure Firewalld to Restrict Loopback Traffic - Ensure firewalld Changes
      are Applied
    ansible.builtin.service:
      name: firewalld
      state: reloaded
    when:
    - result_trusted_ipv4_restriction is changed or result_trusted_ipv6_restriction
      is changed
  when:
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_facts.services['firewalld.service'].state == 'running'
  tags:
  - CCE-86137-7
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.1
  - configure_strategy
  - firewalld_loopback_traffic_restricted
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Configure Firewalld to Restrict Loopback Traffic - Informative Message Based
    on Service State
  ansible.builtin.assert:
    that:
    - ansible_facts.services['firewalld.service'].state == 'running'
    fail_msg:
    - firewalld service is not active. Remediation aborted!
    - This remediation could not be applied because it depends on firewalld service
      running.
    - The service is not started by this remediation in order to prevent connection
      issues.
    success_msg:
    - Configure Firewalld to Restrict Loopback Traffic remediation successfully executed
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86137-7
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.1
  - configure_strategy
  - firewalld_loopback_traffic_restricted
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

Rule   Configure Firewalld to Trust Loopback Traffic   [ref]

Assign loopback interface to the firewalld trusted zone in order to explicitly allow the loopback traffic in the system. To configure firewalld to trust loopback traffic, run the following command: 
sudo firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=trusted --add-interface=lo
To ensure firewalld settings are applied in runtime, run the following command: 
firewall-cmd --reload
Rationale:
Loopback traffic is generated between processes on machine and is typically critical to operation of the system. The loopback interface is the only place that loopback network traffic should be seen, all other interfaces should ignore traffic on this network as an anti-spoofing measure.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_firewalld_loopback_traffic_trusted
Identifiers:

CCE-86116-1

References:
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL3
cis4.2.2
pcidss41.4.1, 1.4

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

if ! rpm -q --quiet "firewalld" ; then
    dnf install -y "firewalld"
fi

if test "$(stat -c %d:%i /)" != "$(stat -c %d:%i /proc/1/root/.)" || [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" == "YES" ]]; then
    firewall-offline-cmd --zone=trusted --add-interface=lo
elif systemctl is-active firewalld; then
    firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=trusted --add-interface=lo
    firewall-cmd --reload
else
    echo "
    firewalld service is not active. Remediation aborted!
    This remediation could not be applied because it depends on firewalld service running.
    The service is not started by this remediation in order to prevent connection issues."
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-86116-1
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.1
  - configure_strategy
  - firewalld_loopback_traffic_trusted
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Configure Firewalld to Trust Loopback Traffic - Ensure firewalld Package is
    Installed
  ansible.builtin.package:
    name: '{{ item }}'
    state: present
  with_items:
  - firewalld
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86116-1
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.1
  - configure_strategy
  - firewalld_loopback_traffic_trusted
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Configure Firewalld to Trust Loopback Traffic - Collect Facts About System
    Services
  ansible.builtin.service_facts: null
  register: result_services_states
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86116-1
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.1
  - configure_strategy
  - firewalld_loopback_traffic_trusted
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Configure Firewalld to Trust Loopback Traffic - Remediation is Applicable
    if firewalld Service is Running
  block:

  - name: Configure Firewalld to Trust Loopback Traffic - Ensure firewalld trusted
      Zone Includes lo Interface
    ansible.builtin.command:
      cmd: firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=trusted --add-interface=lo
    register: result_lo_interface_assignment
    changed_when:
    - '''ALREADY_ENABLED'' not in result_lo_interface_assignment.stderr'

  - name: Configure Firewalld to Trust Loopback Traffic - Ensure firewalld Changes
      are Applied
    ansible.builtin.service:
      name: firewalld
      state: reloaded
    when:
    - result_lo_interface_assignment is changed
  when:
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_facts.services['firewalld.service'].state == 'running'
  tags:
  - CCE-86116-1
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.1
  - configure_strategy
  - firewalld_loopback_traffic_trusted
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Configure Firewalld to Trust Loopback Traffic - Informative Message Based
    on Service State
  ansible.builtin.assert:
    that:
    - ansible_facts.services['firewalld.service'].state == 'running'
    fail_msg:
    - firewalld service is not active. Remediation aborted!
    - This remediation could not be applied because it depends on firewalld service
      running.
    - The service is not started by this remediation in order to prevent connection
      issues.
    success_msg:
    - Configure Firewalld to Trust Loopback Traffic remediation successfully executed
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86116-1
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.1
  - configure_strategy
  - firewalld_loopback_traffic_trusted
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

Rule   Set Default firewalld Zone for Incoming Packets   [ref]

To set the default zone to drop for the built-in default zone which processes incoming IPv4 and IPv6 packets, modify the following line in /etc/firewalld/firewalld.conf to be: 
DefaultZone=drop
Warning:  To prevent denying any access to the system, automatic remediation of this control is not available. Remediation must be automated as a component of machine provisioning, or followed manually as outlined above.
Rationale:
In firewalld the default zone is applied only after all the applicable rules in the table are examined for a match. Setting the default zone to drop implements proper design for a firewall, i.e. any packets which are not explicitly permitted should not be accepted.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_set_firewalld_default_zone
Identifiers:

CCE-84023-1

References:
cis-csc11, 14, 3, 9
cjis5.10.1
cobit5BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.05, DSS06.06
cui3.1.3, 3.4.7, 3.13.6
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 7.6
ism1416
iso27001-2013A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.9.1.2
nistCA-3(5), CM-7(b), SC-7(23), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.IP-1, PR.PT-3
pcidssReq-1.4
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL3
pcidss41.3.1, 1.3
Group   IPv6   Group contains 1 group and 6 rules
[ref]   The system includes support for Internet Protocol version 6. A major and often-mentioned improvement over IPv4 is its enormous increase in the number of available addresses. Another important feature is its support for automatic configuration of many network settings.
Group   Configure IPv6 Settings if Necessary   Group contains 6 rules
[ref]   A major feature of IPv6 is the extent to which systems implementing it can automatically configure their networking devices using information from the network. From a security perspective, manually configuring important configuration information is preferable to accepting it from the network in an unauthenticated fashion.

Rule   Configure Accepting Router Advertisements on All IPv6 Interfaces   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra=0
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra = 0
Rationale:
An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra
Identifiers:

CCE-84120-5

References:
cis-csc11, 14, 3, 9
cobit5BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.05, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.9.1.2
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.IP-1, PR.PT-3
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.11
stigidRHEL-09-254010
stigrefSV-257971r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value='0'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84120-5"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra%3D0%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84120-5
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254010
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84120-5
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254010
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra from config files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra
    replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84120-5
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254010
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value: !!str 0
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84120-5
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254010
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_ra

Rule   Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv6 Interfaces   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects=0
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
Rationale:
An illicit ICMP redirect message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects
Identifiers:

CCE-84125-4

References:
cis-csc11, 14, 3, 9
cobit5BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.05, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.9.1.2
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a), CM-6(b), CM-6.1(iv)
nist-csfPR.IP-1, PR.PT-3
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR13
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.5
stigidRHEL-09-254015
stigrefSV-257972r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value='0'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84125-4"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects%3D0%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84125-4
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84125-4
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects from config
    files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects
    replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84125-4
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value: !!str 0
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84125-4
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_redirects

Rule   Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv6 Interfaces   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route=0
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
Rationale:
Source-routed packets allow the source of the packet to suggest routers forward the packet along a different path than configured on the router, which can be used to bypass network security measures. This requirement applies only to the forwarding of source-routerd traffic, such as when IPv6 forwarding is enabled and the system is functioning as a router.

Accepting source-routed packets in the IPv6 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route
Identifiers:

CCE-84131-2

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 4, 6, 8, 9
cobit5APO01.06, APO13.01, DSS01.05, DSS03.01, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, DSS06.02
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.2.3.4, 4.3.3.4, 4.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-1, ID.AM-3, PR.AC-5, PR.DS-5, PR.PT-4
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR13
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.8
stigidRHEL-09-254020
stigrefSV-257973r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value='0'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84131-2"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route%3D0%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84131-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84131-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route from
    config files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route
    replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84131-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value: !!str 0
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84131-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_all_accept_source_route

Rule   Disable Accepting Router Advertisements on all IPv6 Interfaces by Default   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra=0
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra = 0
Rationale:
An illicit router advertisement message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra
Identifiers:

CCE-84124-7

References:
cis-csc11, 14, 3, 9
cobit5BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.05, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.9.1.2
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.IP-1, PR.PT-3
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.11
stigidRHEL-09-254030
stigrefSV-257975r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value='0'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84124-7"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra%3D0%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84124-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254030
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84124-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254030
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra from config
    files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra
    replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84124-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254030
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value: !!str 0
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84124-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254030
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_ra

Rule   Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv6 Interfaces   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects=0
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
Rationale:
An illicit ICMP redirect message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects
Identifiers:

CCE-84113-0

References:
cis-csc11, 14, 3, 9
cobit5BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.05, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.9.1.2
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.IP-1, PR.PT-3
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR13
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.5
stigidRHEL-09-254035
stigrefSV-257976r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value='0'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84113-0"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects%20%3D%200%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84113-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254035
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84113-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254035
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects from
    config files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects
    replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84113-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254035
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value: !!str 0
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84113-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254035
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_redirects

Rule   Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv6 Interfaces by Default   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route=0
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
Rationale:
Source-routed packets allow the source of the packet to suggest routers forward the packet along a different path than configured on the router, which can be used to bypass network security measures. This requirement applies only to the forwarding of source-routerd traffic, such as when IPv6 forwarding is enabled and the system is functioning as a router. Accepting source-routed packets in the IPv6 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route
Identifiers:

CCE-84130-4

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 4, 6, 8, 9
cobit5APO01.06, APO13.01, DSS01.05, DSS03.01, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, DSS06.02
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.2.3.4, 4.3.3.4, 4.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a), CM-6(b), CM-6.1(iv)
nist-csfDE.AE-1, ID.AM-3, PR.AC-5, PR.DS-5, PR.PT-4
pcidssReq-1.4.3
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR13
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.8
pcidss41.4.2, 1.4
stigidRHEL-09-254040
stigrefSV-257977r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value='0'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route="$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84130-4"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route%3D0%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84130-4
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254040
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84130-4
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254040
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route from
    config files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route
    replace: '#net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84130-4
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254040
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value: !!str 0
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84130-4
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-254040
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6.1(iv)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv6_conf_default_accept_source_route
Group   Kernel Parameters Which Affect Networking   Group contains 2 groups and 16 rules
[ref]   The sysctl utility is used to set parameters which affect the operation of the Linux kernel. Kernel parameters which affect networking and have security implications are described here.
Group   Network Related Kernel Runtime Parameters for Hosts and Routers   Group contains 13 rules
[ref]   Certain kernel parameters should be set for systems which are acting as either hosts or routers to improve the system's ability defend against certain types of IPv4 protocol attacks.

Rule   Disable Accepting ICMP Redirects for All IPv4 Interfaces   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects=0
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0
Rationale:
ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages modify the host's route table and are unauthenticated. An illicit ICMP redirect message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack.
This feature of the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless absolutely required."
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects
Identifiers:

CCE-84011-6

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.10.1.1
cobit5APO13.01, BAI04.04, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS01.03, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.2, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.12.1.2, A.12.1.3, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.17.2.1, A.9.1.2
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a), SC-7(a)
nist-csfDE.CM-1, PR.DS-4, PR.IP-1, PR.PT-3
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR12
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.5
stigidRHEL-09-253015
stigrefSV-257958r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value='0'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84011-6"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects%3D0%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84011-6
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84011-6
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects from config
    files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects
    replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84011-6
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value: !!str 0
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84011-6
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_redirects

Rule   Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route=0
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0
Rationale:
Source-routed packets allow the source of the packet to suggest routers forward the packet along a different path than configured on the router, which can be used to bypass network security measures. This requirement applies only to the forwarding of source-routerd traffic, such as when IPv4 forwarding is enabled and the system is functioning as a router.

Accepting source-routed packets in the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route
Identifiers:

CCE-84001-7

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9
cobit5APO01.06, APO13.01, BAI04.04, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS01.03, DSS01.05, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.02, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.2.3.4, 4.3.3.4, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3, 4.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.2, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.12.1.3, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.17.2.1, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-007-3 R4, CIP-007-3 R4.1, CIP-007-3 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), SC-5, CM-6(a), SC-7(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-1, DE.CM-1, ID.AM-3, PR.AC-5, PR.DS-4, PR.DS-5, PR.IP-1, PR.PT-3, PR.PT-4
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR12
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.8
stigidRHEL-09-253020
stigrefSV-257959r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value='0'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84001-7"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route%3D0%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84001-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84001-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route from
    config files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route
    replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84001-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value: !!str 0
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84001-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_accept_source_route

Rule   Enable Kernel Parameter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians=1
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1
Rationale:
The presence of "martian" packets (which have impossible addresses) as well as spoofed packets, source-routed packets, and redirects could be a sign of nefarious network activity. Logging these packets enables this activity to be detected.
Severity: 
unknown
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians
Identifiers:

CCE-84000-9

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9
cobit5APO13.01, BAI04.04, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.2, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.1.2, A.12.1.3, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.17.2.1, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.9.1.2
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), SC-5(3)(a)
nist-csfDE.CM-1, PR.AC-3, PR.DS-4, PR.IP-1, PR.PT-3, PR.PT-4
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.9
stigidRHEL-09-253025
stigrefSV-257960r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value='1'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84000-9"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians%3D1%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84000-9
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians
  - unknown_severity

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84000-9
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians
  - unknown_severity

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians from config
    files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians
    replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84000-9
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians
  - unknown_severity
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value: !!str 1
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84000-9
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_log_martians
  - unknown_severity

Rule   Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter=1
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1
Rationale:
Enabling reverse path filtering drops packets with source addresses that should not have been able to be received on the interface they were received on. It should not be used on systems which are routers for complicated networks, but is helpful for end hosts and routers serving small networks.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter
Identifiers:

CCE-84008-2

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9
cobit5APO01.06, APO13.01, BAI04.04, DSS01.03, DSS01.05, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, DSS06.02
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.2.3.4, 4.3.3.4, 4.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.2, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.12.1.3, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.17.2.1, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a), SC-7(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-1, DE.CM-1, ID.AM-3, PR.AC-5, PR.DS-4, PR.DS-5, PR.PT-4
pcidssReq-1.4.3
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR12
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.7
pcidss41.4.3, 1.4
stigidRHEL-09-253035
stigrefSV-257962r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value='1'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84008-2"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter%3D1%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84008-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253035
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84008-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253035
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter from config files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter
    replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84008-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253035
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value: !!str 1
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84008-2
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253035
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_rp_filter

Rule   Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects=0
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = 0
Rationale:
Accepting "secure" ICMP redirects (from those gateways listed as default gateways) has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects
Identifiers:

CCE-84016-5

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9
cobit5APO01.06, APO13.01, BAI04.04, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS01.03, DSS01.05, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.02, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-001503, CCI-001551
isa-62443-20094.2.3.4, 4.3.3.4, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3, 4.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.2, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.12.1.3, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.17.2.1, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a), SC-7(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-1, DE.CM-1, ID.AM-3, PR.AC-5, PR.DS-4, PR.DS-5, PR.IP-1, PR.PT-3, PR.PT-4
pcidssReq-1.4.3
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR12
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.6
pcidss41.4.3, 1.4

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value='0'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84016-5"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects%3D0%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84016-5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84016-5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects from config
    files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects
    replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84016-5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value: !!str 0
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84016-5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_secure_redirects

Rule   Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting ICMP Redirects by Default on IPv4 Interfaces   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects=0
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0
Rationale:
ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages modify the host's route table and are unauthenticated. An illicit ICMP redirect message could result in a man-in-the-middle attack.
This feature of the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless absolutely required.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects
Identifiers:

CCE-84003-3

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.10.1.1
cobit5APO01.06, APO13.01, BAI04.04, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS01.03, DSS01.05, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.02, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.2.3.4, 4.3.3.4, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3, 4.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.2, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.12.1.3, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.17.2.1, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a), SC-7(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-1, DE.CM-1, ID.AM-3, PR.AC-5, PR.DS-4, PR.DS-5, PR.IP-1, PR.PT-3, PR.PT-4
pcidssReq-1.4.3
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR12
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.5
pcidss41.4.3, 1.4
stigidRHEL-09-253040
stigrefSV-257963r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value='0'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84003-3"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects%3D0%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84003-3
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253040
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84003-3
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253040
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects from
    config files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects
    replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84003-3
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253040
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value: !!str 0
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84003-3
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253040
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_redirects

Rule   Disable Kernel Parameter for Accepting Source-Routed Packets on IPv4 Interfaces by Default   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route=0
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0
Rationale:
Source-routed packets allow the source of the packet to suggest routers forward the packet along a different path than configured on the router, which can be used to bypass network security measures.
Accepting source-routed packets in the IPv4 protocol has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required, such as when IPv4 forwarding is enabled and the system is legitimately functioning as a router.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route
Identifiers:

CCE-84007-4

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.10.1.1
cobit5APO01.06, APO13.01, BAI04.04, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS01.03, DSS01.05, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.02, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.2.3.4, 4.3.3.4, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3, 4.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.2, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.12.1.3, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.17.2.1, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-007-3 R4, CIP-007-3 R4.1, CIP-007-3 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), SC-5, SC-7(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-1, DE.CM-1, ID.AM-3, PR.AC-5, PR.DS-4, PR.DS-5, PR.IP-1, PR.PT-3, PR.PT-4
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR12
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.8
stigidRHEL-09-253045
stigrefSV-257964r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value='0'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84007-4"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route%3D0%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84007-4
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253045
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84007-4
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253045
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route from
    config files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route
    replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84007-4
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253045
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value: !!str 0
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84007-4
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253045
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_accept_source_route

Rule   Enable Kernel Paremeter to Log Martian Packets on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians=1
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = 1
Rationale:
The presence of "martian" packets (which have impossible addresses) as well as spoofed packets, source-routed packets, and redirects could be a sign of nefarious network activity. Logging these packets enables this activity to be detected.
Severity: 
unknown
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians
Identifiers:

CCE-84014-0

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9
cobit5APO13.01, BAI04.04, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.2, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.1.2, A.12.1.3, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.17.2.1, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.9.1.2
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), SC-5(3)(a)
nist-csfDE.CM-1, PR.AC-3, PR.DS-4, PR.IP-1, PR.PT-3, PR.PT-4
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.9
stigidRHEL-09-253030
stigrefSV-257961r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value='1'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84014-0"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians%3D1%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84014-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253030
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians
  - unknown_severity

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84014-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253030
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians
  - unknown_severity

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians from config
    files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians
    replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84014-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253030
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians
  - unknown_severity
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value: !!str 1
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84014-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253030
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_log_martians
  - unknown_severity

Rule   Enable Kernel Parameter to Use Reverse Path Filtering on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter=1
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1
Rationale:
Enabling reverse path filtering drops packets with source addresses that should not have been able to be received on the interface they were received on. It should not be used on systems which are routers for complicated networks, but is helpful for end hosts and routers serving small networks.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter
Identifiers:

CCE-84009-0

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9
cobit5APO01.06, APO13.01, BAI04.04, DSS01.03, DSS01.05, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, DSS06.02
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.2.3.4, 4.3.3.4, 4.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.2, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.12.1.3, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.17.2.1, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a), SC-7(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-1, DE.CM-1, ID.AM-3, PR.AC-5, PR.DS-4, PR.DS-5, PR.PT-4
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR12
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.7
stigidRHEL-09-253050
stigrefSV-257965r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value='1'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84009-0"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter%3D1%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84009-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253050
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84009-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253050
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter from config
    files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter
    replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84009-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253050
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value: !!str 1
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84009-0
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253050
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_rp_filter

Rule   Configure Kernel Parameter for Accepting Secure Redirects By Default   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects=0
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = 0
Rationale:
Accepting "secure" ICMP redirects (from those gateways listed as default gateways) has few legitimate uses. It should be disabled unless it is absolutely required.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects
Identifiers:

CCE-84019-9

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9
cobit5APO01.06, APO13.01, BAI04.04, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS01.03, DSS01.05, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.02, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-001551
isa-62443-20094.2.3.4, 4.3.3.4, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3, 4.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.2, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.12.1.3, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.17.2.1, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-007-3 R4, CIP-007-3 R4.1, CIP-007-3 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), SC-5, SC-7(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-1, DE.CM-1, ID.AM-3, PR.AC-5, PR.DS-4, PR.DS-5, PR.IP-1, PR.PT-3, PR.PT-4
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR12
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.6

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value='0'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects="$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84019-9"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects%3D0%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84019-9
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84019-9
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects from
    config files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects
    replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84019-9
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value: !!str 0
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84019-9
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_secure_redirects

Rule   Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore ICMP Broadcast Echo Requests on IPv4 Interfaces   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts=1
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1
Rationale:
Responding to broadcast (ICMP) echoes facilitates network mapping and provides a vector for amplification attacks.
Ignoring ICMP echo requests (pings) sent to broadcast or multicast addresses makes the system slightly more difficult to enumerate on the network.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts
Identifiers:

CCE-84004-1

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.10.1.1
cobit5APO01.06, APO13.01, BAI04.04, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS01.03, DSS01.05, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.02, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.2.3.4, 4.3.3.4, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3, 4.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.2, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.12.1.3, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.17.2.1, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-007-3 R4, CIP-007-3 R4.1, CIP-007-3 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), SC-5
nist-csfDE.AE-1, DE.CM-1, ID.AM-3, PR.AC-5, PR.DS-4, PR.DS-5, PR.IP-1, PR.PT-3, PR.PT-4
pcidssReq-1.4.3
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.4
pcidss41.4.2, 1.4
stigidRHEL-09-253055
stigrefSV-257966r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value='1'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts="$sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84004-1"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts%3D1%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84004-1
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253055
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84004-1
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253055
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts from config
    files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts
    replace: '#net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84004-1
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253055
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value: !!str 1
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84004-1
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253055
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts

Rule   Enable Kernel Parameter to Ignore Bogus ICMP Error Responses on IPv4 Interfaces   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses=1
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1
Rationale:
Ignoring bogus ICMP error responses reduces log size, although some activity would not be logged.
Severity: 
unknown
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses
Identifiers:

CCE-84015-7

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9
cobit5APO13.01, BAI04.04, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS01.03, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.2, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.12.1.2, A.12.1.3, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.17.2.1, A.9.1.2
nerc-cipCIP-007-3 R4, CIP-007-3 R4.1, CIP-007-3 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), SC-5
nist-csfDE.CM-1, PR.DS-4, PR.IP-1, PR.PT-3
pcidssReq-1.4.3
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR12
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.3
pcidss41.4.2, 1.4
stigidRHEL-09-253060
stigrefSV-257967r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value='1'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses="$sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84015-7"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses%3D1%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84015-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253060
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses
  - unknown_severity

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84015-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253060
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses
  - unknown_severity

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses
    from config files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses
    replace: '#net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84015-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253060
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses
  - unknown_severity
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value: !!str 1
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84015-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253060
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.2
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses
  - unknown_severity

Rule   Enable Kernel Parameter to Use TCP Syncookies on Network Interfaces   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=1
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
Rationale:
A TCP SYN flood attack can cause a denial of service by filling a system's TCP connection table with connections in the SYN_RCVD state. Syncookies can be used to track a connection when a subsequent ACK is received, verifying the initiator is attempting a valid connection and is not a flood source. This feature is activated when a flood condition is detected, and enables the system to continue servicing valid connection requests.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies
Identifiers:

CCE-84006-6

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.10.1.1
cobit5APO01.06, APO13.01, BAI04.04, DSS01.03, DSS01.05, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, DSS06.02
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-001095, CCI-000366, CCI-002385
isa-62443-20094.2.3.4, 4.3.3.4, 4.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.2, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.12.1.3, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.17.2.1, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), SC-5(1), SC-5(2), SC-5(3)(a), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-1, DE.CM-1, ID.AM-3, PR.AC-5, PR.DS-4, PR.DS-5, PR.PT-4
pcidssReq-1.4.1
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227, SRG-OS-000420-GPOS-00186, SRG-OS-000142-GPOS-00071
anssiR12
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.10
pcidss41.4.3, 1.4
stigidRHEL-09-253010
stigrefSV-257957r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"

sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value='1'


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies="$sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value"
fi

#
# If net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to appropriate value
#	else, add "net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = value" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-84006-6"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies%3D1%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84006-6
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253010
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(1)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84006-6
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253010
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(1)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies from config files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies
    replace: '#net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84006-6
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253010
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(1)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies
- name: XCCDF Value sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value: !!str 1
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies is set
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies
    value: '{{ sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies_value }}'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84006-6
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253010
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(1)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(2)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5(3)(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.4.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_tcp_syncookies
Group   Network Parameters for Hosts Only   Group contains 3 rules
[ref]   If the system is not going to be used as a router, then setting certain kernel parameters ensure that the host will not perform routing of network traffic.

Rule   Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects=0
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0
Rationale:
ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages contain information from the system's route table possibly revealing portions of the network topology.
The ability to send ICMP redirects is only appropriate for systems acting as routers.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects
Identifiers:

CCE-83997-7

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.10.1.1
cobit5APO01.06, APO13.01, BAI04.04, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS01.03, DSS01.05, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.02, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.2.3.4, 4.3.3.4, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3, 4.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.2, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.12.1.3, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.17.2.1, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-007-3 R4, CIP-007-3 R4.1, CIP-007-3 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), SC-5, CM-6(a), SC-7(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-1, DE.CM-1, ID.AM-3, PR.AC-5, PR.DS-4, PR.DS-5, PR.IP-1, PR.PT-3, PR.PT-4
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR12
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.2
pcidss41.4.5, 1.4
stigidRHEL-09-253065
stigrefSV-257968r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects="0"
fi

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0"
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-83997-7"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects%3D0%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83997-7
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253065
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.5
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83997-7
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253065
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.5
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects from config
    files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects
    replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83997-7
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253065
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.5
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects is set to 0
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects
    value: '0'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83997-7
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253065
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.5
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_all_send_redirects

Rule   Disable Kernel Parameter for Sending ICMP Redirects on all IPv4 Interfaces by Default   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects=0
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0
Rationale:
ICMP redirect messages are used by routers to inform hosts that a more direct route exists for a particular destination. These messages contain information from the system's route table possibly revealing portions of the network topology.
The ability to send ICMP redirects is only appropriate for systems acting as routers.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects
Identifiers:

CCE-83999-3

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.10.1.1
cobit5APO01.06, APO13.01, BAI04.04, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS01.03, DSS01.05, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.02, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.2.3.4, 4.3.3.4, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3, 4.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.2, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.12.1.3, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.17.2.1, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-007-3 R4, CIP-007-3 R4.1, CIP-007-3 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), SC-5, CM-6(a), SC-7(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-1, DE.CM-1, ID.AM-3, PR.AC-5, PR.DS-4, PR.DS-5, PR.IP-1, PR.PT-3, PR.PT-4
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR12
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.2
pcidss41.4.5, 1.4
stigidRHEL-09-253070
stigrefSV-257969r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects="0"
fi

#
# If net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0"
#	else, add "net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-83999-3"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects%3D0%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/sysctl.d/75-sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83999-3
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253070
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.5
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83999-3
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253070
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.5
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects from config
    files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects
    replace: '#net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83999-3
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253070
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.5
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects is set to 0
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects
    value: '0'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83999-3
  - CJIS-5.10.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-253070
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.5
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_conf_default_send_redirects

Rule   Disable Kernel Parameter for IP Forwarding on IPv4 Interfaces   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the net.ipv4.ip_forward kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0
Warning:  Certain technologies such as virtual machines, containers, etc. rely on IPv4 forwarding to enable and use networking. Disabling IPv4 forwarding would cause those technologies to stop working. Therefore, this rule should not be used in profiles or benchmarks that target usage of IPv4 forwarding.
Rationale:
Routing protocol daemons are typically used on routers to exchange network topology information with other routers. If this capability is used when not required, system network information may be unnecessarily transmitted across the network.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward
Identifiers:

CCE-83998-5

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9
cobit5APO13.01, BAI04.04, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS01.03, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.06
cui3.1.20
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.2, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.12.1.2, A.12.1.3, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.17.2.1, A.9.1.2
nerc-cipCIP-007-3 R4, CIP-007-3 R4.1, CIP-007-3 R4.2, CIP-007-3 R5.1
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), SC-5, CM-6(a), SC-7(a)
nist-csfDE.CM-1, PR.DS-4, PR.IP-1, PR.PT-3, PR.PT-4
pcidssReq-1.3.1, Req-1.3.2
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR12
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
cis3.3.1
pcidss41.4.3, 1.4

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.ip_forward from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "net.ipv4.ip_forward" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"


#
# Set runtime for net.ipv4.ip_forward
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w net.ipv4.ip_forward="0"
fi

#
# If net.ipv4.ip_forward present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0"
#	else, add "net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^net.ipv4.ip_forward")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^net.ipv4.ip_forward\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^net.ipv4.ip_forward\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-83998-5"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83998-5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.1
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83998-5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.1
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward

- name: Comment out any occurrences of net.ipv4.ip_forward from config files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*net.ipv4.ip_forward
    replace: '#net.ipv4.ip_forward'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83998-5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.1
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward

- name: Ensure sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward is set to 0
  sysctl:
    name: net.ipv4.ip_forward
    value: '0'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83998-5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.20
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-5
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.1
  - PCI-DSS-Req-1.3.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.4.3
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_net_ipv4_ip_forward
Group   nftables   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   If firewalld or iptables are being used in your environment, please follow the guidance in their respective section and pass-over the guidance in this section.

nftables is a subsystem of the Linux kernel providing filtering and classification of network packets/datagrams/frames and is the successor to iptables. The biggest change with the successor nftables is its simplicity. With iptables, we have to configure every single rule and use the syntax which can be compared with normal commands. With nftables, the simpler syntax, much like BPF (Berkely Packet Filter) means shorter lines and less repetition. Support for nftables should also be compiled into the kernel, together with the related nftables modules.

It is available in Linux kernels >= 3.13. Please ensure that your kernel supports nftables before choosing this option.

Rule   Verify nftables Service is Disabled   [ref]

nftables is a subsystem of the Linux kernel providing filtering and classification of network packets/datagrams/frames and is the successor to iptables. The nftables service can be disabled with the following command: 
systemctl disable nftables
Rationale:
Running both firewalld and nftables may lead to conflict. nftables is actually one of the backends for firewalld management tools.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_service_nftables_disabled
Identifiers:

CCE-88429-6

References:
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL3
cis4.1.2
pcidss41.2.1, 1.2

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if ( rpm --quiet -q firewalld && rpm --quiet -q nftables && rpm --quiet -q kernel ); then

SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl'
"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'nftables.service'
"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" disable 'nftables.service'
"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'nftables.service'
# Disable socket activation if we have a unit file for it
if "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" -q list-unit-files nftables.socket; then
    "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" stop 'nftables.socket'
    "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" mask 'nftables.socket'
fi
# The service may not be running because it has been started and failed,
# so let's reset the state so OVAL checks pass.
# Service should be 'inactive', not 'failed' after reboot though.
"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" reset-failed 'nftables.service' || true

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    systemd:
      units:
      - name: nftables.service
        enabled: false
        mask: true
      - name: nftables.socket
        enabled: false
        mask: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

service disable nftables



[customizations.services]
masked = ["nftables"]

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-88429-6
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.1
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - service_nftables_disabled

- name: Verify nftables Service is Disabled - Collect systemd Services Present in
    the System
  ansible.builtin.command: systemctl -q list-unit-files --type service
  register: service_exists
  changed_when: false
  failed_when: service_exists.rc not in [0, 1]
  check_mode: false
  when: ( "firewalld" in ansible_facts.packages and "nftables" in ansible_facts.packages
    and "kernel" in ansible_facts.packages )
  tags:
  - CCE-88429-6
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.1
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - service_nftables_disabled

- name: Verify nftables Service is Disabled - Ensure nftables.service is Masked
  ansible.builtin.systemd:
    name: nftables.service
    state: stopped
    enabled: false
    masked: true
  when:
  - ( "firewalld" in ansible_facts.packages and "nftables" in ansible_facts.packages
    and "kernel" in ansible_facts.packages )
  - service_exists.stdout_lines is search("nftables.service", multiline=True)
  tags:
  - CCE-88429-6
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.1
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - service_nftables_disabled

- name: Unit Socket Exists - nftables.socket
  ansible.builtin.command: systemctl -q list-unit-files nftables.socket
  register: socket_file_exists
  changed_when: false
  failed_when: socket_file_exists.rc not in [0, 1]
  check_mode: false
  when: ( "firewalld" in ansible_facts.packages and "nftables" in ansible_facts.packages
    and "kernel" in ansible_facts.packages )
  tags:
  - CCE-88429-6
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.1
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - service_nftables_disabled

- name: Verify nftables Service is Disabled - Disable Socket nftables
  ansible.builtin.systemd:
    name: nftables.socket
    enabled: false
    state: stopped
    masked: true
  when:
  - ( "firewalld" in ansible_facts.packages and "nftables" in ansible_facts.packages
    and "kernel" in ansible_facts.packages )
  - socket_file_exists.stdout_lines is search("nftables.socket", multiline=True)
  tags:
  - CCE-88429-6
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.1
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - service_nftables_disabled

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
include disable_nftables

class disable_nftables {
  service {'nftables':
    enable => false,
    ensure => 'stopped',
  }
}
Group   File Permissions and Masks   Group contains 3 groups and 4 rules
[ref]   Traditional Unix security relies heavily on file and directory permissions to prevent unauthorized users from reading or modifying files to which they should not have access.

Several of the commands in this section search filesystems for files or directories with certain characteristics, and are intended to be run on every local partition on a given system. When the variable PART appears in one of the commands below, it means that the command is intended to be run repeatedly, with the name of each local partition substituted for PART in turn.

The following command prints a list of all xfs partitions on the local system, which is the default filesystem for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 installations: 
$ mount -t xfs | awk '{print $3}'
For any systems that use a different local filesystem type, modify this command as appropriate.
Group   Restrict Dynamic Mounting and Unmounting of Filesystems   Group contains 3 rules
[ref]   Linux includes a number of facilities for the automated addition and removal of filesystems on a running system. These facilities may be necessary in many environments, but this capability also carries some risk -- whether direct risk from allowing users to introduce arbitrary filesystems, or risk that software flaws in the automated mount facility itself could allow an attacker to compromise the system.

This command can be used to list the types of filesystems that are available to the currently executing kernel: 
$ find /lib/modules/`uname -r`/kernel/fs -type f -name '*.ko'
If these filesystems are not required then they can be explicitly disabled in a configuratio file in /etc/modprobe.d.

Rule   Disable Mounting of squashfs   [ref]

To configure the system to prevent the squashfs kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf: 
install squashfs /bin/false
This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem. The squashfs filesystem type is a compressed read-only Linux filesystem embedded in small footprint systems (similar to cramfs). A squashfs image can be used without having to first decompress the image.
Rationale:
Removing support for unneeded filesystem types reduces the local attack surface of the system.
Severity: 
low
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_kernel_module_squashfs_disabled
Identifiers:

CCE-83855-7

References:
cis-csc11, 14, 3, 9
cobit5BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.05, DSS06.06
cui3.4.6
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.9.1.2
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.IP-1, PR.PT-3
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL4
cis1.1.1.6

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install squashfs" /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf ; then
	
	sed -i 's#^install squashfs.*#install squashfs /bin/false#g' /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf
	echo "install squashfs /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf
fi

if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist squashfs$" /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf ; then
	echo "blacklist squashfs" >> /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,install%20squashfs%20/bin/false%0Ablacklist%20squashfs%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83855-7
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.6
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - kernel_module_squashfs_disabled
  - low_complexity
  - low_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required

- name: Ensure kernel module 'squashfs' is disabled
  lineinfile:
    create: true
    dest: /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf
    regexp: install\s+squashfs
    line: install squashfs /bin/false
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83855-7
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.6
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - kernel_module_squashfs_disabled
  - low_complexity
  - low_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required

- name: Ensure kernel module 'squashfs' is blacklisted
  lineinfile:
    create: true
    dest: /etc/modprobe.d/squashfs.conf
    regexp: ^blacklist squashfs$
    line: blacklist squashfs
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83855-7
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.6
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - kernel_module_squashfs_disabled
  - low_complexity
  - low_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required

Rule   Disable Mounting of udf   [ref]

To configure the system to prevent the udf kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf: 
install udf /bin/false
This effectively prevents usage of this uncommon filesystem. The udf filesystem type is the universal disk format used to implement the ISO/IEC 13346 and ECMA-167 specifications. This is an open vendor filesystem type for data storage on a broad range of media. This filesystem type is neccessary to support writing DVDs and newer optical disc formats.
Rationale:
Removing support for unneeded filesystem types reduces the local attack surface of the system.
Severity: 
low
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_kernel_module_udf_disabled
Identifiers:

CCE-83852-4

References:
cis-csc11, 14, 3, 9
cobit5BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.05, DSS06.06
cui3.4.6
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.9.1.2
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.IP-1, PR.PT-3
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL4
cis1.1.1.7

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install udf" /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf ; then
	
	sed -i 's#^install udf.*#install udf /bin/false#g' /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf
	echo "install udf /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf
fi

if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist udf$" /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf ; then
	echo "blacklist udf" >> /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,install%20udf%20/bin/false%0Ablacklist%20udf%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83852-4
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.6
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - kernel_module_udf_disabled
  - low_complexity
  - low_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required

- name: Ensure kernel module 'udf' is disabled
  lineinfile:
    create: true
    dest: /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf
    regexp: install\s+udf
    line: install udf /bin/false
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83852-4
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.6
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - kernel_module_udf_disabled
  - low_complexity
  - low_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required

- name: Ensure kernel module 'udf' is blacklisted
  lineinfile:
    create: true
    dest: /etc/modprobe.d/udf.conf
    regexp: ^blacklist udf$
    line: blacklist udf
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83852-4
  - NIST-800-171-3.4.6
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - kernel_module_udf_disabled
  - low_complexity
  - low_severity
  - medium_disruption
  - reboot_required

Rule   Disable Modprobe Loading of USB Storage Driver   [ref]

To prevent USB storage devices from being used, configure the kernel module loading system to prevent automatic loading of the USB storage driver. To configure the system to prevent the usb-storage kernel module from being loaded, add the following line to the file /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf: 
install usb-storage /bin/false
This will prevent the modprobe program from loading the usb-storage module, but will not prevent an administrator (or another program) from using the insmod program to load the module manually.
Rationale:
USB storage devices such as thumb drives can be used to introduce malicious software.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_kernel_module_usb-storage_disabled
Identifiers:

CCE-83851-6

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 15, 16, 5
cobit5APO13.01, DSS01.04, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.10
cui3.1.21
disaCCI-000778, CCI-001958, CCI-003959
hipaa164.308(a)(3)(i), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.310(d)(1), 164.310(d)(2), 164.312(a)(1), 164.312(a)(2)(iv), 164.312(b)
isa-62443-20094.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.18.1.4, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.7.1.1, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a), MP-7
nist-csfPR.AC-1, PR.AC-3, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7
os-srgSRG-OS-000114-GPOS-00059, SRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000141-CTR-000315
ccnA.15.SEC-RHEL1
cis1.1.1.8
pcidss43.4.2, 3.4
stigidRHEL-09-291010
stigrefSV-258034r997116_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^install usb-storage" /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf ; then
	
	sed -i 's#^install usb-storage.*#install usb-storage /bin/false#g' /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf
else
	echo -e "\n# Disable per security requirements" >> /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf
	echo "install usb-storage /bin/false" >> /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf
fi

if ! LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 "^blacklist usb-storage$" /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf ; then
	echo "blacklist usb-storage" >> /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,install%20usb-storage%20/bin/false%0Ablacklist%20usb-storage%0A
        mode: 0644
        path: /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83851-6
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-291010
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.21
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-MP-7
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2
  - disable_strategy
  - kernel_module_usb-storage_disabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required

- name: Ensure kernel module 'usb-storage' is disabled
  lineinfile:
    create: true
    dest: /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf
    regexp: install\s+usb-storage
    line: install usb-storage /bin/false
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83851-6
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-291010
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.21
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-MP-7
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2
  - disable_strategy
  - kernel_module_usb-storage_disabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required

- name: Ensure kernel module 'usb-storage' is blacklisted
  lineinfile:
    create: true
    dest: /etc/modprobe.d/usb-storage.conf
    regexp: ^blacklist usb-storage$
    line: blacklist usb-storage
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83851-6
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-291010
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.21
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-MP-7
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.4.2
  - disable_strategy
  - kernel_module_usb-storage_disabled
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
Group   Restrict Programs from Dangerous Execution Patterns   Group contains 1 group and 1 rule
[ref]   The recommendations in this section are designed to ensure that the system's features to protect against potentially dangerous program execution are activated. These protections are applied at the system initialization or kernel level, and defend against certain types of badly-configured or compromised programs.
Group   Disable Core Dumps   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   A core dump file is the memory image of an executable program when it was terminated by the operating system due to errant behavior. In most cases, only software developers legitimately need to access these files. The core dump files may also contain sensitive information, or unnecessarily occupy large amounts of disk space.

Once a hard limit is set in /etc/security/limits.conf, or to a file within the /etc/security/limits.d/ directory, a user cannot increase that limit within his or her own session. If access to core dumps is required, consider restricting them to only certain users or groups. See the limits.conf man page for more information.

The core dumps of setuid programs are further protected. The sysctl variable fs.suid_dumpable controls whether the kernel allows core dumps from these programs at all. The default value of 0 is recommended.

Rule   Disable Core Dumps for SUID programs   [ref]

To set the runtime status of the fs.suid_dumpable kernel parameter, run the following command: 
$ sudo sysctl -w fs.suid_dumpable=0
To make sure that the setting is persistent, add the following line to a file in the directory /etc/sysctl.d: 
fs.suid_dumpable = 0
Rationale:
The core dump of a setuid program is more likely to contain sensitive data, as the program itself runs with greater privileges than the user who initiated execution of the program. Disabling the ability for any setuid program to write a core file decreases the risk of unauthorized access of such data.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable
Identifiers:

CCE-83981-1

References:
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3), 164.308(a)(4), 164.310(b), 164.310(c), 164.312(a), 164.312(e)
nistSI-11(a), SI-11(b)
anssiR14
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL6
pcidss43.3.1.1, 3.3.1, 3.3

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Comment out any occurrences of fs.suid_dumpable from /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files

for f in /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf /run/sysctl.d/*.conf /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/*.conf; do


  # skip systemd-sysctl symlink (/etc/sysctl.d/99-sysctl.conf -> /etc/sysctl.conf)
  if [[ "$(readlink -f "$f")" == "/etc/sysctl.conf" ]]; then continue; fi

  matching_list=$(grep -P '^(?!#).*[\s]*fs.suid_dumpable.*$' $f | uniq )
  if ! test -z "$matching_list"; then
    while IFS= read -r entry; do
      escaped_entry=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$entry")
      # comment out "fs.suid_dumpable" matches to preserve user data
      sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^${escaped_entry}$/# &/g" $f
    done <<< "$matching_list"
  fi
done

#
# Set sysctl config file which to save the desired value
#

SYSCONFIG_FILE="/etc/sysctl.conf"


#
# Set runtime for fs.suid_dumpable
#
if [[ "$OSCAP_BOOTC_BUILD" != "YES" ]] ; then
    /sbin/sysctl -q -n -w fs.suid_dumpable="0"
fi

#
# If fs.suid_dumpable present in /etc/sysctl.conf, change value to "0"
#	else, add "fs.suid_dumpable = 0" to /etc/sysctl.conf
#

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^fs.suid_dumpable")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "0"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^fs.suid_dumpable\\>" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^fs.suid_dumpable\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
else
    if [[ -s "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    fi
    cce="CCE-83981-1"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "${SYSCONFIG_FILE}"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:medium
Reboot:true
Strategy:disable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83981-1
  - NIST-800-53-SI-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-11(b)
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.1
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable

- name: List /etc/sysctl.d/*.conf files
  find:
    paths:
    - /etc/sysctl.d/
    - /run/sysctl.d/
    - /usr/local/lib/sysctl.d/
    contains: ^[\s]*fs.suid_dumpable.*$
    patterns: '*.conf'
    file_type: any
  register: find_sysctl_d
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83981-1
  - NIST-800-53-SI-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-11(b)
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.1
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable

- name: Comment out any occurrences of fs.suid_dumpable from config files
  replace:
    path: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: ^[\s]*fs.suid_dumpable
    replace: '#fs.suid_dumpable'
  loop: '{{ find_sysctl_d.files }}'
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83981-1
  - NIST-800-53-SI-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-11(b)
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.1
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable

- name: Ensure sysctl fs.suid_dumpable is set to 0
  sysctl:
    name: fs.suid_dumpable
    value: '0'
    sysctl_file: /etc/sysctl.conf
    state: present
    reload: true
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83981-1
  - NIST-800-53-SI-11(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SI-11(b)
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-3.3.1.1
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - medium_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - sysctl_fs_suid_dumpable
Group   SELinux   Group contains 4 rules
[ref]   SELinux is a feature of the Linux kernel which can be used to guard against misconfigured or compromised programs. SELinux enforces the idea that programs should be limited in what files they can access and what actions they can take.

The default SELinux policy, as configured on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9, has been sufficiently developed and debugged that it should be usable on almost any system with minimal configuration and a small amount of system administrator training. This policy prevents system services - including most of the common network-visible services such as mail servers, FTP servers, and DNS servers - from accessing files which those services have no valid reason to access. This action alone prevents a huge amount of possible damage from network attacks against services, from trojaned software, and so forth.

This guide recommends that SELinux be enabled using the default (targeted) policy on every Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 system, unless that system has unusual requirements which make a stronger policy appropriate.

Rule   Install libselinux Package   [ref]

The libselinux package can be installed with the following command: 
$ sudo dnf install libselinux
Rationale:
Security-enhanced Linux is a feature of the Linux kernel and a number of utilities with enhanced security functionality designed to add mandatory access controls to Linux. The libselinux package contains the core library of the Security-enhanced Linux system.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_libselinux_installed
Identifiers:

CCE-84069-4

References:
ccnA.6.SEC-RHEL1
cis1.3.1.1
pcidss41.2.6, 1.2

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

if ! rpm -q --quiet "libselinux" ; then
    dnf install -y "libselinux"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable

package install libselinux



[[packages]]
name = "libselinux"
version = "*"

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84069-4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6
  - enable_strategy
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_libselinux_installed

- name: Ensure libselinux is installed
  package:
    name: libselinux
    state: present
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84069-4
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6
  - enable_strategy
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_libselinux_installed

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable

dnf install libselinux

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable

package --add=libselinux

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
include install_libselinux

class install_libselinux {
  package { 'libselinux':
    ensure => 'installed',
  }
}

Rule   Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub   [ref]

SELinux can be disabled at boot time by an argument in /etc/default/grub. Remove any instances of selinux=0 from the kernel arguments in that file to prevent SELinux from being disabled at boot.
Rationale:
Disabling a major host protection feature, such as SELinux, at boot time prevents it from confining system services at boot time. Further, it increases the chances that it will remain off during system operation.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_grub2_enable_selinux
Identifiers:

CCE-84078-5

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9
cobit5APO01.06, APO11.04, APO13.01, BAI03.05, DSS01.05, DSS03.01, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.02, DSS06.03, DSS06.06, MEA02.01
cui3.1.2, 3.7.2
disaCCI-000022, CCI-000032
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3), 164.308(a)(4), 164.310(b), 164.310(c), 164.312(a), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.4, 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.4, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4, 4.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-003-8 R5.1.1, CIP-003-8 R5.3, CIP-004-6 R2.2.3, CIP-004-6 R2.3, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.2, CIP-007-3 R5.2, CIP-007-3 R5.3.1, CIP-007-3 R5.3.2, CIP-007-3 R5.3.3
nistAC-3, AC-3(3)(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-1, ID.AM-3, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-5, PR.AC-6, PR.DS-5, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-3, PR.PT-4
ccnA.6.SEC-RHEL1
cis1.3.1.2
pcidss41.2.6, 1.2

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel && { rpm --quiet -q grub2-common; }; then

sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/selinux=0//gI" /etc/default/grub /etc/grub2.cfg /etc/grub.d/*
sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/enforcing=0//gI" /etc/default/grub /etc/grub2.cfg /etc/grub.d/*

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84078-5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.7.2
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6
  - grub2_enable_selinux
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Find /etc/grub.d/ files
  ansible.builtin.find:
    paths:
    - /etc/grub.d/
    follow: true
  register: result_grub_d
  when:
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84078-5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.7.2
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6
  - grub2_enable_selinux
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Ensure SELinux Not Disabled
    in /etc/grub.d/ files
  ansible.builtin.replace:
    dest: '{{ item.path }}'
    regexp: (selinux|enforcing)=0
  with_items:
  - '{{ result_grub_d.files }}'
  when:
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84078-5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.7.2
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6
  - grub2_enable_selinux
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Check if /etc/grub2.cfg
    exists
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /etc/grub2.cfg
  register: result_grub2_cfg_present
  when:
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84078-5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.7.2
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6
  - grub2_enable_selinux
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Check if /etc/default/grub
    exists
  ansible.builtin.stat:
    path: /etc/default/grub
  register: result_default_grub_present
  when:
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84078-5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.7.2
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6
  - grub2_enable_selinux
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Ensure SELinux Not Disabled
    in /etc/grub2.cfg
  ansible.builtin.replace:
    dest: /etc/grub2.cfg
    regexp: (selinux|enforcing)=0
  when:
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_grub2_cfg_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CCE-84078-5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.7.2
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6
  - grub2_enable_selinux
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Ensure SELinux Not Disabled in /etc/default/grub - Ensure SELinux Not Disabled
    in /etc/default/grub
  ansible.builtin.replace:
    dest: /etc/default/grub
    regexp: (selinux|enforcing)=0
  when:
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"grub2-common" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - result_default_grub_present.stat.exists
  tags:
  - CCE-84078-5
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.7.2
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6
  - grub2_enable_selinux
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Configure SELinux Policy   [ref]

The SELinux targeted policy is appropriate for general-purpose desktops and servers, as well as systems in many other roles. To configure the system to use this policy, add or correct the following line in /etc/selinux/config: 
SELINUXTYPE=targeted
Other policies, such as mls, provide additional security labeling and greater confinement but are not compatible with many general-purpose use cases.
Rationale:
Setting the SELinux policy to targeted or a more specialized policy ensures the system will confine processes that are likely to be targeted for exploitation, such as network or system services.

Note: During the development or debugging of SELinux modules, it is common to temporarily place non-production systems in permissive mode. In such temporary cases, SELinux policies should be developed, and once work is completed, the system should be reconfigured to targeted.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_selinux_policytype
Identifiers:

CCE-84074-4

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9
cobit5APO01.06, APO11.04, APO13.01, BAI03.05, DSS01.05, DSS03.01, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.02, DSS06.03, DSS06.06, MEA02.01
cui3.1.2, 3.7.2
disaCCI-002696
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3), 164.308(a)(4), 164.310(b), 164.310(c), 164.312(a), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.4, 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.4, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4, 4.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-003-8 R5.1.1, CIP-003-8 R5.2, CIP-003-8 R5.3, CIP-004-6 R2.2.3, CIP-004-6 R2.3, CIP-004-6 R3.3, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.2, CIP-007-3 R5.2, CIP-007-3 R5.3.1, CIP-007-3 R5.3.2, CIP-007-3 R5.3.3, CIP-007-3 R6.5
nistAC-3, AC-3(3)(a), AU-9, SC-7(21)
nist-csfDE.AE-1, ID.AM-3, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-5, PR.AC-6, PR.DS-5, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-3, PR.PT-4
os-srgSRG-OS-000445-GPOS-00199
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000233-CTR-000585
anssiR46, R64
bsiAPP.4.4.A4, SYS.1.6.A3, SYS.1.6.A18, SYS.1.6.A21
ccnA.6.SEC-RHEL1
cis1.3.1.3
pcidss41.2.6, 1.2
stigidRHEL-09-431015
stigrefSV-258079r958944_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

var_selinux_policy_name='targeted'


if [ -e "/etc/selinux/config" ] ; then
    
    LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^SELINUXTYPE=/Id" "/etc/selinux/config"
else
    touch "/etc/selinux/config"
fi
# make sure file has newline at the end
sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/selinux/config"

cp "/etc/selinux/config" "/etc/selinux/config.bak"
# Insert at the end of the file
printf '%s\n' "SELINUXTYPE=$var_selinux_policy_name" >> "/etc/selinux/config"
# Clean up after ourselves.
rm "/etc/selinux/config.bak"

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84074-4
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-431015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.7.2
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-9
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy
  - selinux_policytype
- name: XCCDF Value var_selinux_policy_name # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_selinux_policy_name: !!str targeted
  tags:
    - always

- name: Configure SELinux Policy
  block:

  - name: Check for duplicate values
    lineinfile:
      path: /etc/selinux/config
      create: true
      regexp: (?i)^SELINUXTYPE=
      state: absent
    check_mode: true
    changed_when: false
    register: dupes

  - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/selinux/config
    lineinfile:
      path: /etc/selinux/config
      create: true
      regexp: (?i)^SELINUXTYPE=
      state: absent
    when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1

  - name: Insert correct line to /etc/selinux/config
    lineinfile:
      path: /etc/selinux/config
      create: true
      regexp: (?i)^SELINUXTYPE=
      line: SELINUXTYPE={{ var_selinux_policy_name }}
      state: present
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84074-4
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-431015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.7.2
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-9
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy
  - selinux_policytype

Rule   Ensure SELinux State is Enforcing   [ref]

The SELinux state should be set to enforcing at system boot time. In the file /etc/selinux/config, add or correct the following line to configure the system to boot into enforcing mode: 
SELINUX=enforcing
Rationale:
Setting the SELinux state to enforcing ensures SELinux is able to confine potentially compromised processes to the security policy, which is designed to prevent them from causing damage to the system or further elevating their privileges.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_selinux_state
Identifiers:

CCE-84079-3

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9
cobit5APO01.06, APO11.04, APO13.01, BAI03.05, DSS01.05, DSS03.01, DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.02, DSS06.03, DSS06.06, MEA02.01
cui3.1.2, 3.7.2
disaCCI-002696, CCI-001084
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3), 164.308(a)(4), 164.310(b), 164.310(c), 164.312(a), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.4, 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.4, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4, 4.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.1.1, A.12.1.2, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.2, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-003-8 R5.1.1, CIP-003-8 R5.2, CIP-003-8 R5.3, CIP-004-6 R2.2.3, CIP-004-6 R2.3, CIP-004-6 R3.3, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.2, CIP-007-3 R5.2, CIP-007-3 R5.3.1, CIP-007-3 R5.3.2, CIP-007-3 R5.3.3, CIP-007-3 R6.5
nistAC-3, AC-3(3)(a), AU-9, SC-7(21)
nist-csfDE.AE-1, ID.AM-3, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-5, PR.AC-6, PR.DS-5, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-3, PR.PT-4
os-srgSRG-OS-000445-GPOS-00199, SRG-OS-000134-GPOS-00068
anssiR37, R79
bsiAPP.4.4.A4, SYS.1.6.A3, SYS.1.6.A18, SYS.1.6.A21
ccnA.6.SEC-RHEL1
cis1.3.1.5
pcidss41.2.6, 1.2
stigidRHEL-09-431010
stigrefSV-258078r958944_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

var_selinux_state='enforcing'


if [ -e "/etc/selinux/config" ] ; then
    
    LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^SELINUX=/Id" "/etc/selinux/config"
else
    touch "/etc/selinux/config"
fi
# make sure file has newline at the end
sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/selinux/config"

cp "/etc/selinux/config" "/etc/selinux/config.bak"
# Insert at the end of the file
printf '%s\n' "SELINUX=$var_selinux_state" >> "/etc/selinux/config"
# Clean up after ourselves.
rm "/etc/selinux/config.bak"

fixfiles onboot
fixfiles -f relabel

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84079-3
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-431010
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.7.2
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-9
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - selinux_state
- name: XCCDF Value var_selinux_state # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_selinux_state: !!str enforcing
  tags:
    - always

- name: Ensure SELinux State is Enforcing
  block:

  - name: Check for duplicate values
    lineinfile:
      path: /etc/selinux/config
      create: true
      regexp: (?i)^SELINUX=
      state: absent
    check_mode: true
    changed_when: false
    register: dupes

  - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/selinux/config
    lineinfile:
      path: /etc/selinux/config
      create: true
      regexp: (?i)^SELINUX=
      state: absent
    when: dupes.found is defined and dupes.found > 1

  - name: Insert correct line to /etc/selinux/config
    lineinfile:
      path: /etc/selinux/config
      create: true
      regexp: (?i)^SELINUX=
      line: SELINUX={{ var_selinux_state }}
      state: present
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84079-3
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-431010
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.2
  - NIST-800-171-3.7.2
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3
  - NIST-800-53-AC-3(3)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-9
  - NIST-800-53-SC-7(21)
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-1.2.6
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - selinux_state
Group   Services   Group contains 18 groups and 18 rules
[ref]   The best protection against vulnerable software is running less software. This section describes how to review the software which Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 installs on a system and disable software which is not needed. It then enumerates the software packages installed on a default Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 system and provides guidance about which ones can be safely disabled.

Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 provides a convenient minimal install option that essentially installs the bare necessities for a functional system. When building Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 systems, it is highly recommended to select the minimal packages and then build up the system from there.
Group   DNS Server   Group contains 1 group and 1 rule
[ref]   Most organizations have an operational need to run at least one nameserver. However, there are many common attacks involving DNS server software, and this server software should be disabled on any system on which it is not needed.
Group   Disable DNS Server   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   DNS software should be disabled on any systems which does not need to be a nameserver. Note that the BIND DNS server software is not installed on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 by default. The remainder of this section discusses secure configuration of systems which must be nameservers.

Rule   Uninstall bind Package   [ref]

The named service is provided by the bind package. The bind package can be removed with the following command: 
$ sudo dnf remove bind
Rationale:
If there is no need to make DNS server software available, removing it provides a safeguard against its activation.
Severity: 
low
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_bind_removed
Identifiers:

CCE-86505-5

References:
cis-csc11, 14, 3, 9
cobit5BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.05, DSS06.06
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.9.1.2
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.IP-1, PR.PT-3
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL4
cis2.1.4

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove bind
#	   from the system, and may remove any packages
#	   that depend on bind. Execute this
#	   remediation AFTER testing on a non-production
#	   system!

if rpm -q --quiet "bind" ; then
dnf remove -y --noautoremove "bind"
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

package remove bind

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
- name: Ensure bind is removed
  package:
    name: bind
    state: absent
  tags:
  - CCE-86505-5
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - low_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_bind_removed

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

dnf remove bind

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

package --remove=bind

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
include remove_bind

class remove_bind {
  package { 'bind':
    ensure => 'purged',
  }
}
Group   FTP Server   Group contains 1 group and 1 rule
[ref]   FTP is a common method for allowing remote access to files. Like telnet, the FTP protocol is unencrypted, which means that passwords and other data transmitted during the session can be captured and that the session is vulnerable to hijacking. Therefore, running the FTP server software is not recommended.

However, there are some FTP server configurations which may be appropriate for some environments, particularly those which allow only read-only anonymous access as a means of downloading data available to the public.
Group   Disable vsftpd if Possible   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   To minimize attack surface, disable vsftpd if at all possible.

Rule   Uninstall vsftpd Package   [ref]

The vsftpd package can be removed with the following command: 
 $ sudo dnf remove vsftpd
Rationale:
Removing the vsftpd package decreases the risk of its accidental activation.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_vsftpd_removed
Identifiers:

CCE-84159-3

References:
cis-csc11, 14, 3, 9
cobit5BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.05, DSS06.06
disaCCI-000366, CCI-000197, CCI-000381
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.9.1.2
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a), IA-5(1)(c), IA-5(1).1(v), CM-7, CM-7.1(ii)
nist-csfPR.IP-1, PR.PT-3
os-srgSRG-OS-000074-GPOS-00042, SRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049, SRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL4
cis2.1.7
stigidRHEL-09-215015
stigrefSV-257826r987796_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove vsftpd
#	   from the system, and may remove any packages
#	   that depend on vsftpd. Execute this
#	   remediation AFTER testing on a non-production
#	   system!

if rpm -q --quiet "vsftpd" ; then
dnf remove -y --noautoremove "vsftpd"
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

package remove vsftpd

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
- name: Ensure vsftpd is removed
  package:
    name: vsftpd
    state: absent
  tags:
  - CCE-84159-3
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-215015
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7.1(ii)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1)(c)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-5(1).1(v)
  - disable_strategy
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_vsftpd_removed

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

dnf remove vsftpd

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

package --remove=vsftpd

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
include remove_vsftpd

class remove_vsftpd {
  package { 'vsftpd':
    ensure => 'purged',
  }
}
Group   IMAP and POP3 Server   Group contains 2 groups and 2 rules
[ref]   Dovecot provides IMAP and POP3 services. It is not installed by default. The project page at http://www.dovecot.org contains more detailed information about Dovecot configuration.
Group   Disable Cyrus IMAP   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   If the system does not need to operate as an IMAP or POP3 server, the Cyrus IMAP software should be removed.

Rule   Uninstall cyrus-imapd Package   [ref]

The cyrus-imapd package can be removed with the following command: 
$ sudo dnf remove cyrus-imapd
Rationale:
If there is no need to make the cyrus-imapd software available, removing it provides a safeguard against its activation.
Severity: 
unknown
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_cyrus-imapd_removed
Identifiers:

CCE-88120-1

References:
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL4
cis2.1.8

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove cyrus-imapd
#	   from the system, and may remove any packages
#	   that depend on cyrus-imapd. Execute this
#	   remediation AFTER testing on a non-production
#	   system!

if rpm -q --quiet "cyrus-imapd" ; then
dnf remove -y --noautoremove "cyrus-imapd"
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

package remove cyrus-imapd

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
- name: Ensure cyrus-imapd is removed
  package:
    name: cyrus-imapd
    state: absent
  tags:
  - CCE-88120-1
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_cyrus-imapd_removed
  - unknown_severity

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

dnf remove cyrus-imapd

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

package --remove=cyrus-imapd

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
include remove_cyrus-imapd

class remove_cyrus-imapd {
  package { 'cyrus-imapd':
    ensure => 'purged',
  }
}
Group   Disable Dovecot   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   If the system does not need to operate as an IMAP or POP3 server, the dovecot software should be disabled and removed.

Rule   Uninstall dovecot Package   [ref]

The dovecot package can be removed with the following command: 
$ sudo dnf remove dovecot
Rationale:
If there is no need to make the Dovecot software available, removing it provides a safeguard against its activation.
Severity: 
unknown
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_dovecot_removed
Identifiers:

CCE-85977-7

References:
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL4
cis2.1.8

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove dovecot
#	   from the system, and may remove any packages
#	   that depend on dovecot. Execute this
#	   remediation AFTER testing on a non-production
#	   system!

if rpm -q --quiet "dovecot" ; then
dnf remove -y --noautoremove "dovecot"
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

package remove dovecot

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
- name: Ensure dovecot is removed
  package:
    name: dovecot
    state: absent
  tags:
  - CCE-85977-7
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_dovecot_removed
  - unknown_severity

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

dnf remove dovecot

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

package --remove=dovecot

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
include remove_dovecot

class remove_dovecot {
  package { 'dovecot':
    ensure => 'purged',
  }
}
Group   Network Time Protocol   Group contains 3 rules
[ref]   The Network Time Protocol is used to manage the system clock over a network. Computer clocks are not very accurate, so time will drift unpredictably on unmanaged systems. Central time protocols can be used both to ensure that time is consistent among a network of systems, and that their time is consistent with the outside world.

If every system on a network reliably reports the same time, then it is much easier to correlate log messages in case of an attack. In addition, a number of cryptographic protocols (such as Kerberos) use timestamps to prevent certain types of attacks. If your network does not have synchronized time, these protocols may be unreliable or even unusable.

Depending on the specifics of the network, global time accuracy may be just as important as local synchronization, or not very important at all. If your network is connected to the Internet, using a public timeserver (or one provided by your enterprise) provides globally accurate timestamps which may be essential in investigating or responding to an attack which originated outside of your network.

A typical network setup involves a small number of internal systems operating as NTP servers, and the remainder obtaining time information from those internal servers.

There is a choice between the daemons ntpd and chronyd, which are available from the repositories in the ntp and chrony packages respectively.

The default chronyd daemon can work well when external time references are only intermittently accesible, can perform well even when the network is congested for longer periods of time, can usually synchronize the clock faster and with better time accuracy, and quickly adapts to sudden changes in the rate of the clock, for example, due to changes in the temperature of the crystal oscillator. Chronyd should be considered for all systems which are frequently suspended or otherwise intermittently disconnected and reconnected to a network. Mobile and virtual systems for example.

The ntpd NTP daemon fully supports NTP protocol version 4 (RFC 5905), including broadcast, multicast, manycast clients and servers, and the orphan mode. It also supports extra authentication schemes based on public-key cryptography (RFC 5906). The NTP daemon (ntpd) should be considered for systems which are normally kept permanently on. Systems which are required to use broadcast or multicast IP, or to perform authentication of packets with the Autokey protocol, should consider using ntpd.

Refer to https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/9/html/configuring_basic_system_settings/configuring-time-synchronization_configuring-basic-system-settings for more detailed comparison of features of chronyd and ntpd daemon features respectively, and for further guidance how to choose between the two NTP daemons.

The upstream manual pages at https://chrony-project.org/documentation.html for chronyd and http://www.ntp.org for ntpd provide additional information on the capabilities and configuration of each of the NTP daemons.

Rule   The Chrony package is installed   [ref]

System time should be synchronized between all systems in an environment. This is typically done by establishing an authoritative time server or set of servers and having all systems synchronize their clocks to them. The chrony package can be installed with the following command: 
$ sudo dnf install chrony
Rationale:
Time synchronization is important to support time sensitive security mechanisms like Kerberos and also ensures log files have consistent time records across the enterprise, which aids in forensic investigations.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_chrony_installed
Identifiers:

CCE-84215-3

References:
disaCCI-004923
ism0988, 1405
osppFMT_SMF_EXT.1
pcidssReq-10.4
os-srgSRG-OS-000355-GPOS-00143
anssiR71
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL3
cis2.3.1
pcidss410.6.1, 10.6
stigidRHEL-09-252010
stigrefSV-257943r1015081_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

if ! rpm -q --quiet "chrony" ; then
    dnf install -y "chrony"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable

package install chrony



[[packages]]
name = "chrony"
version = "*"

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84215-3
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-252010
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.6
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.1
  - enable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_chrony_installed

- name: Ensure chrony is installed
  package:
    name: chrony
    state: present
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84215-3
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-252010
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.6
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.1
  - enable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_chrony_installed

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable

dnf install chrony

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable

package --add=chrony

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
include install_chrony

class install_chrony {
  package { 'chrony':
    ensure => 'installed',
  }
}

Rule   A remote time server for Chrony is configured   [ref]

Chrony is a daemon which implements the Network Time Protocol (NTP). It is designed to synchronize system clocks across a variety of systems and use a source that is highly accurate. More information on chrony can be found at https://chrony-project.org/. Chrony can be configured to be a client and/or a server. Add or edit server or pool lines to /etc/chrony.conf as appropriate: 
server <remote-server>
Multiple servers may be configured.
Rationale:
If chrony is in use on the system proper configuration is vital to ensuring time synchronization is working properly.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_chronyd_specify_remote_server
Identifiers:

CCE-84218-7

References:
disaCCI-001890, CCI-004926, CCI-004923
ism0988, 1405
nistCM-6(a), AU-8(1)(a)
pcidssReq-10.4.3
os-srgSRG-OS-000355-GPOS-00143
anssiR71
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL3
cis2.3.2
pcidss410.6.2, 10.6
stigidRHEL-09-252020
stigrefSV-257945r1015083_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel && { rpm --quiet -q chrony; }; then

var_multiple_time_servers='0.rhel.pool.ntp.org,1.rhel.pool.ntp.org,2.rhel.pool.ntp.org,3.rhel.pool.ntp.org'


config_file="/etc/chrony.conf"

if ! grep -q '^[[:space:]]*\(server\|pool\)[[:space:]]\+[[:graph:]]\+' "$config_file" ; then
  if ! grep -q '#[[:space:]]*server' "$config_file" ; then
    for server in $(echo "$var_multiple_time_servers" | tr ',' '\n') ; do
      printf '\nserver %s' "$server" >> "$config_file"
    done
  else
    sed -i 's/#[ \t]*server/server/g' "$config_file"
  fi
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84218-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-252020
  - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.6
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.2
  - chronyd_specify_remote_server
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
- name: XCCDF Value var_multiple_time_servers # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_multiple_time_servers: !!str 0.rhel.pool.ntp.org,1.rhel.pool.ntp.org,2.rhel.pool.ntp.org,3.rhel.pool.ntp.org
  tags:
    - always

- name: Detect if chrony is already configured with pools or servers
  find:
    path: /etc
    patterns: chrony.conf
    contains: ^[\s]*(?:server|pool)[\s]+[\w]+
  register: chrony_servers
  when:
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"chrony" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84218-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-252020
  - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.6
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.2
  - chronyd_specify_remote_server
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Configure remote time servers
  lineinfile:
    path: /etc/chrony.conf
    line: server {{ item }}
    state: present
    create: true
  loop: '{{ var_multiple_time_servers.split(",") }}'
  when:
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"chrony" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - chrony_servers.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-84218-7
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-252020
  - NIST-800-53-AU-8(1)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.4.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.6
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.2
  - chronyd_specify_remote_server
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

Rule   Ensure that chronyd is running under chrony user account   [ref]

chrony is a daemon which implements the Network Time Protocol (NTP). It is designed to synchronize system clocks across a variety of systems and use a source that is highly accurate. More information on chrony can be found at https://chrony-project.org/. Chrony can be configured to be a client and/or a server. To ensure that chronyd is running under chrony user account, remove any -u ... option from OPTIONS other than -u chrony, as chrony is run under its own user by default. This recommendation only applies if chrony is in use on the system.
Rationale:
If chrony is in use on the system proper configuration is vital to ensuring time synchronization is working properly.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_chronyd_run_as_chrony_user
Identifiers:

CCE-84108-0

References:
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL3
cis2.3.3
pcidss410.6.3, 10.6

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel && { rpm --quiet -q chrony; }; then

if grep -q 'OPTIONS=.*' /etc/sysconfig/chronyd; then
	# trying to solve cases where the parameter after OPTIONS
	#may or may not be enclosed in quotes
	sed -i -E -e 's/\s*-u\s*\w+\s*/ /' -e 's/^([\s]*OPTIONS=["]?[^"]*)("?)/\1\2/' /etc/sysconfig/chronyd
fi

if grep -q 'OPTIONS=.*' /etc/sysconfig/chronyd; then
	# trying to solve cases where the parameter after OPTIONS
	#may or may not be enclosed in quotes
	sed -i -E -e 's/\s*-u\s*\w+\s*/ /' -e 's/^([\s]*OPTIONS=["]?[^"]*)("?)/\1 -u chrony\2/' /etc/sysconfig/chronyd
else
	echo 'OPTIONS="-u chrony"' >> /etc/sysconfig/chronyd
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84108-0
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.6
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3
  - chronyd_run_as_chrony_user
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Detect if file /etc/sysconfig/chronyd is not empty or missing
  find:
    path: /etc/sysconfig/
    patterns: chronyd
    contains: ^([\s]*OPTIONS=["]?[^"]*)("?)
  register: chronyd_file
  when:
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"chrony" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-84108-0
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.6
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3
  - chronyd_run_as_chrony_user
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Remove any previous configuration of user used to run chronyd process
  replace:
    path: /etc/sysconfig/chronyd
    regexp: \s*-u\s*\w+\s*
    replace: ' '
  when:
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"chrony" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - chronyd_file is defined and chronyd_file.matched > 0
  tags:
  - CCE-84108-0
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.6
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.6.3
  - chronyd_run_as_chrony_user
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
Group   Obsolete Services   Group contains 2 groups and 2 rules
[ref]   This section discusses a number of network-visible services which have historically caused problems for system security, and for which disabling or severely limiting the service has been the best available guidance for some time. As a result of this, many of these services are not installed as part of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 by default.

Organizations which are running these services should switch to more secure equivalents as soon as possible. If it remains absolutely necessary to run one of these services for legacy reasons, care should be taken to restrict the service as much as possible, for instance by configuring host firewall software such as firewalld to restrict access to the vulnerable service to only those remote hosts which have a known need to use it.
Group   Telnet   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   The telnet protocol does not provide confidentiality or integrity for information transmitted on the network. This includes authentication information such as passwords. Organizations which use telnet should be actively working to migrate to a more secure protocol.

Rule   Uninstall telnet-server Package   [ref]

The telnet-server package can be removed with the following command: 
$ sudo dnf remove telnet-server
Rationale:
It is detrimental for operating systems to provide, or install by default, functionality exceeding requirements or mission objectives. These unnecessary capabilities are often overlooked and therefore may remain unsecure. They increase the risk to the platform by providing additional attack vectors.
The telnet service provides an unencrypted remote access service which does not provide for the confidentiality and integrity of user passwords or the remote session. If a privileged user were to login using this service, the privileged user password could be compromised.
Removing the telnet-server package decreases the risk of the telnet service's accidental (or intentional) activation.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_telnet-server_removed
Identifiers:

CCE-84149-4

References:
cis-csc11, 12, 14, 15, 3, 8, 9
cobit5APO13.01, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS01.04, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.05, DSS06.06
disaCCI-000381
hipaa164.308(a)(4)(i), 164.308(b)(1), 164.308(b)(3), 164.310(b), 164.312(e)(1), 164.312(e)(2)(ii)
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.9.1.2
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.AC-3, PR.IP-1, PR.PT-3, PR.PT-4
pcidssReq-2.2.2
os-srgSRG-OS-000095-GPOS-00049
anssiR62
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL4
cis2.1.15
pcidss42.2.4, 2.2
stigidRHEL-09-215040
stigrefSV-257831r958478_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove telnet-server
#	   from the system, and may remove any packages
#	   that depend on telnet-server. Execute this
#	   remediation AFTER testing on a non-production
#	   system!

if rpm -q --quiet "telnet-server" ; then
dnf remove -y --noautoremove "telnet-server"
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

package remove telnet-server

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
- name: Ensure telnet-server is removed
  package:
    name: telnet-server
    state: absent
  tags:
  - CCE-84149-4
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-215040
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-2.2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4
  - disable_strategy
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_telnet-server_removed

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

dnf remove telnet-server

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

package --remove=telnet-server

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
include remove_telnet-server

class remove_telnet-server {
  package { 'telnet-server':
    ensure => 'purged',
  }
}
Group   TFTP Server   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   TFTP is a lightweight version of the FTP protocol which has traditionally been used to configure networking equipment. However, TFTP provides little security, and modern versions of networking operating systems frequently support configuration via SSH or other more secure protocols. A TFTP server should be run only if no more secure method of supporting existing equipment can be found.

Rule   Uninstall tftp-server Package   [ref]

The tftp-server package can be removed with the following command: 
 $ sudo dnf remove tftp-server
Rationale:
Removing the tftp-server package decreases the risk of the accidental (or intentional) activation of tftp services.

If TFTP is required for operational support (such as transmission of router configurations), its use must be documented with the Information Systems Securty Manager (ISSM), restricted to only authorized personnel, and have access control rules established.
Severity: 
high
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_tftp-server_removed
Identifiers:

CCE-84154-4

References:
cis-csc11, 12, 14, 15, 3, 8, 9
cobit5APO13.01, BAI10.01, BAI10.02, BAI10.03, BAI10.05, DSS01.04, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.05, DSS06.06
disaCCI-000366
isa-62443-20094.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.2, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.1.2, A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.2, A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.9.1.2
nistCM-7(a), CM-7(b), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.AC-3, PR.IP-1, PR.PT-3, PR.PT-4
os-srgSRG-OS-000480-GPOS-00227
anssiR62
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL4
cis2.1.16
pcidss42.2.4, 2.2
stigidRHEL-09-215060
stigrefSV-257835r991589_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove tftp-server
#	   from the system, and may remove any packages
#	   that depend on tftp-server. Execute this
#	   remediation AFTER testing on a non-production
#	   system!

if rpm -q --quiet "tftp-server" ; then
dnf remove -y --noautoremove "tftp-server"
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

package remove tftp-server

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
- name: Ensure tftp-server is removed
  package:
    name: tftp-server
    state: absent
  tags:
  - CCE-84154-4
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-215060
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-7(b)
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4
  - disable_strategy
  - high_severity
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_tftp-server_removed

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

dnf remove tftp-server

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

package --remove=tftp-server

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
include remove_tftp-server

class remove_tftp-server {
  package { 'tftp-server':
    ensure => 'purged',
  }
}
Group   Proxy Server   Group contains 1 group and 1 rule
[ref]   A proxy server is a very desirable target for a potential adversary because much (or all) sensitive data for a given infrastructure may flow through it. Therefore, if one is required, the system acting as a proxy server should be dedicated to that purpose alone and be stored in a physically secure location. The system's default proxy server software is Squid, and provided in an RPM package of the same name.
Group   Disable Squid if Possible   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   If Squid was installed and activated, but the system does not need to act as a proxy server, then it should be disabled and removed.

Rule   Uninstall squid Package   [ref]

The squid package can be removed with the following command: 
 $ sudo dnf remove squid
Rationale:
If there is no need to make the proxy server software available, removing it provides a safeguard against its activation.
Severity: 
unknown
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_squid_removed
Identifiers:

CCE-84238-5

References:
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL4
cis2.1.17

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove squid
#	   from the system, and may remove any packages
#	   that depend on squid. Execute this
#	   remediation AFTER testing on a non-production
#	   system!

if rpm -q --quiet "squid" ; then
dnf remove -y --noautoremove "squid"
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

package remove squid

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
- name: Ensure squid is removed
  package:
    name: squid
    state: absent
  tags:
  - CCE-84238-5
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_squid_removed
  - unknown_severity

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

dnf remove squid

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

package --remove=squid

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
include remove_squid

class remove_squid {
  package { 'squid':
    ensure => 'purged',
  }
}
Group   SNMP Server   Group contains 1 group and 1 rule
[ref]   The Simple Network Management Protocol allows administrators to monitor the state of network devices, including computers. Older versions of SNMP were well-known for weak security, such as plaintext transmission of the community string (used for authentication) and usage of easily-guessable choices for the community string.
Group   Disable SNMP Server if Possible   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   The system includes an SNMP daemon that allows for its remote monitoring, though it not installed by default. If it was installed and activated but is not needed, the software should be disabled and removed.

Rule   Uninstall net-snmp Package   [ref]

The net-snmp package provides the snmpd service. The net-snmp package can be removed with the following command: 
$ sudo dnf remove net-snmp
Rationale:
If there is no need to run SNMP server software, removing the package provides a safeguard against its activation.
Severity: 
unknown
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_net-snmp_removed
Identifiers:

CCE-85981-9

References:
ccnA.8.SEC-RHEL4
cis2.1.14
pcidss42.2.4, 2.2

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

# CAUTION: This remediation script will remove net-snmp
#	   from the system, and may remove any packages
#	   that depend on net-snmp. Execute this
#	   remediation AFTER testing on a non-production
#	   system!

if rpm -q --quiet "net-snmp" ; then
dnf remove -y --noautoremove "net-snmp"
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

package remove net-snmp

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
- name: Ensure net-snmp is removed
  package:
    name: net-snmp
    state: absent
  tags:
  - CCE-85981-9
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-2.2.4
  - disable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_net-snmp_removed
  - unknown_severity

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

dnf remove net-snmp

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

package --remove=net-snmp

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable
include remove_net-snmp

class remove_net-snmp {
  package { 'net-snmp':
    ensure => 'purged',
  }
}
Group   SSH Server   Group contains 1 group and 4 rules
[ref]   The SSH protocol is recommended for remote login and remote file transfer. SSH provides confidentiality and integrity for data exchanged between two systems, as well as server authentication, through the use of public key cryptography. The implementation included with the system is called OpenSSH, and more detailed documentation is available from its website, https://www.openssh.com. Its server program is called sshd and provided by the RPM package openssh-server.
Group   Configure OpenSSH Server if Necessary   Group contains 4 rules
[ref]   If the system needs to act as an SSH server, then certain changes should be made to the OpenSSH daemon configuration file /etc/ssh/sshd_config. The following recommendations can be applied to this file. See the sshd_config(5) man page for more detailed information.

Rule   Set SSH Client Alive Count Max   [ref]

The SSH server sends at most ClientAliveCountMax messages during a SSH session and waits for a response from the SSH client. The option ClientAliveInterval configures timeout after each ClientAliveCountMax message. If the SSH server does not receive a response from the client, then the connection is considered unresponsive and terminated. For SSH earlier than v8.2, a ClientAliveCountMax value of 0 causes a timeout precisely when the ClientAliveInterval is set. Starting with v8.2, a value of 0 disables the timeout functionality completely. If the option is set to a number greater than 0, then the session will be disconnected after ClientAliveInterval * ClientAliveCountMax seconds without receiving a keep alive message.
Rationale:
This ensures a user login will be terminated as soon as the ClientAliveInterval is reached.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sshd_set_keepalive
Identifiers:

CCE-90805-3

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 5, 7, 8
cjis5.5.6
cobit5APO13.01, BAI03.01, BAI03.02, BAI03.03, DSS01.03, DSS03.05, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.10
cui3.1.11
disaCCI-001133, CCI-002361
hipaa164.308(a)(4)(i), 164.308(b)(1), 164.308(b)(3), 164.310(b), 164.312(e)(1), 164.312(e)(2)(ii)
isa-62443-20094.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 6.2
iso27001-2013A.12.4.1, A.12.4.3, A.14.1.1, A.14.2.1, A.14.2.5, A.18.1.4, A.6.1.2, A.6.1.5, A.7.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-004-6 R2.2.3, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R5.2, CIP-007-3 R5.3.1, CIP-007-3 R5.3.2, CIP-007-3 R5.3.3
nistAC-2(5), AC-12, AC-17(a), SC-10, CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, PR.AC-1, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, PR.IP-2
pcidssReq-8.1.8
os-srgSRG-OS-000163-GPOS-00072, SRG-OS-000279-GPOS-00109
ccnA.5.SEC-RHEL7
cis5.1.9
pcidss48.2.8, 8.2
stigidRHEL-09-255095
stigrefSV-257995r970703_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

var_sshd_set_keepalive='1'


mkdir -p /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
touch /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf

LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d"/*.conf
if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf" ] ; then
    
    LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*ClientAliveCountMax\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf"
else
    touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf"
fi
# make sure file has newline at the end
sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf"

cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf.bak"
# Insert at the beginning of the file
printf '%s\n' "ClientAliveCountMax $var_sshd_set_keepalive" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf"
cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf"
# Clean up after ourselves.
rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf.bak"

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-90805-3
  - CJIS-5.5.6
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-255095
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.11
  - NIST-800-53-AC-12
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-10
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sshd_set_keepalive
- name: XCCDF Value var_sshd_set_keepalive # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_sshd_set_keepalive: !!str 1
  tags:
    - always

- name: Set SSH Client Alive Count Max
  block:

  - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config
    lineinfile:
      path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config
      create: false
      regexp: (?i)(?i)^\s*{{ "ClientAliveCountMax"| regex_escape }}\s+
      state: absent

  - name: Check if /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d exists
    stat:
      path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
    register: _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_exists

  - name: Check if the parameter ClientAliveCountMax is present in /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
    find:
      paths: /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
      recurse: 'yes'
      follow: 'no'
      contains: (?i)^\s*{{ "ClientAliveCountMax"| regex_escape }}\s+
    register: _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_has_parameter
    when: _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_exists.stat.isdir is defined and _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_exists.stat.isdir

  - name: Remove parameter from files in /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item.path }}'
      create: false
      regexp: (?i)(?i)^\s*{{ "ClientAliveCountMax"| regex_escape }}\s+
      state: absent
    with_items: '{{ _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_has_parameter.files }}'
    when: _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_has_parameter.matched

  - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf
    lineinfile:
      path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf
      create: true
      regexp: (?i)(?i)^\s*{{ "ClientAliveCountMax"| regex_escape }}\s+
      line: ClientAliveCountMax {{ var_sshd_set_keepalive }}
      state: present
      insertbefore: BOF
      validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-90805-3
  - CJIS-5.5.6
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-255095
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.11
  - NIST-800-53-AC-12
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-10
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sshd_set_keepalive

Rule   Set SSH Client Alive Interval   [ref]

SSH allows administrators to set a network responsiveness timeout interval. After this interval has passed, the unresponsive client will be automatically logged out.

To set this timeout interval, edit the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config as follows: 
ClientAliveInterval 900


The timeout interval is given in seconds. For example, have a timeout of 10 minutes, set interval to 600.

If a shorter timeout has already been set for the login shell, that value will preempt any SSH setting made in /etc/ssh/sshd_config. Keep in mind that some processes may stop SSH from correctly detecting that the user is idle.
Warning:  SSH disconnecting unresponsive clients will not have desired effect without also configuring ClientAliveCountMax in the SSH service configuration.
Warning:  Following conditions may prevent the SSH session to time out:
  • Remote processes on the remote machine generates output. As the output has to be transferred over the network to the client, the timeout is reset every time such transfer happens.
  • Any scp or sftp activity by the same user to the host resets the timeout.
Rationale:
Terminating an idle ssh session within a short time period reduces the window of opportunity for unauthorized personnel to take control of a management session enabled on the console or console port that has been let unattended.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sshd_set_idle_timeout
Identifiers:

CCE-90811-1

References:
cis-csc1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 5, 7, 8
cjis5.5.6
cobit5APO13.01, BAI03.01, BAI03.02, BAI03.03, DSS01.03, DSS03.05, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS05.10, DSS06.03, DSS06.10
cui3.1.11
disaCCI-001133, CCI-002361, CCI-002891
isa-62443-20094.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.3.3
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 6.2
iso27001-2013A.12.4.1, A.12.4.3, A.14.1.1, A.14.2.1, A.14.2.5, A.18.1.4, A.6.1.2, A.6.1.5, A.7.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-004-6 R2.2.3, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R5.2, CIP-007-3 R5.3.1, CIP-007-3 R5.3.2, CIP-007-3 R5.3.3
nistCM-6(a), AC-17(a), AC-2(5), AC-12, AC-17(a), SC-10, CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, PR.AC-1, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-6, PR.AC-7, PR.IP-2
pcidssReq-8.1.8
os-srgSRG-OS-000126-GPOS-00066, SRG-OS-000163-GPOS-00072, SRG-OS-000279-GPOS-00109, SRG-OS-000395-GPOS-00175
ccnA.5.SEC-RHEL7
cis5.1.9
pcidss48.2.8, 8.2
stigidRHEL-09-255100
stigrefSV-257996r997070_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

sshd_idle_timeout_value='900'


mkdir -p /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
touch /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf

LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*ClientAliveInterval\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*ClientAliveInterval\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d"/*.conf
if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf" ] ; then
    
    LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*ClientAliveInterval\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf"
else
    touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf"
fi
# make sure file has newline at the end
sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf"

cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf.bak"
# Insert at the beginning of the file
printf '%s\n' "ClientAliveInterval $sshd_idle_timeout_value" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf"
cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf"
# Clean up after ourselves.
rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf.bak"

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-90811-1
  - CJIS-5.5.6
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-255100
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.11
  - NIST-800-53-AC-12
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-10
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sshd_set_idle_timeout
- name: XCCDF Value sshd_idle_timeout_value # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    sshd_idle_timeout_value: !!str 900
  tags:
    - always

- name: Set SSH Client Alive Interval
  block:

  - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config
    lineinfile:
      path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config
      create: false
      regexp: (?i)(?i)^\s*{{ "ClientAliveInterval"| regex_escape }}\s+
      state: absent

  - name: Check if /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d exists
    stat:
      path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
    register: _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_exists

  - name: Check if the parameter ClientAliveInterval is present in /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
    find:
      paths: /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
      recurse: 'yes'
      follow: 'no'
      contains: (?i)^\s*{{ "ClientAliveInterval"| regex_escape }}\s+
    register: _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_has_parameter
    when: _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_exists.stat.isdir is defined and _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_exists.stat.isdir

  - name: Remove parameter from files in /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item.path }}'
      create: false
      regexp: (?i)(?i)^\s*{{ "ClientAliveInterval"| regex_escape }}\s+
      state: absent
    with_items: '{{ _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_has_parameter.files }}'
    when: _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_has_parameter.matched

  - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf
    lineinfile:
      path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf
      create: true
      regexp: (?i)(?i)^\s*{{ "ClientAliveInterval"| regex_escape }}\s+
      line: ClientAliveInterval {{ sshd_idle_timeout_value }}
      state: present
      insertbefore: BOF
      validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-90811-1
  - CJIS-5.5.6
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-255100
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.11
  - NIST-800-53-AC-12
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(5)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - NIST-800-53-SC-10
  - PCI-DSS-Req-8.1.8
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-8.2.8
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sshd_set_idle_timeout

Rule   Enable SSH Warning Banner   [ref]

To enable the warning banner and ensure it is consistent across the system, add or correct the following line in /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf: 
Banner /etc/issue.net
Another section contains information on how to create an appropriate system-wide warning banner.
Rationale:
The warning message reinforces policy awareness during the logon process and facilitates possible legal action against attackers. Alternatively, systems whose ownership should not be obvious should ensure usage of a banner that does not provide easy attribution.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sshd_enable_warning_banner_net
Identifiers:

CCE-87979-1

References:
cjis5.5.6
cobit5DSS05.04, DSS05.10, DSS06.10
cui3.1.9
disaCCI-000048, CCI-000050, CCI-001384, CCI-001385, CCI-001386, CCI-001387, CCI-001388
hipaa164.308(a)(4)(i), 164.308(b)(1), 164.308(b)(3), 164.310(b), 164.312(e)(1), 164.312(e)(2)(ii)
isa-62443-20094.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.2, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9
iso27001-2013A.18.1.4, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3
nistAC-8(a), AC-8(c), AC-17(a), CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.AC-7
os-srgSRG-OS-000023-GPOS-00006, SRG-OS-000228-GPOS-00088
ccnA.11.SEC-RHEL4
cis5.1.8

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

mkdir -p /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
touch /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf

LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*Banner\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config"
LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*Banner\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d"/*.conf
if [ -e "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf" ] ; then
    
    LC_ALL=C sed -i "/^\s*Banner\s\+/Id" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf"
else
    touch "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf"
fi
# make sure file has newline at the end
sed -i -e '$a\' "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf"

cp "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf" "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf.bak"
# Insert at the beginning of the file
printf '%s\n' "Banner /etc/issue.net" > "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf"
cat "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf.bak" >> "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf"
# Clean up after ourselves.
rm "/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf.bak"

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-87979-1
  - CJIS-5.5.6
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.9
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sshd_enable_warning_banner_net

- name: Enable SSH Warning Banner
  block:

  - name: Deduplicate values from /etc/ssh/sshd_config
    lineinfile:
      path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config
      create: false
      regexp: (?i)(?i)^\s*{{ "Banner"| regex_escape }}\s+
      state: absent

  - name: Check if /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d exists
    stat:
      path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
    register: _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_exists

  - name: Check if the parameter Banner is present in /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
    find:
      paths: /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
      recurse: 'yes'
      follow: 'no'
      contains: (?i)^\s*{{ "Banner"| regex_escape }}\s+
    register: _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_has_parameter
    when: _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_exists.stat.isdir is defined and _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_exists.stat.isdir

  - name: Remove parameter from files in /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ item.path }}'
      create: false
      regexp: (?i)(?i)^\s*{{ "Banner"| regex_escape }}\s+
      state: absent
    with_items: '{{ _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_has_parameter.files }}'
    when: _etc_ssh_sshd_config_d_has_parameter.matched

  - name: Insert correct line to /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf
    lineinfile:
      path: /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-complianceascode-hardening.conf
      create: true
      regexp: (?i)(?i)^\s*{{ "Banner"| regex_escape }}\s+
      line: Banner /etc/issue.net
      state: present
      insertbefore: BOF
      validate: /usr/sbin/sshd -t -f %s
  when: '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-87979-1
  - CJIS-5.5.6
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.9
  - NIST-800-53-AC-17(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(a)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-8(c)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
  - sshd_enable_warning_banner_net

Rule   Limit Users' SSH Access   [ref]

By default, the SSH configuration allows any user with an account to access the system. There are several options available to limit which users and group can access the system via SSH. It is recommended that at least one of the following options be leveraged: - AllowUsers variable gives the system administrator the option of allowing specific users to ssh into the system. The list consists of space separated user names. Numeric user IDs are not recognized with this variable. If a system administrator wants to restrict user access further by specifically allowing a user's access only from a particular host, the entry can be specified in the form of user@host. - AllowGroups variable gives the system administrator the option of allowing specific groups of users to ssh into the system. The list consists of space separated group names. Numeric group IDs are not recognized with this variable. - DenyUsers variable gives the system administrator the option of denying specific users to ssh into the system. The list consists of space separated user names. Numeric user IDs are not recognized with this variable. If a system administrator wants to restrict user access further by specifically denying a user's access from a particular host, the entry can be specified in the form of user@host. - DenyGroups variable gives the system administrator the option of denying specific groups of users to ssh into the system. The list consists of space separated group names. Numeric group IDs are not recognized with this variable.
Warning:  Automated remediation is not available for this configuration check because each system has unique user names and group names.
Rationale:
Specifying which accounts are allowed SSH access into the system reduces the possibility of unauthorized access to the system.
Severity: 
unknown
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_sshd_limit_user_access
Identifiers:

CCE-86817-4

References:
cis-csc11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 3, 5
cobit5DSS05.02, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.03, DSS06.06
cui3.1.12
isa-62443-20094.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4, 4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2, 4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8, 4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4, SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7
iso27001-2013A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-003-8 R5.1.1, CIP-003-8 R5.3, CIP-004-6 R2.2.3, CIP-004-6 R2.3, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.2, CIP-007-3 R5.2, CIP-007-3 R5.3.1, CIP-007-3 R5.3.2, CIP-007-3 R5.3.3
nistAC-3, CM-6(a)
nist-csfPR.AC-4, PR.AC-6, PR.PT-3
pcidssReq-2.2.4
ccnA.11.SEC-RHEL2
cis5.1.7
pcidss42.2.6, 2.2
Group   USBGuard daemon   Group contains 3 rules
[ref]   The USBGuard daemon enforces the USB device authorization policy for all USB devices.

Rule   Install usbguard Package   [ref]

The usbguard package can be installed with the following command: 
$ sudo dnf install usbguard
Rationale:
usbguard is a software framework that helps to protect against rogue USB devices by implementing basic whitelisting/blacklisting capabilities based on USB device attributes.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_usbguard_installed
Identifiers:

CCE-84203-9

References:
disaCCI-001958, CCI-003959
ism1418
nistCM-8(3), IA-3
os-srgSRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000141-CTR-000315
ccnA.23.SEC-RHEL1
stigidRHEL-09-291015
stigrefSV-258035r1014859_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if ( ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease && rpm --quiet -q kernel ); then

if ! rpm -q --quiet "usbguard" ; then
    dnf install -y "usbguard"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
  extensions:
    - usbguard

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable

package install usbguard



[[packages]]
name = "usbguard"
version = "*"

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84203-9
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-291015
  - NIST-800-53-CM-8(3)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-3
  - enable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_usbguard_installed

- name: Ensure usbguard is installed
  package:
    name: usbguard
    state: present
  when: ( ansible_architecture != "s390x" and "kernel" in ansible_facts.packages )
  tags:
  - CCE-84203-9
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-291015
  - NIST-800-53-CM-8(3)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-3
  - enable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - package_usbguard_installed

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable

dnf install usbguard

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable

package --add=usbguard

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
include install_usbguard

class install_usbguard {
  package { 'usbguard':
    ensure => 'installed',
  }
}

Rule   Enable the USBGuard Service   [ref]

The USBGuard service should be enabled. The usbguard service can be enabled with the following command: 
$ sudo systemctl enable usbguard.service
Rationale:
The usbguard service must be running in order to enforce the USB device authorization policy for all USB devices.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_service_usbguard_enabled
Identifiers:

CCE-84205-4

References:
disaCCI-001958, CCI-003959
ism1418
nistCM-8(3)(a), IA-3
osppFMT_SMF_EXT.1
os-srgSRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000141-CTR-000315
ccnA.23.SEC-RHEL1
stigidRHEL-09-291020
stigrefSV-258036r1014861_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if ( ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease && rpm --quiet -q kernel ); then

SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl'
"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'usbguard.service'
"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" start 'usbguard.service'
"$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'usbguard.service'

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi


---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
metadata:
  annotations:
    complianceascode.io/depends-on: xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_package_usbguard_installed
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    systemd:
      units:
      - name: usbguard.service
        enabled: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:disable

service enable usbguard



[customizations.services]
enabled = ["usbguard"]

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-84205-4
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-291020
  - NIST-800-53-CM-8(3)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-3
  - enable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - service_usbguard_enabled

- name: Enable the USBGuard Service - Enable service usbguard
  block:

  - name: Gather the package facts
    package_facts:
      manager: auto

  - name: Enable the USBGuard Service - Enable Service usbguard
    ansible.builtin.systemd:
      name: usbguard
      enabled: true
      state: started
      masked: false
    when:
    - '"usbguard" in ansible_facts.packages'
  when: ( ansible_architecture != "s390x" and "kernel" in ansible_facts.packages )
  tags:
  - CCE-84205-4
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-291020
  - NIST-800-53-CM-8(3)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-3
  - enable_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - service_usbguard_enabled

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:enable
include enable_usbguard

class enable_usbguard {
  service {'usbguard':
    enable => true,
    ensure => 'running',
  }
}

Rule   Generate USBGuard Policy   [ref]

By default USBGuard when enabled prevents access to all USB devices and this lead to inaccessible system if they use USB mouse/keyboard. To prevent this scenario, the initial policy configuration must be generated based on current connected USB devices.
Rationale:
The usbguard must be configured to allow connected USB devices to work properly, avoiding the system to become inaccessible.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_usbguard_generate_policy
Identifiers:

CCE-88882-6

References:
disaCCI-001958
nistCM-8(3)(a), IA-3
os-srgSRG-OS-000378-GPOS-00163
ccnA.23.SEC-RHEL1
stigidRHEL-09-291030
stigrefSV-258038r1017033_rule

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if ( ! grep -q s390x /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease && rpm --quiet -q kernel ); then

if rpm --quiet -q usbguard
then
    USBGUARD_CONF=/etc/usbguard/rules.conf
    if [ ! -f "$USBGUARD_CONF" ] || [ ! -s "$USBGUARD_CONF" ]; then
        usbguard generate-policy > $USBGUARD_CONF
        if [ ! -s "$USBGUARD_CONF" ]; then
            # make sure OVAL check doesn't fail on systems where
            # generate-policy doesn't find any USB devices (for
            # example a system might not have a USB bus)
            echo "# No USB devices found" > $USBGUARD_CONF
        fi
        # make sure it has correct permissions
        chmod 600 $USBGUARD_CONF

        SYSTEMCTL_EXEC='/usr/bin/systemctl'
        "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" unmask 'usbguard.service'
        "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" restart 'usbguard.service'
        "$SYSTEMCTL_EXEC" enable 'usbguard.service'
    fi
else
    echo "USBGuard is not installed. No remediation was applied!"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-88882-6
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-291030
  - NIST-800-53-CM-8(3)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-3
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - usbguard_generate_policy

- name: Generate USBGuard Policy
  block:

  - name: Gather the package facts
    package_facts:
      manager: auto

  - name: Check that the /etc/usbguard/rules.conf exists
    stat:
      path: /etc/usbguard/rules.conf
    register: policy_file

  - name: Create USBGuard Policy configuration
    command: usbguard generate-policy
    register: policy
    when: not policy_file.stat.exists or policy_file.stat.size == 0

  - name: Copy the Generated Policy configuration to a persistent file
    copy:
      content: '{{ policy.stdout }}'
      dest: /etc/usbguard/rules.conf
      mode: 384
    when: not policy_file.stat.exists or policy_file.stat.size == 0

  - name: Add comment into /etc/usbguard/rules.conf when system has no USB devices
    lineinfile:
      path: /etc/usbguard/rules.conf
      line: '# No USB devices found'
      state: present
    when: not policy_file.stat.exists or policy_file.stat.size == 0

  - name: Enable service usbguard
    systemd:
      name: usbguard
      enabled: 'yes'
      state: started
      masked: 'no'
  when:
  - ( ansible_architecture != "s390x" and "kernel" in ansible_facts.packages )
  - '"usbguard" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-88882-6
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-291030
  - NIST-800-53-CM-8(3)(a)
  - NIST-800-53-IA-3
  - configure_strategy
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - usbguard_generate_policy
Group   System Accounting with auditd   Group contains 4 groups and 32 rules
[ref]   The audit service provides substantial capabilities for recording system activities. By default, the service audits about SELinux AVC denials and certain types of security-relevant events such as system logins, account modifications, and authentication events performed by programs such as sudo. Under its default configuration, auditd has modest disk space requirements, and should not noticeably impact system performance.

NOTE: The Linux Audit daemon auditd can be configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules files (*.rules) located in /etc/audit/rules.d location and compile them to create the resulting form of the /etc/audit/audit.rules configuration file during the daemon startup (default configuration). Alternatively, the auditd daemon can use the auditctl utility to read audit rules from the /etc/audit/audit.rules configuration file during daemon startup, and load them into the kernel. The expected behavior is configured via the appropriate ExecStartPost directive setting in the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file. To instruct the auditd daemon to use the augenrules program to read audit rules (default configuration), use the following setting: 
ExecStartPost=-/sbin/augenrules --load
in the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file. In order to instruct the auditd daemon to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules, use the following setting: 
ExecStartPost=-/sbin/auditctl -R /etc/audit/audit.rules
in the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file. Refer to [Service] section of the /usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.service configuration file for further details.

Government networks often have substantial auditing requirements and auditd can be configured to meet these requirements. Examining some example audit records demonstrates how the Linux audit system satisfies common requirements. The following example from Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Documentation available at https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html-single/selinux_users_and_administrators_guide/index#sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Fixing_Problems-Raw_Audit_Messages shows the substantial amount of information captured in a two typical "raw" audit messages, followed by a breakdown of the most important fields. In this example the message is SELinux-related and reports an AVC denial (and the associated system call) that occurred when the Apache HTTP Server attempted to access the /var/www/html/file1 file (labeled with the samba_share_t type): 
type=AVC msg=audit(1226874073.147:96): avc:  denied  { getattr } for pid=2465 comm="httpd"
path="/var/www/html/file1" dev=dm-0 ino=284133 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0
tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0 tclass=file

type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1226874073.147:96): arch=40000003 syscall=196 success=no exit=-13
a0=b98df198 a1=bfec85dc a2=54dff4 a3=2008171 items=0 ppid=2463 pid=2465 auid=502 uid=48
gid=48 euid=48 suid=48 fsuid=48 egid=48 sgid=48 fsgid=48 tty=(none) ses=6 comm="httpd"
exe="/usr/sbin/httpd" subj=unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 key=(null)
  • msg=audit(1226874073.147:96)
    • The number in parentheses is the unformatted time stamp (Epoch time) for the event, which can be converted to standard time by using the date command.
  • { getattr }
    • The item in braces indicates the permission that was denied. getattr indicates the source process was trying to read the target file's status information. This occurs before reading files. This action is denied due to the file being accessed having the wrong label. Commonly seen permissions include getattr, read, and write.
  • comm="httpd"
    • The executable that launched the process. The full path of the executable is found in the exe= section of the system call (SYSCALL) message, which in this case, is exe="/usr/sbin/httpd".
  • path="/var/www/html/file1"
    • The path to the object (target) the process attempted to access.
  • scontext="unconfined_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0"
    • The SELinux context of the process that attempted the denied action. In this case, it is the SELinux context of the Apache HTTP Server, which is running in the httpd_t domain.
  • tcontext="unconfined_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0"
    • The SELinux context of the object (target) the process attempted to access. In this case, it is the SELinux context of file1. Note: the samba_share_t type is not accessible to processes running in the httpd_t domain.
  • From the system call (SYSCALL) message, two items are of interest:
    • success=no: indicates whether the denial (AVC) was enforced or not. success=no indicates the system call was not successful (SELinux denied access). success=yes indicates the system call was successful - this can be seen for permissive domains or unconfined domains, such as initrc_t and kernel_t.
    • exe="/usr/sbin/httpd": the full path to the executable that launched the process, which in this case, is exe="/usr/sbin/httpd".
Group   Configure auditd Rules for Comprehensive Auditing   Group contains 2 groups and 31 rules
[ref]   The auditd program can perform comprehensive monitoring of system activity. This section describes recommended configuration settings for comprehensive auditing, but a full description of the auditing system's capabilities is beyond the scope of this guide. The mailing list linux-audit@redhat.com exists to facilitate community discussion of the auditing system.

The audit subsystem supports extensive collection of events, including:
  • Tracing of arbitrary system calls (identified by name or number) on entry or exit.
  • Filtering by PID, UID, call success, system call argument (with some limitations), etc.
  • Monitoring of specific files for modifications to the file's contents or metadata.

Auditing rules at startup are controlled by the file /etc/audit/audit.rules. Add rules to it to meet the auditing requirements for your organization. Each line in /etc/audit/audit.rules represents a series of arguments that can be passed to auditctl and can be individually tested during runtime. See documentation in /usr/share/doc/audit-VERSION and in the related man pages for more details.

If copying any example audit rulesets from /usr/share/doc/audit-VERSION, be sure to comment out the lines containing arch= which are not appropriate for your system's architecture. Then review and understand the following rules, ensuring rules are activated as needed for the appropriate architecture.

After reviewing all the rules, reading the following sections, and editing as needed, the new rules can be activated as follows: 
$ sudo service auditd restart
Group   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls   Group contains 13 rules
[ref]   At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. Note that the "-F arch=b32" lines should be present even on a 64 bit system. These commands identify system calls for auditing. Even if the system is 64 bit it can still execute 32 bit system calls. Additionally, these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. An example of this is that the "-S" calls could be split up and placed on separate lines, however, this is less efficient. Add the following to /etc/audit/audit.rules: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
    -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown,fchown,fchownat,lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
    -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If your system is 64 bit then these lines should be duplicated and the arch=b32 replaced with arch=b64 as follows: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
    -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown,fchown,fchownat,lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
    -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr,lsetxattr,fsetxattr,removexattr,lremovexattr,fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chmod   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod
Identifiers:

CCE-83830-0

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2
nistAU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.5.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160, SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220, SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225, SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230, SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260, SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295, SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.9
pcidss410.3.4, 10.3
stigidRHEL-09-654015
stigrefSV-258177r1014911_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="chmod"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83830-0
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit chmod tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" )
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83830-0
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chmod for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - chmod
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - chmod
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" )
  tags:
  - CCE-83830-0
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chmod for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - chmod
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - chmod
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of chmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" )
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83830-0
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_chmod
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - chown   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S chown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_chown
Identifiers:

CCE-83812-8

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2
nistAU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.5.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203, SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160, SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220, SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225, SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230, SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260, SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295, SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.9
pcidss410.3.4, 10.3
stigidRHEL-09-654020
stigrefSV-258178r1014913_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="chown"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83812-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_chown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit chown tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" )
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83812-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_chown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chown for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - chown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - chown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" )
  tags:
  - CCE-83812-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_chown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for chown for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - chown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - chown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of chown in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" )
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83812-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_chown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmod   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmod -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod
Identifiers:

CCE-83832-6

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2
nistAU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.5.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160, SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220, SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225, SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230, SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260, SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295, SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.9
pcidss410.3.4, 10.3
stigidRHEL-09-654015
stigrefSV-258177r1014911_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="fchmod"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83832-6
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit fchmod tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83832-6
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmod for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchmod
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchmod
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83832-6
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmod for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchmod
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchmod
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of fchmod in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83832-6
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmod
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchmodat   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat
Identifiers:

CCE-83822-7

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2
nistAU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.5.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160, SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220, SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225, SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230, SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260, SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295, SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.9
pcidss410.3.4, 10.3
stigidRHEL-09-654015
stigrefSV-258177r1014911_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="fchmodat"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="chmod fchmod fchmodat"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83822-7
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit fchmodat tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83822-7
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmodat for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchmodat
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchmodat
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83822-7
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchmodat for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchmodat
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchmodat
      syscall_grouping:
      - chmod
      - fchmod
      - fchmodat

  - name: Check existence of fchmodat in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83822-7
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654015
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchmodat
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchown   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown
Identifiers:

CCE-83829-2

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2
nistAU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.5.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203, SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160, SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220, SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225, SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230, SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260, SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295, SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.9
pcidss410.3.4, 10.3
stigidRHEL-09-654020
stigrefSV-258178r1014913_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="fchown"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83829-2
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit fchown tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83829-2
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchown for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83829-2
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchown for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of fchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83829-2
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fchownat   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fchownat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_fchownat
Identifiers:

CCE-83831-8

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2
nistAU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.5.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203, SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160, SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220, SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225, SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230, SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260, SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295, SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.9
pcidss410.3.4, 10.3
stigidRHEL-09-654020
stigrefSV-258178r1014913_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="fchownat"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83831-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchownat
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit fchownat tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83831-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchownat
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchownat for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchownat
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchownat
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83831-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchownat
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fchownat for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchownat
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fchownat
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of fchownat in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83831-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fchownat
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fremovexattr   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root.

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod


If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod


If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod


If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_fremovexattr
Identifiers:

CCE-83821-9

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2
nistAU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.5.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160, SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220, SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225, SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230, SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260, SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295, SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000496-CTR-001240, SRG-APP-000497-CTR-001245, SRG-APP-000498-CTR-001250, SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.9
pcidss410.3.4, 10.3
stigidRHEL-09-654025
stigrefSV-258179r1014915_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="fremovexattr"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done



for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid=0"
	SYSCALL="fremovexattr"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83821-9
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fremovexattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit fremovexattr tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83821-9
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fremovexattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fremovexattr for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fremovexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fremovexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fremovexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fremovexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83821-9
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fremovexattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fremovexattr for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fremovexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fremovexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fremovexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fremovexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of fremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83821-9
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fremovexattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - fsetxattr   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S fsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S fsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_fsetxattr
Identifiers:

CCE-83817-7

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2
nistAU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.5.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160, SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220, SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225, SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230, SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260, SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295, SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000496-CTR-001240, SRG-APP-000497-CTR-001245, SRG-APP-000498-CTR-001250, SRG-APP-000501-CTR-001265, SRG-APP-000502-CTR-001270
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.9
pcidss410.3.4, 10.3
stigidRHEL-09-654025
stigrefSV-258179r1014915_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="fsetxattr"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done



for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid=0"
	SYSCALL="fsetxattr"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83817-7
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fsetxattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit fsetxattr tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83817-7
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fsetxattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fsetxattr for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fsetxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fsetxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fsetxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fsetxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83817-7
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fsetxattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for fsetxattr for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fsetxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fsetxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fsetxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - fsetxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of fsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83817-7
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_fsetxattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lchown   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lchown -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_lchown
Identifiers:

CCE-83833-4

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2
nistAU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.5.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203, SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160, SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220, SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225, SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230, SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260, SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295, SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.9
pcidss410.3.4, 10.3
stigidRHEL-09-654020
stigrefSV-258178r1014913_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel && { ! ( grep -q aarch64 /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease ); }; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="lchown"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="chown fchown fchownat lchown"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83833-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_lchown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit lchown tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" )
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83833-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_lchown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lchown for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lchown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lchown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" )
  tags:
  - CCE-83833-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_lchown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lchown for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lchown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lchown
      syscall_grouping:
      - chown
      - fchown
      - fchownat
      - lchown

  - name: Check existence of lchown in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - not ( ansible_architecture == "aarch64" )
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83833-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654020
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_lchown
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lremovexattr   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root.

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod


If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod


If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod


If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lremovexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_lremovexattr
Identifiers:

CCE-83814-4

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2
nistAU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.5.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207, SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160, SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220, SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225, SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230, SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260, SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295, SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000496-CTR-001240, SRG-APP-000497-CTR-001245, SRG-APP-000498-CTR-001250, SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255, SRG-APP-000501-CTR-001265, SRG-APP-000502-CTR-001270
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.9
pcidss410.3.4, 10.3
stigidRHEL-09-654025
stigrefSV-258179r1014915_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="lremovexattr"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done



for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid=0"
	SYSCALL="lremovexattr"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83814-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_lremovexattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit lremovexattr tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83814-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_lremovexattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lremovexattr for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lremovexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lremovexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lremovexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lremovexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83814-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_lremovexattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lremovexattr for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lremovexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lremovexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lremovexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lremovexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of lremovexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83814-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_lremovexattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - lsetxattr   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S lsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S lsetxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_lsetxattr
Identifiers:

CCE-83808-6

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2
nistAU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.5.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160, SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220, SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225, SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230, SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260, SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295, SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000496-CTR-001240, SRG-APP-000497-CTR-001245, SRG-APP-000498-CTR-001250, SRG-APP-000501-CTR-001265, SRG-APP-000502-CTR-001270
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.9
pcidss410.3.4, 10.3
stigidRHEL-09-654025
stigrefSV-258179r1014915_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="lsetxattr"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done



for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid=0"
	SYSCALL="lsetxattr"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83808-6
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_lsetxattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit lsetxattr tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83808-6
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_lsetxattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lsetxattr for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lsetxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lsetxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lsetxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lsetxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83808-6
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_lsetxattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for lsetxattr for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lsetxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lsetxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lsetxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - lsetxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of lsetxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83808-6
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_lsetxattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - removexattr   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root.

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod


If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod


If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S removexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod


If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S removexattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_removexattr
Identifiers:

CCE-83807-8

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2
nistAU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.5.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000463-GPOS-00207, SRG-OS-000468-GPOS-00212, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000474-GPOS-00219, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160, SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220, SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225, SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230, SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260, SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295, SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000496-CTR-001240, SRG-APP-000497-CTR-001245, SRG-APP-000498-CTR-001250, SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255, SRG-APP-000501-CTR-001265, SRG-APP-000502-CTR-001270
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.9
pcidss410.3.4, 10.3
stigidRHEL-09-654025
stigrefSV-258179r1014915_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="removexattr"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done



for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid=0"
	SYSCALL="removexattr"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83807-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_removexattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit removexattr tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83807-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_removexattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for removexattr for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - removexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - removexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - removexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - removexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83807-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_removexattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for removexattr for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - removexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - removexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - removexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - removexattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of removexattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83807-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_removexattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify the System's Discretionary Access Controls - setxattr   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect file permission changes for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S setxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod
If the system is 64 bit then also add the following line: 
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S setxattr -F auid=0 -F key=perm_mod
Warning:  Note that these rules can be configured in a number of ways while still achieving the desired effect. Here the system calls have been placed independent of other system calls. Grouping these system calls with others as identifying earlier in this guide is more efficient.
Rationale:
The changing of file permissions could indicate that a user is attempting to gain access to information that would otherwise be disallowed. Auditing DAC modifications can facilitate the identification of patterns of abuse among both authorized and unauthorized users.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_dac_modification_setxattr
Identifiers:

CCE-83811-0

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2
nistAU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.5.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000064-GPOS-00033, SRG-OS-000458-GPOS-00203
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000091-CTR-000160, SRG-APP-000492-CTR-001220, SRG-APP-000493-CTR-001225, SRG-APP-000494-CTR-001230, SRG-APP-000500-CTR-001260, SRG-APP-000507-CTR-001295, SRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.9
pcidss410.3.4, 10.3
stigidRHEL-09-654025
stigrefSV-258179r1014915_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="setxattr"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done



for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid=0"
	SYSCALL="setxattr"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING="fremovexattr lremovexattr removexattr fsetxattr lsetxattr setxattr"

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83811-0
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_setxattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit setxattr tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83811-0
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_setxattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for setxattr for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - setxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - setxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - setxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - setxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83811-0
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_setxattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for setxattr for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - setxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - setxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - setxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - setxattr
      syscall_grouping:
      - fremovexattr
      - lremovexattr
      - removexattr
      - fsetxattr
      - lsetxattr
      - setxattr

  - name: Check existence of setxattr in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid=0 (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid=0 (?:-k |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid=0 -F
        key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83811-0
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654025
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.4
  - audit_rules_dac_modification_setxattr
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy
Group   Record Attempts to Alter Logon and Logout Events   Group contains 2 rules

Rule   Ensure auditd Collects Information on Exporting to Media (successful)   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect media exportation events for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: 
-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S mount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=export
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, setting ARCH to either b32 or b64 as appropriate for your system: 
-a always,exit -F arch=ARCH -S mount -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset -F key=export
Rationale:
The unauthorized exportation of data to external media could result in an information leak where classified information, Privacy Act information, and intellectual property could be lost. An audit trail should be created each time a filesystem is mounted to help identify and guard against information loss.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_media_export
Identifiers:

CCE-83735-1

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-000172, CCI-002884
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2
nistAU-2(d), AU-12(c), AC-6(9), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.2.7
os-srgSRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL10
cis6.3.3.10
pcidss410.2.1.7, 10.2.1, 10.2

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# First perform the remediation of the syscall rule
# Retrieve hardware architecture of the underlying system
[ "$(getconf LONG_BIT)" = "32" ] && RULE_ARCHS=("b32") || RULE_ARCHS=("b32" "b64")

for ARCH in "${RULE_ARCHS[@]}"
do
	ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS="-a always,exit -F arch=$ARCH"
	OTHER_FILTERS=""
	AUID_FILTERS="-F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset"
	SYSCALL="mount"
	KEY="perm_mod"
	SYSCALL_GROUPING=""

	# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()

# If audit tool is 'augenrules', then check if the audit rule is defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to the list for inspection
# If rule isn't defined yet, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules' to the list for inspection
default_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
# As other_filters may include paths, lets use a different delimiter for it
# The "F" script expression tells sed to print the filenames where the expressions matched
readarray -t files_to_inspect < <(sed -s -n -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d" -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" -e "F" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)
# Case when particular rule isn't defined in /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules yet
if [ ${#files_to_inspect[@]} -eq "0" ]
then
    file_to_inspect="/etc/audit/rules.d/$KEY.rules"
    files_to_inspect=("$file_to_inspect")
    if [ ! -e "$file_to_inspect" ]
    then
        touch "$file_to_inspect"
        chmod 0600 "$file_to_inspect"
    fi
fi

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
	unset syscall_a
unset syscall_grouping
unset syscall_string
unset syscall
unset file_to_edit
unset rule_to_edit
unset rule_syscalls_to_edit
unset other_string
unset auid_string
unset full_rule

# Load macro arguments into arrays
read -a syscall_a <<< $SYSCALL
read -a syscall_grouping <<< $SYSCALL_GROUPING

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Tool used to load audit rules | Rule already defined  |  Audit rules file to inspect    |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        auditctl                |     Doesn't matter    |  /etc/audit/audit.rules         |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#        augenrules              |          Yes          |  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules     |
#        augenrules              |          No           |  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
files_to_inspect=()


# If audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# file to the list of files to be inspected
default_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules' )

# After converting to jinja, we cannot return; therefore we skip the rest of the macro if needed instead
skip=1

for audit_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Filter existing $audit_file rules' definitions to select those that satisfy the rule pattern,
    # i.e, collect rules that match:
    # * the action, list and arch, (2-nd argument)
    # * the other filters, (3-rd argument)
    # * the auid filters, (4-rd argument)
    readarray -t similar_rules < <(sed -e "/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS/!d"  -e "\#$OTHER_FILTERS#!d" -e "/$AUID_FILTERS/!d" "$audit_file")

    candidate_rules=()
    # Filter out rules that have more fields then required. This will remove rules more specific than the required scope
    for s_rule in "${similar_rules[@]}"
    do
        # Strip all the options and fields we know of,
        # than check if there was any field left over
        extra_fields=$(sed -E -e "s/^$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS//"  -e "s#$OTHER_FILTERS##" -e "s/$AUID_FILTERS//" -e "s/((:?-S [[:alnum:],]+)+)//g" -e "s/-F key=\w+|-k \w+//"<<< "$s_rule")
        grep -q -- "-F" <<< "$extra_fields" || candidate_rules+=("$s_rule")
    done

    if [[ ${#syscall_a[@]} -ge 1 ]]
    then
        # Check if the syscall we want is present in any of the similar existing rules
        for rule in "${candidate_rules[@]}"
        do
            rule_syscalls=$(echo "$rule" | grep -o -P '(-S [\w,]+)+' | xargs)
            all_syscalls_found=0
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls" || {
                   # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
                   all_syscalls_found=1
                   }
            done
            if [[ $all_syscalls_found -eq 0 ]]
            then
                # We found a rule with all the syscall(s) we want; skip rest of macro
                skip=0
                break
            fi

            # Check if this rule can be grouped with our target syscall and keep track of it
            for syscall_g in "${syscall_grouping[@]}"
            do
                if grep -q -- "\b${syscall_g}\b" <<< "$rule_syscalls"
                then
                    file_to_edit=${audit_file}
                    rule_to_edit=${rule}
                    rule_syscalls_to_edit=${rule_syscalls}
                fi
            done
        done
    else
        # If there is any candidate rule, it is compliant; skip rest of macro
        if [ "${#candidate_rules[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            skip=0
        fi
    fi

    if [ "$skip" -eq 0 ]; then
        break
    fi
done

if [ "$skip" -ne 0 ]; then
    # We checked all rules that matched the expected resemblance pattern (action, arch & auid)
    # At this point we know if we need to either append the $full_rule or group
    # the syscall together with an exsiting rule

    # Append the full_rule if it cannot be grouped to any other rule
    if [ -z ${rule_to_edit+x} ]
    then
        # Build full_rule while avoid adding double spaces when other_filters is empty
        if [ "${#syscall_a[@]}" -gt 0 ]
        then
            syscall_string=""
            for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
            do
                syscall_string+=" -S $syscall"
            done
        fi
        other_string=$([[ $OTHER_FILTERS ]] && echo " $OTHER_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        auid_string=$([[ $AUID_FILTERS ]] && echo " $AUID_FILTERS") || /bin/true
        full_rule="$ACTION_ARCH_FILTERS${syscall_string}${other_string}${auid_string} -F key=$KEY" || /bin/true
        echo "$full_rule" >> "$default_file"
        chmod o-rwx ${default_file}
    else
        # Check if the syscalls are declared as a comma separated list or
        # as multiple -S parameters
        if grep -q -- "," <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        then
            delimiter=","
        else
            delimiter=" -S "
        fi
        new_grouped_syscalls="${rule_syscalls_to_edit}"
        for syscall in "${syscall_a[@]}"
        do
            grep -q -- "\b${syscall}\b" <<< "${rule_syscalls_to_edit}" || {
               # A syscall was not found in the candidate rule
               new_grouped_syscalls+="${delimiter}${syscall}"
               }
        done

        # Group the syscall in the rule
        sed -i -e "\#${rule_to_edit}#s#${rule_syscalls_to_edit}#${new_grouped_syscalls}#" "$file_to_edit"
    fi
fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83735-1
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7
  - audit_rules_media_export
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set architecture for audit mount tasks
  set_fact:
    audit_arch: b64
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - ansible_architecture == "aarch64" or ansible_architecture == "ppc64" or ansible_architecture
    == "ppc64le" or ansible_architecture == "s390x" or ansible_architecture == "x86_64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83735-1
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7
  - audit_rules_media_export
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for mount for 32bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - mount
      syscall_grouping: []

  - name: Check existence of mount in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - mount
      syscall_grouping: []

  - name: Check existence of mount in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b32(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b32)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83735-1
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7
  - audit_rules_media_export
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Perform remediation of Audit rules for mount for 64bit platform
  block:

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - mount
      syscall_grouping: []

  - name: Check existence of mount in /etc/audit/rules.d/
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: '*.rules'
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Reset syscalls found per file
    set_fact:
      syscalls_per_file: {}
      found_paths_dict: {}

  - name: Declare syscalls found per file
    set_fact: syscalls_per_file="{{ syscalls_per_file | combine( {item.files[0].path
      :[item.item] + syscalls_per_file.get(item.files[0].path, []) } ) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | selectattr(''matched'') | list }}'

  - name: Declare files where syscalls were found
    set_fact: found_paths="{{ find_command.results | map(attribute='files') | flatten
      | map(attribute='path') | list }}"

  - name: Count occurrences of syscalls in paths
    set_fact: found_paths_dict="{{ found_paths_dict | combine({ item:1+found_paths_dict.get(item,
      0) }) }}"
    loop: '{{ find_command.results | map(attribute=''files'') | flatten | map(attribute=''path'')
      | list }}'

  - name: Get path with most syscalls
    set_fact: audit_file="{{ (found_paths_dict | dict2items() | sort(attribute='value')
      | last).key }}"
    when: found_paths | length >= 1

  - name: No file with syscall found, set path to /etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/perm_mod.rules"
    when: found_paths | length == 0

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_per_file[audit_file]
        | join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k
        |-F key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0

  - name: Declare list of syscalls
    set_fact:
      syscalls:
      - mount
      syscall_grouping: []

  - name: Check existence of mount in /etc/audit/audit.rules
    find:
      paths: /etc/audit
      contains: -a always,exit -F arch=b64(( -S |,)\w+)*(( -S |,){{ item }})+(( -S
        |,)\w+)* -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (-k\s+|-F\s+key=)\S+\s*$
      patterns: audit.rules
    register: find_command
    loop: '{{ (syscall_grouping + syscalls) | unique }}'

  - name: Set path to /etc/audit/audit.rules
    set_fact: audit_file="/etc/audit/audit.rules"

  - name: Declare found syscalls
    set_fact: syscalls_found="{{ find_command.results | selectattr('matched') | map(attribute='item')
      | list }}"

  - name: Declare missing syscalls
    set_fact: missing_syscalls="{{ syscalls | difference(syscalls_found) }}"

  - name: Replace the audit rule in {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      regexp: (-a always,exit -F arch=b64)(?=.*(?:(?:-S |,)(?:{{ syscalls_found |
        join("|") }}))\b)((?:( -S |,)\w+)+)( -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=unset (?:-k |-F
        key=)\w+)
      line: \1\2\3{{ missing_syscalls | join("\3") }}\4
      backrefs: true
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length > 0 and missing_syscalls | length > 0

  - name: Add the audit rule to {{ audit_file }}
    lineinfile:
      path: '{{ audit_file }}'
      line: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S {{ syscalls | join(',') }} -F auid>=1000
        -F auid!=unset -F key=perm_mod
      create: true
      mode: g-rwx,o-rwx
      state: present
    when: syscalls_found | length == 0
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - audit_arch == "b64"
  tags:
  - CCE-83735-1
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.7
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.7
  - audit_rules_media_export
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Attempts to Alter Process and Session Initiation Information   [ref]

The audit system already collects process information for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d in order to watch for attempted manual edits of files involved in storing such process information: 
-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session
-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session
-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file in order to watch for attempted manual edits of files involved in storing such process information: 
-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session
-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session
-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session
Rationale:
Manual editing of these files may indicate nefarious activity, such as an attacker attempting to remove evidence of an intrusion.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_session_events
Identifiers:

CCE-83713-8

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.13, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
ism0582, 0584, 05885, 0586, 0846, 0957
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2
nistAU-2(d), AU-12(c), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-3, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.2.3
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000505-CTR-001285
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL1
cis6.3.3.11
pcidss410.2.1.3, 10.2.1, 10.2

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()


# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules')

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/run/utmp" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/run/utmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/run/utmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()

# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' to list of files for inspection.
readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/run/utmp" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)

# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
    # Extract filepath from the match
    rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
    # Append that path into list of files for inspection
    files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ]
then
    # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' into list of files for inspection
    key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules"
    # If the session.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
    if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ]
    then
        touch "$key_rule_file"
        chmod 0600 "$key_rule_file"
    fi
    files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file")
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/run/utmp" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/run/utmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/run/utmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()


# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules')

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/btmp" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/btmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/btmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()

# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' to list of files for inspection.
readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/btmp" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)

# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
    # Extract filepath from the match
    rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
    # Append that path into list of files for inspection
    files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ]
then
    # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' into list of files for inspection
    key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules"
    # If the session.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
    if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ]
    then
        touch "$key_rule_file"
        chmod 0600 "$key_rule_file"
    fi
    files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file")
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/btmp" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/btmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/btmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()


# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules')

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/wtmp" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/wtmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/wtmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()

# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' to list of files for inspection.
readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/wtmp" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)

# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
    # Extract filepath from the match
    rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
    # Append that path into list of files for inspection
    files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ]
then
    # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules' into list of files for inspection
    key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules"
    # If the session.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
    if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ]
    then
        touch "$key_rule_file"
        chmod 0600 "$key_rule_file"
    fi
    files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file")
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/wtmp" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/wtmp $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/wtmp$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
---


apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,{{ %0A-w%20/var/run/utmp%20-p%20wa%20-k%20session%0A-w%20/var/log/btmp%20-p%20wa%20-k%20session%0A-w%20/var/log/wtmp%20-p%20wa%20-k%20session%0A }}
        mode: 0600
        path: /etc/audit/rules.d/75-audit-session-events.rules
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /var/run/utmp already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/run/utmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_existing_watch_rules_d
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key session
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)session$
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_watch_key
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /var/run/utmp in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  lineinfile:
    path: '{{ all_files[0] }}'
    line: -w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /var/run/utmp already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/run/utmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: audit.rules
  register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /var/run/utmp in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  lineinfile:
    line: -w /var/run/utmp -p wa -k session
    state: present
    dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/btmp already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/btmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_existing_watch_rules_d
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key session
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)session$
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_watch_key
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /var/log/btmp in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  lineinfile:
    path: '{{ all_files[0] }}'
    line: -w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/btmp already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/btmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: audit.rules
  register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /var/log/btmp in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  lineinfile:
    line: -w /var/log/btmp -p wa -k session
    state: present
    dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/wtmp already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/wtmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_existing_watch_rules_d
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key session
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)session$
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_watch_key
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - /etc/audit/rules.d/session.rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /var/log/wtmp in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  lineinfile:
    path: '{{ all_files[0] }}'
    line: -w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/wtmp already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/wtmp\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: audit.rules
  register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /var/log/wtmp in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  lineinfile:
    line: -w /var/log/wtmp -p wa -k session
    state: present
    dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83713-8
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_rules_session_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Ensure auditd Collects System Administrator Actions   [ref]

At a minimum, the audit system should collect administrator actions for all users and root. If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following line to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d: 
-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions
-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions
If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following line to /etc/audit/audit.rules file: 
-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions
-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions
Rationale:
The actions taken by system administrators should be audited to keep a record of what was executed on the system, as well as, for accountability purposes.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_sysadmin_actions
Identifiers:

CCE-83729-4

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.03, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-000126, CCI-000130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-000172, CCI-002884
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.1.2, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.7.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistAC-2(7)(b), AU-2(d), AU-12(c), AC-6(9), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-1, PR.AC-3, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-6, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.2.2, Req-10.2.5.b
os-srgSRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004, SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089, SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090, SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091, SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120, SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000026-CTR-000070, SRG-APP-000027-CTR-000075, SRG-APP-000028-CTR-000080, SRG-APP-000291-CTR-000675, SRG-APP-000292-CTR-000680, SRG-APP-000293-CTR-000685, SRG-APP-000294-CTR-000690, SRG-APP-000319-CTR-000745, SRG-APP-000320-CTR-000750, SRG-APP-000509-CTR-001305
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.1
pcidss410.2.1.5, 10.2.1, 10.2

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()


# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules')

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()

# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' to list of files for inspection.
readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)

# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
    # Extract filepath from the match
    rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
    # Append that path into list of files for inspection
    files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ]
then
    # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' into list of files for inspection
    key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules"
    # If the actions.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
    if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ]
    then
        touch "$key_rule_file"
        chmod 0600 "$key_rule_file"
    fi
    files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file")
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()


# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules')

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers.d/" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()

# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' to list of files for inspection.
readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers.d/" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)

# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
    # Extract filepath from the match
    rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
    # Append that path into list of files for inspection
    files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ]
then
    # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules' into list of files for inspection
    key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules"
    # If the actions.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
    if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ]
    then
        touch "$key_rule_file"
        chmod 0600 "$key_rule_file"
    fi
    files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file")
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/sudoers.d/" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/ $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/sudoers.d/$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,{{ -w%20/etc/sudoers.d/%20-p%20wa%20-k%20actions%0A-w%20/etc/sudoers%20-p%20wa%20-k%20actions%0A }}
        mode: 0600
        path: /etc/audit/rules.d/75-audit-sysadmin-actions.rules
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83729-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: audit.rules
  register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83729-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  lineinfile:
    line: -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions
    state: present
    dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83729-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_existing_watch_rules_d
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83729-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key actions
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)actions$
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_watch_key
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83729-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83729-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83729-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  lineinfile:
    path: '{{ all_files[0] }}'
    line: -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k actions
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83729-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers.d/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: audit.rules
  register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83729-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  lineinfile:
    line: -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions
    state: present
    dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83729-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/sudoers.d/\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_existing_watch_rules_d
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83729-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key actions
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)actions$
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_watch_key
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83729-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - /etc/audit/rules.d/actions.rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83729-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83729-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /etc/sudoers.d/ in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  lineinfile:
    path: '{{ all_files[0] }}'
    line: -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k actions
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83729-4
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(7)(b)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_sysadmin_actions
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/group   [ref]

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify account changes: 

-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification


If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify account changes: 

-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
Rationale:
In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group
Identifiers:

CCE-83722-9

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.03, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-001403, CCI-001404, CCI-001405, CCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-002130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884, CCI-000018, CCI-000015
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.1.2, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.7.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-004-6 R2.2.2, CIP-004-6 R2.2.3, CIP-007-3 R.1.3, CIP-007-3 R5, CIP-007-3 R5.1.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.3, CIP-007-3 R5.2.1, CIP-007-3 R5.2.3
nistAC-2(4), AU-2(d), AU-12(c), AC-6(9), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-1, PR.AC-3, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-6, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.2.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004, SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089, SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090, SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091, SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255, SRG-APP-000503-CTR-001275
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.8
pcidss410.2.1.5, 10.2.1, 10.2
stigidRHEL-09-654225
stigrefSV-258219r1015130_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()


# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules')

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/group" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()

# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection.
readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/group" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)

# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
    # Extract filepath from the match
    rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
    # Append that path into list of files for inspection
    files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ]
then
    # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection
    key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules"
    # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
    if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ]
    then
        touch "$key_rule_file"
        chmod 0600 "$key_rule_file"
    fi
    files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file")
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/group" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/group$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83722-9
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654225
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/group already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/group\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_existing_watch_rules_d
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83722-9
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654225
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_usergroup_modification
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_usergroup_modification$
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_watch_key
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83722-9
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654225
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules as the recipient
    for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83722-9
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654225
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83722-9
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654225
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /etc/group in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  lineinfile:
    path: '{{ all_files[0] }}'
    line: -w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83722-9
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654225
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/group already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/group\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: audit.rules
  register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83722-9
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654225
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /etc/group in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  lineinfile:
    line: -w /etc/group -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
    state: present
    dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83722-9
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654225
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_group
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/gshadow   [ref]

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify account changes: 

-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification


If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify account changes: 

-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
Rationale:
In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow
Identifiers:

CCE-83723-7

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.03, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-001403, CCI-001404, CCI-001405, CCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-002130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884, CCI-000018, CCI-000015
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.1.2, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.7.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-004-6 R2.2.2, CIP-004-6 R2.2.3, CIP-007-3 R.1.3, CIP-007-3 R5, CIP-007-3 R5.1.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.3, CIP-007-3 R5.2.1, CIP-007-3 R5.2.3
nistAC-2(4), AU-2(d), AU-12(c), AC-6(9), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-1, PR.AC-3, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-6, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.2.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004, SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089, SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090, SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091, SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255, SRG-APP-000503-CTR-001275
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.8
pcidss410.2.1.5, 10.2.1, 10.2
stigidRHEL-09-654230
stigrefSV-258220r1015131_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()


# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules')

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()

# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection.
readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)

# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
    # Extract filepath from the match
    rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
    # Append that path into list of files for inspection
    files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ]
then
    # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection
    key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules"
    # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
    if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ]
    then
        touch "$key_rule_file"
        chmod 0600 "$key_rule_file"
    fi
    files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file")
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/gshadow" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/gshadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83723-7
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654230
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/gshadow already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/gshadow\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_existing_watch_rules_d
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83723-7
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654230
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_usergroup_modification
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_usergroup_modification$
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_watch_key
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83723-7
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654230
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules as the recipient
    for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83723-7
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654230
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83723-7
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654230
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /etc/gshadow in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  lineinfile:
    path: '{{ all_files[0] }}'
    line: -w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83723-7
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654230
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/gshadow already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/gshadow\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: audit.rules
  register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83723-7
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654230
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /etc/gshadow in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  lineinfile:
    line: -w /etc/gshadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
    state: present
    dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83723-7
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654230
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_gshadow
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/security/opasswd   [ref]

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify account changes: 

-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification


If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify account changes: 

-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
Rationale:
In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd
Identifiers:

CCE-83712-0

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.03, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-001403, CCI-001404, CCI-001405, CCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-002130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884, CCI-000018, CCI-000015
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.1.2, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.7.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-004-6 R2.2.2, CIP-004-6 R2.2.3, CIP-007-3 R.1.3, CIP-007-3 R5, CIP-007-3 R5.1.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.3, CIP-007-3 R5.2.1, CIP-007-3 R5.2.3
nistAC-2(4), AU-2(d), AU-12(c), AC-6(9), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-1, PR.AC-3, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-6, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.2.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004, SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089, SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090, SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091, SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000496-CTR-001240, SRG-APP-000497-CTR-001245, SRG-APP-000498-CTR-001250, SRG-APP-000503-CTR-001275
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.8
pcidss410.2.1.5, 10.2.1, 10.2
stigidRHEL-09-654235
stigrefSV-258221r1015132_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()


# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules')

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()

# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection.
readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)

# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
    # Extract filepath from the match
    rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
    # Append that path into list of files for inspection
    files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ]
then
    # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection
    key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules"
    # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
    if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ]
    then
        touch "$key_rule_file"
        chmod 0600 "$key_rule_file"
    fi
    files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file")
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/security/opasswd" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/security/opasswd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83712-0
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654235
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/security/opasswd already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/security/opasswd\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_existing_watch_rules_d
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83712-0
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654235
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_usergroup_modification
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_usergroup_modification$
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_watch_key
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83712-0
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654235
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules as the recipient
    for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83712-0
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654235
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83712-0
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654235
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /etc/security/opasswd in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  lineinfile:
    path: '{{ all_files[0] }}'
    line: -w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83712-0
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654235
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/security/opasswd already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/security/opasswd\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: audit.rules
  register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83712-0
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654235
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /etc/security/opasswd in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  lineinfile:
    line: -w /etc/security/opasswd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
    state: present
    dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83712-0
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654235
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_opasswd
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/passwd   [ref]

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify account changes: 

-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification


If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify account changes: 

-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
Rationale:
In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd
Identifiers:

CCE-83714-6

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.03, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-001403, CCI-001404, CCI-001405, CCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-002130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884, CCI-000018, CCI-000015
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.1.2, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.7.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-004-6 R2.2.2, CIP-004-6 R2.2.3, CIP-007-3 R.1.3, CIP-007-3 R5, CIP-007-3 R5.1.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.3, CIP-007-3 R5.2.1, CIP-007-3 R5.2.3
nistAC-2(4), AU-2(d), AU-12(c), AC-6(9), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-1, PR.AC-3, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-6, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.2.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004, SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089, SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090, SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091, SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120, SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221, SRG-OS-000274-GPOS-00104, SRG-OS-000275-GPOS-00105, SRG-OS-000276-GPOS-00106, SRG-OS-000277-GPOS-00107
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255, SRG-APP-000503-CTR-001275
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.8
pcidss410.2.1.5, 10.2.1, 10.2
stigidRHEL-09-654240
stigrefSV-258222r1015133_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()


# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules')

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/passwd" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()

# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection.
readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/passwd" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)

# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
    # Extract filepath from the match
    rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
    # Append that path into list of files for inspection
    files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ]
then
    # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection
    key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules"
    # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
    if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ]
    then
        touch "$key_rule_file"
        chmod 0600 "$key_rule_file"
    fi
    files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file")
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/passwd" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/passwd$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83714-6
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654240
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/passwd already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/passwd\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_existing_watch_rules_d
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83714-6
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654240
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_usergroup_modification
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_usergroup_modification$
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_watch_key
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83714-6
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654240
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules as the recipient
    for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83714-6
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654240
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83714-6
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654240
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /etc/passwd in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  lineinfile:
    path: '{{ all_files[0] }}'
    line: -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83714-6
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654240
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/passwd already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/passwd\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: audit.rules
  register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83714-6
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654240
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /etc/passwd in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  lineinfile:
    line: -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
    state: present
    dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83714-6
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654240
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_passwd
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Events that Modify User/Group Information - /etc/shadow   [ref]

If the auditd daemon is configured to use the augenrules program to read audit rules during daemon startup (the default), add the following lines to a file with suffix .rules in the directory /etc/audit/rules.d, in order to capture events that modify account changes: 

-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification


If the auditd daemon is configured to use the auditctl utility to read audit rules during daemon startup, add the following lines to /etc/audit/audit.rules file, in order to capture events that modify account changes: 

-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
Rationale:
In addition to auditing new user and group accounts, these watches will alert the system administrator(s) to any modifications. Any unexpected users, groups, or modifications should be investigated for legitimacy.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow
Identifiers:

CCE-83725-2

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO10.01, APO10.03, APO10.04, APO10.05, APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS01.03, DSS01.04, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS03.05, DSS05.02, DSS05.03, DSS05.04, DSS05.05, DSS05.07, DSS06.03, MEA01.01, MEA01.02, MEA01.03, MEA01.04, MEA01.05, MEA02.01
cui3.1.7
disaCCI-001403, CCI-001404, CCI-001405, CCI-000172, CCI-000130, CCI-002130, CCI-000135, CCI-000169, CCI-002884, CCI-000018, CCI-000015
hipaa164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), 164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A), 164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C), 164.312(a)(2)(i), 164.312(b), 164.312(d), 164.312(e)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.2.6.7, 4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.1, 4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.7.2, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 1.1, SR 1.13, SR 1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR 2.1, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.6, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 3.1, SR 3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR 5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 6.1, SR 6.2, SR 7.1, SR 7.6
iso27001-2013A.11.2.6, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.14.1.3, A.14.2.7, A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.1.2, A.6.2.1, A.6.2.2, A.7.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.1, A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.2.4, A.9.2.6, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.2, A.9.4.3, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-004-6 R2.2.2, CIP-004-6 R2.2.3, CIP-007-3 R.1.3, CIP-007-3 R5, CIP-007-3 R5.1.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.3, CIP-007-3 R5.2.1, CIP-007-3 R5.2.3
nistAC-2(4), AU-2(d), AU-12(c), AC-6(9), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, DE.CM-1, DE.CM-3, DE.CM-7, ID.SC-4, PR.AC-1, PR.AC-3, PR.AC-4, PR.AC-6, PR.PT-1, PR.PT-4, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.2.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000004-GPOS-00004, SRG-OS-000037-GPOS-00015, SRG-OS-000042-GPOS-00020, SRG-OS-000062-GPOS-00031, SRG-OS-000304-GPOS-00121, SRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000462-GPOS-00206, SRG-OS-000470-GPOS-00214, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215, SRG-OS-000239-GPOS-00089, SRG-OS-000240-GPOS-00090, SRG-OS-000241-GPOS-00091, SRG-OS-000303-GPOS-00120, SRG-OS-000466-GPOS-00210, SRG-OS-000476-GPOS-00221
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000495-CTR-001235, SRG-APP-000499-CTR-001255, SRG-APP-000503-CTR-001275
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.8
pcidss410.2.1.5, 10.2.1, 10.2
stigidRHEL-09-654245
stigrefSV-258223r1015134_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'

# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()


# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules')

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/shadow" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()

# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' to list of files for inspection.
readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/shadow" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)

# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
    # Extract filepath from the match
    rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
    # Append that path into list of files for inspection
    files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ]
then
    # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules' into list of files for inspection
    key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules"
    # If the audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
    if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ]
    then
        touch "$key_rule_file"
        chmod 0600 "$key_rule_file"
    fi
    files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file")
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/etc/shadow" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/etc/shadow$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83725-2
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654245
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/shadow already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/shadow\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_existing_watch_rules_d
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83725-2
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654245
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key audit_rules_usergroup_modification
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)audit_rules_usergroup_modification$
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_watch_key
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83725-2
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654245
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules as the recipient
    for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - /etc/audit/rules.d/audit_rules_usergroup_modification.rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83725-2
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654245
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83725-2
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654245
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /etc/shadow in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  lineinfile:
    path: '{{ all_files[0] }}'
    line: -w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83725-2
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654245
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /etc/shadow already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/etc/shadow\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: audit.rules
  register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83725-2
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654245
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /etc/shadow in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  lineinfile:
    line: -w /etc/shadow -p wa -k audit_rules_usergroup_modification
    state: present
    dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-83725-2
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-654245
  - NIST-800-171-3.1.7
  - NIST-800-53-AC-2(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(9)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-12(c)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-2(d)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.5
  - audit_rules_usergroup_modification_shadow
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   Record Attempts to perform maintenance activities   [ref]

The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 operating system must generate audit records for privileged activities, nonlocal maintenance, diagnostic sessions and other system-level access. Verify the operating system audits activities performed during nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions. Run the following command: 
$ sudo auditctl -l | grep sudo.log
-w /var/log/sudo.log -p wa -k maintenance
Rationale:
If events associated with nonlocal administrative access or diagnostic sessions are not logged, a major tool for assessing and investigating attacks would not be available. This requirement addresses auditing-related issues associated with maintenance tools used specifically for diagnostic and repair actions on organizational information systems. Nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities conducted by individuals communicating through a network, either an external network (e.g., the internet) or an internal network. Local maintenance and diagnostic activities are those activities carried out by individuals physically present at the information system or information system component and not communicating across a network connection. This requirement applies to hardware/software diagnostic test equipment or tools. This requirement does not cover hardware/software components that may support information system maintenance, yet are a part of the system, for example, the software implementing "ping," "ls," "ipconfig," or the hardware and software implementing the monitoring port of an Ethernet switch.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_audit_sudo_log_events
Identifiers:

CCE-86433-0

References:
disaCCI-000172, CCI-002884
pcidssReq-10.2.2, Req-10.2.5.b
os-srgSRG-OS-000392-GPOS-00172, SRG-OS-000471-GPOS-00215
anssiR73
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL7
cis6.3.3.3
pcidss410.2.1.3, 10.2.1, 10.2

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

# Perform the remediation for both possible tools: 'auditctl' and 'augenrules'


# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()


# If the audit tool is 'auditctl', then add '/etc/audit/audit.rules'
# into the list of files to be inspected
files_to_inspect+=('/etc/audit/audit.rules')

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/sudo.log" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/sudo.log $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/sudo.log$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /var/log/sudo.log -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done
# Create a list of audit *.rules files that should be inspected for presence and correctness
# of a particular audit rule. The scheme is as follows:
#
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Tool used to load audit rules	| Rule already defined	|  Audit rules file to inspect	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#	auditctl		|     Doesn't matter	|  /etc/audit/audit.rules	  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 	augenrules		|          Yes		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules	  |
# 	augenrules		|          No		|  /etc/audit/rules.d/$key.rules  |
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
files_to_inspect=()

# If the audit is 'augenrules', then check if rule is already defined
# If rule is defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules' to list of files for inspection.
# If rule isn't defined, add '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' to list of files for inspection.
readarray -t matches < <(grep -HP "[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/sudo.log" /etc/audit/rules.d/*.rules)

# For each of the matched entries
for match in "${matches[@]}"
do
    # Extract filepath from the match
    rulesd_audit_file=$(echo $match | cut -f1 -d ':')
    # Append that path into list of files for inspection
    files_to_inspect+=("$rulesd_audit_file")
done
# Case when particular audit rule isn't defined yet
if [ "${#files_to_inspect[@]}" -eq "0" ]
then
    # Append '/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules' into list of files for inspection
    key_rule_file="/etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules"
    # If the logins.rules file doesn't exist yet, create it with correct permissions
    if [ ! -e "$key_rule_file" ]
    then
        touch "$key_rule_file"
        chmod 0600 "$key_rule_file"
    fi
    files_to_inspect+=("$key_rule_file")
fi

# Finally perform the inspection and possible subsequent audit rule
# correction for each of the files previously identified for inspection
for audit_rules_file in "${files_to_inspect[@]}"
do
    # Check if audit watch file system object rule for given path already present
    if grep -q -P -- "^[\s]*-w[\s]+/var/log/sudo.log" "$audit_rules_file"
    then
        # Rule is found => verify yet if existing rule definition contains
        # all of the required access type bits

        # Define BRE whitespace class shortcut
        sp="[[:space:]]"
        # Extract current permission access types (e.g. -p [r|w|x|a] values) from audit rule
        current_access_bits=$(sed -ne "s#$sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/sudo.log $sp\+-p$sp\+\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\).*#\1#p" "$audit_rules_file")
        # Split required access bits string into characters array
        # (to check bit's presence for one bit at a time)
        for access_bit in $(echo "wa" | grep -o .)
        do
            # For each from the required access bits (e.g. 'w', 'a') check
            # if they are already present in current access bits for rule.
            # If not, append that bit at the end
            if ! grep -q "$access_bit" <<< "$current_access_bits"
            then
                # Concatenate the existing mask with the missing bit
                current_access_bits="$current_access_bits$access_bit"
            fi
        done
        # Propagate the updated rule's access bits (original + the required
        # ones) back into the /etc/audit/audit.rules file for that rule
        sed -i "s#\($sp*-w$sp\+/var/log/sudo.log$sp\+-p$sp\+\)\([rxwa]\{1,4\}\)\(.*\)#\1$current_access_bits\3#" "$audit_rules_file"
    else
        # Rule isn't present yet. Append it at the end of $audit_rules_file file
        # with proper key

        echo "-w /var/log/sudo.log -p wa -k logins" >> "$audit_rules_file"
    fi
done

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-86433-0
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_sudo_log_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/sudo.log already exists in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/sudo.log\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_existing_watch_rules_d
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86433-0
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_sudo_log_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Search /etc/audit/rules.d for other rules with specified key logins
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/rules.d
    contains: ^.*(?:-F key=|-k\s+)logins$
    patterns: '*.rules'
  register: find_watch_key
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-86433-0
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_sudo_log_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use /etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - /etc/audit/rules.d/logins.rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched == 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-86433-0
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_sudo_log_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Use matched file as the recipient for the rule
  set_fact:
    all_files:
    - '{{ find_watch_key.files | map(attribute=''path'') | list | first }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_watch_key.matched is defined and find_watch_key.matched > 0 and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-86433-0
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_sudo_log_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /var/log/sudo.log in /etc/audit/rules.d/
  lineinfile:
    path: '{{ all_files[0] }}'
    line: -w /var/log/sudo.log -p wa -k logins
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_rules_d.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-86433-0
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_sudo_log_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Check if watch rule for /var/log/sudo.log already exists in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  find:
    paths: /etc/audit/
    contains: ^\s*-w\s+/var/log/sudo.log\s+-p\s+wa(\s|$)+
    patterns: audit.rules
  register: find_existing_watch_audit_rules
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86433-0
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_sudo_log_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Add watch rule for /var/log/sudo.log in /etc/audit/audit.rules
  lineinfile:
    line: -w /var/log/sudo.log -p wa -k logins
    state: present
    dest: /etc/audit/audit.rules
    create: true
    mode: '0600'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched is defined and find_existing_watch_audit_rules.matched
    == 0
  tags:
  - CCE-86433-0
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.2
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.2.5.b
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.2.1.3
  - audit_sudo_log_events
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - reboot_required
  - restrict_strategy

Rule   System Audit Logs Must Have Mode 0750 or Less Permissive   [ref]

If log_group in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a group other than the root group account, change the mode of the audit log files with the following command: 
$ sudo chmod 0750 /var/log/audit

Otherwise, change the mode of the audit log files with the following command: 
$ sudo chmod 0700 /var/log/audit
Rationale:
If users can write to audit logs, audit trails can be modified or destroyed.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_directory_permissions_var_log_audit
Identifiers:

CCE-83734-4

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
cobit5APO01.06, APO11.04, APO12.06, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, DSS06.02, MEA02.01
disaCCI-000162, CCI-000163, CCI-000164
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 2.1, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 5.2, SR 6.1
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-003-8 R5.1.1, CIP-003-8 R5.2, CIP-003-8 R5.3, CIP-004-6 R2.3, CIP-004-6 R3.3, CIP-007-3 R2.1, CIP-007-3 R2.2, CIP-007-3 R2.3, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.2, CIP-007-3 R6.5
nistCM-6(a), AC-6(1), AU-9
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, PR.AC-4, PR.DS-5, PR.PT-1, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
os-srgSRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027, SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028, SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL2
cis6.3.4.1

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

if LC_ALL=C grep -iw ^log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then
  DIR=$(awk -F "=" '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ' | rev | cut -d"/" -f2- | rev)
else
  DIR="/var/log/audit"
fi


if LC_ALL=C grep -m 1 -q ^log_group /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then
  GROUP=$(awk -F "=" '/log_group/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ')
  if ! [ "${GROUP}" == 'root' ] ; then
    chmod 0750 $DIR
  else
    chmod 0700 $DIR
  fi
else
  chmod 0700 $DIR
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   System Audit Logs Must Be Group Owned By Root   [ref]

All audit logs must be group owned by root user. The path for audit log can be configured via log_file parameter in 
/etc/audit/auditd.conf
or, by default, the path for audit log is 
/var/log/audit/
. To properly set the group owner of /var/log/audit/*, run the command: 
$ sudo chgrp root /var/log/audit/*
If log_group in /etc/audit/auditd.conf is set to a group other than the root group account, change the group ownership of the audit logs to this specific group.
Rationale:
Unauthorized disclosure of audit records can reveal system and configuration data to attackers, thus compromising its confidentiality.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_file_group_ownership_var_log_audit
Identifiers:

CCE-89603-5

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO01.06, APO11.04, APO12.06, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, DSS06.02, MEA02.01
cui3.3.1
disaCCI-000162, CCI-000163, CCI-000164, CCI-001314
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 2.1, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 5.2, SR 6.1
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nistCM-6(a), AC-6(1), AU-9(4)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, PR.AC-4, PR.DS-5, PR.PT-1, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.5.1
os-srgSRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027, SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028, SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029, SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL2
cis6.3.4.4
pcidss410.3.2, 10.3

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

if LC_ALL=C grep -iw log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then
  FILE=$(awk -F "=" '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ')
else
  FILE="/var/log/audit/audit.log"
fi


if LC_ALL=C grep -m 1 -q ^log_group /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then
  GROUP=$(awk -F "=" '/log_group/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ')
    if ! [ "${GROUP}" == 'root' ]; then
      chgrp ${GROUP} $FILE*
    else
      chgrp root $FILE*
    fi
else
  chgrp root $FILE*
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Audit Configuration Files Must Be Owned By Group root   [ref]

All audit configuration files must be owned by group root. 
chown :root /etc/audit/audit*.{rules,conf} /etc/audit/rules.d/*
Rationale:
Without the capability to restrict which roles and individuals can select which events are audited, unauthorized personnel may be able to prevent the auditing of critical events. Misconfigured audits may degrade the system's performance by overwhelming the audit log. Misconfigured audits may also make it more difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_file_groupownership_audit_configuration
Identifiers:

CCE-86446-2

References:
disaCCI-000171
os-srgSRG-OS-000063-GPOS-00032
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL4
cis6.3.4.7

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

find -L /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group 0 -regextype posix-extended -regex '^.*audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$' -exec chgrp -L 0 {} \;

find -L /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group 0 -regextype posix-extended -regex '^.*\.rules$' -exec chgrp -L 0 {} \;

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-86446-2
  - configure_strategy
  - file_groupownership_audit_configuration
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Find /etc/audit/ file(s) matching ^.*audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$
  command: find -H /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group 0 -regextype posix-extended
    -regex "^.*audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$"
  register: files_found
  changed_when: false
  failed_when: false
  check_mode: false
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86446-2
  - configure_strategy
  - file_groupownership_audit_configuration
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure group owner on /etc/audit/ file(s) matching ^.*audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$
  file:
    path: '{{ item }}'
    group: '0'
    state: file
  with_items:
  - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86446-2
  - configure_strategy
  - file_groupownership_audit_configuration
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Find /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) matching ^.*\.rules$
  command: find -H /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -group 0 -regextype posix-extended
    -regex "^.*\.rules$"
  register: files_found
  changed_when: false
  failed_when: false
  check_mode: false
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86446-2
  - configure_strategy
  - file_groupownership_audit_configuration
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure group owner on /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) matching ^.*\.rules$
  file:
    path: '{{ item }}'
    group: '0'
    state: file
  with_items:
  - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86446-2
  - configure_strategy
  - file_groupownership_audit_configuration
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

Rule   Audit Configuration Files Must Be Owned By Root   [ref]

All audit configuration files must be owned by root user. To properly set the owner of /etc/audit/, run the command: 
$ sudo chown root /etc/audit/
To properly set the owner of /etc/audit/rules.d/, run the command: 
$ sudo chown root /etc/audit/rules.d/
Rationale:
Without the capability to restrict which roles and individuals can select which events are audited, unauthorized personnel may be able to prevent the auditing of critical events. Misconfigured audits may degrade the system's performance by overwhelming the audit log. Misconfigured audits may also make it more difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_file_ownership_audit_configuration
Identifiers:

CCE-86445-4

References:
disaCCI-000171
os-srgSRG-OS-000063-GPOS-00032
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL4
cis6.3.4.6

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

find -L /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regextype posix-extended -regex '^.*audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$' -exec chown -L 0 {} \;

find -L /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regextype posix-extended -regex '^.*\.rules$' -exec chown -L 0 {} \;

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-86445-4
  - configure_strategy
  - file_ownership_audit_configuration
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Find /etc/audit/ file(s) matching ^.*audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$
  command: find -H /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regextype posix-extended
    -regex "^.*audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$"
  register: files_found
  changed_when: false
  failed_when: false
  check_mode: false
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86445-4
  - configure_strategy
  - file_ownership_audit_configuration
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure owner on /etc/audit/ file(s) matching ^.*audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$
  file:
    path: '{{ item }}'
    owner: '0'
    state: file
  with_items:
  - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86445-4
  - configure_strategy
  - file_ownership_audit_configuration
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Find /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) matching ^.*\.rules$
  command: find -H /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -type f ! -uid 0 -regextype posix-extended
    -regex "^.*\.rules$"
  register: files_found
  changed_when: false
  failed_when: false
  check_mode: false
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86445-4
  - configure_strategy
  - file_ownership_audit_configuration
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Ensure owner on /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s) matching ^.*\.rules$
  file:
    path: '{{ item }}'
    owner: '0'
    state: file
  with_items:
  - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-86445-4
  - configure_strategy
  - file_ownership_audit_configuration
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

Rule   System Audit Logs Must Be Owned By Root   [ref]

All audit logs must be owned by root user and group. By default, the path for audit log is 
/var/log/audit/
. To properly set the owner of /var/log/audit, run the command: 
$ sudo chown root /var/log/audit
To properly set the owner of /var/log/audit/*, run the command: 
$ sudo chown root /var/log/audit/*
Rationale:
Unauthorized disclosure of audit records can reveal system and configuration data to attackers, thus compromising its confidentiality.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_file_ownership_var_log_audit
Identifiers:

CCE-83726-0

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO01.06, APO11.04, APO12.06, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, DSS06.02, MEA02.01
cui3.3.1
disaCCI-000162, CCI-000163, CCI-000164, CCI-001314
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 2.1, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 5.2, SR 6.1
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-003-8 R5.1.1, CIP-003-8 R5.3, CIP-004-6 R2.3, CIP-007-3 R2.1, CIP-007-3 R2.2, CIP-007-3 R2.3, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.2
nistCM-6(a), AC-6(1), AU-9(4)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, PR.AC-4, PR.DS-5, PR.PT-1, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.5.1
os-srgSRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027, SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028, SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000118-CTR-000240
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL2
pcidss410.3.2, 10.3

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

if LC_ALL=C grep -m 1 -q ^log_group /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then
  GROUP=$(awk -F "=" '/log_group/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ')
  if ! [ "${GROUP}" == 'root' ] ; then
    chown root:${GROUP} /var/log/audit
    chown root:${GROUP} /var/log/audit/audit.log*
  else
    chown root:root /var/log/audit
    chown root:root /var/log/audit/audit.log*
  fi
else
  chown root:root /var/log/audit
  chown root:root /var/log/audit/audit.log*
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Rule   Audit Configuration Files Permissions are 640 or More Restrictive   [ref]

All audit configuration files permissions must be 640 or more restrictive. 
chmod 0640 /etc/audit/audit*.{rules,conf} /etc/audit/rules.d/*
Rationale:
Without the capability to restrict which roles and individuals can select which events are audited, unauthorized personnel may be able to prevent the auditing of critical events. Misconfigured audits may degrade the system's performance by overwhelming the audit log. Misconfigured audits may also make it more difficult to establish, correlate, and investigate the events relating to an incident or identify those responsible for one.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_file_permissions_audit_configuration
Identifiers:

CCE-88002-1

References:
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL4
cis6.3.4.5

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

find -L /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt  -type f -regextype posix-extended -regex '^.*audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$' -exec chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt {} \;

find -L /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt  -type f -regextype posix-extended -regex '^.*\.rules$' -exec chmod u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt {} \;

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:configure
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-88002-1
  - configure_strategy
  - file_permissions_audit_configuration
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Find /etc/audit/ file(s)
  command: find -H /etc/audit/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt  -type f -regextype
    posix-extended -regex "^.*audit(\.rules|d\.conf)$"
  register: files_found
  changed_when: false
  failed_when: false
  check_mode: false
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-88002-1
  - configure_strategy
  - file_permissions_audit_configuration
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Set permissions for /etc/audit/ file(s)
  file:
    path: '{{ item }}'
    mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt
    state: file
  with_items:
  - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-88002-1
  - configure_strategy
  - file_permissions_audit_configuration
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Find /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s)
  command: find -H /etc/audit/rules.d/ -maxdepth 1 -perm /u+xs,g+xws,o+xwrt  -type
    f -regextype posix-extended -regex "^.*\.rules$"
  register: files_found
  changed_when: false
  failed_when: false
  check_mode: false
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-88002-1
  - configure_strategy
  - file_permissions_audit_configuration
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

- name: Set permissions for /etc/audit/rules.d/ file(s)
  file:
    path: '{{ item }}'
    mode: u-xs,g-xws,o-xwrt
    state: file
  with_items:
  - '{{ files_found.stdout_lines }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-88002-1
  - configure_strategy
  - file_permissions_audit_configuration
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed

Rule   System Audit Logs Must Have Mode 0640 or Less Permissive   [ref]

Determine where the audit logs are stored with the following command: 
$ sudo grep -iw log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf
log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log
Configure the audit log to be protected from unauthorized read access by setting the correct permissive mode with the following command: 
$ sudo chmod 0600 audit_log_file
By default, audit_log_file is "/var/log/audit/audit.log".
Rationale:
If users can write to audit logs, audit trails can be modified or destroyed.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_file_permissions_var_log_audit
Identifiers:

CCE-83720-3

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO01.06, APO11.04, APO12.06, BAI03.05, BAI08.02, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, DSS06.02, MEA02.01
cui3.3.1
disaCCI-000163, CCI-000164, CCI-001314, CCI-000162
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 2.1, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 5.2, SR 6.1
iso27001-2013A.10.1.1, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.5, A.11.2.1, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.13.1.1, A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3, A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.6.1.2, A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2, A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5
nerc-cipCIP-003-8 R5.1.1, CIP-003-8 R5.3, CIP-004-6 R2.3, CIP-007-3 R2.1, CIP-007-3 R2.2, CIP-007-3 R2.3, CIP-007-3 R5.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.1, CIP-007-3 R5.1.2
nistCM-6(a), AC-6(1), AU-9(4)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, PR.AC-4, PR.DS-5, PR.PT-1, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.5
os-srgSRG-OS-000057-GPOS-00027, SRG-OS-000058-GPOS-00028, SRG-OS-000059-GPOS-00029, SRG-OS-000206-GPOS-00084
app-srg-ctrSRG-APP-000118-CTR-000240
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL2
cis6.3.4.2
pcidss410.3.1, 10.3
stigidRHEL-09-653090
stigrefSV-258167r958434_rule

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

if LC_ALL=C grep -iw ^log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf; then
    FILE=$(awk -F "=" '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf | tr -d ' ')
else
    FILE="/var/log/audit/audit.log"
fi


chmod 0600 $FILE

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83720-3
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-653090
  - NIST-800-171-3.3.1
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1
  - file_permissions_var_log_audit
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Get audit log files
  command: grep -iw ^log_file /etc/audit/auditd.conf
  failed_when: false
  register: log_file_exists
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83720-3
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-653090
  - NIST-800-171-3.3.1
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1
  - file_permissions_var_log_audit
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Parse log file line
  command: awk -F '=' '/^log_file/ {print $2}' /etc/audit/auditd.conf
  register: log_file_line
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - log_file_exists is not skipped and (log_file_exists.stdout | length > 0)
  tags:
  - CCE-83720-3
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-653090
  - NIST-800-171-3.3.1
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1
  - file_permissions_var_log_audit
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set default log_file if not set
  set_fact:
    log_file: /var/log/audit/audit.log
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - (log_file_exists is skipped) or (log_file_exists is undefined) or (log_file_exists.stdout
    | length == 0)
  tags:
  - CCE-83720-3
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-653090
  - NIST-800-171-3.3.1
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1
  - file_permissions_var_log_audit
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Set log_file from log_file_line if not set already
  set_fact:
    log_file: '{{ log_file_line.stdout | trim }}'
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - (log_file_exists is not skipped) and (log_file_line.stdout is defined) and (log_file_line.stdout
    | length > 0)
  tags:
  - CCE-83720-3
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-653090
  - NIST-800-171-3.3.1
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1
  - file_permissions_var_log_audit
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy

- name: Apply mode to log file
  file:
    path: '{{ log_file }}'
    mode: 384
  failed_when: false
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83720-3
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - DISA-STIG-RHEL-09-653090
  - NIST-800-171-3.3.1
  - NIST-800-53-AC-6(1)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-9(4)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.5
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3
  - PCI-DSSv4-10.3.1
  - file_permissions_var_log_audit
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
Group   Configure auditd Data Retention   Group contains 1 rule
[ref]   The audit system writes data to /var/log/audit/audit.log. By default, auditd rotates 5 logs by size (6MB), retaining a maximum of 30MB of data in total, and refuses to write entries when the disk is too full. This minimizes the risk of audit data filling its partition and impacting other services. This also minimizes the risk of the audit daemon temporarily disabling the system if it cannot write audit log (which it can be configured to do). For a busy system or a system which is thoroughly auditing system activity, the default settings for data retention may be insufficient. The log file size needed will depend heavily on what types of events are being audited. First configure auditing to log all the events of interest. Then monitor the log size manually for awhile to determine what file size will allow you to keep the required data for the correct time period.

Using a dedicated partition for /var/log/audit prevents the auditd logs from disrupting system functionality if they fill, and, more importantly, prevents other activity in /var from filling the partition and stopping the audit trail. (The audit logs are size-limited and therefore unlikely to grow without bound unless configured to do so.) Some machines may have requirements that no actions occur which cannot be audited. If this is the case, then auditd can be configured to halt the machine if it runs out of space. Note: Since older logs are rotated, configuring auditd this way does not prevent older logs from being rotated away before they can be viewed. If your system is configured to halt when logging cannot be performed, make sure this can never happen under normal circumstances! Ensure that /var/log/audit is on its own partition, and that this partition is larger than the maximum amount of data auditd will retain normally.

Rule   Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size   [ref]

The default action to take when the logs reach their maximum size is to rotate the log files, discarding the oldest one. To configure the action taken by auditd, add or correct the line in /etc/audit/auditd.conf: 
max_log_file_action = ACTION
Possible values for ACTION are described in the auditd.conf man page. These include:
  • ignore
  • syslog
  • suspend
  • rotate
  • keep_logs
Set the ACTION to keep_logs. The setting is case-insensitive.
Rationale:
Automatically rotating logs (by setting this to rotate) minimizes the chances of the system unexpectedly running out of disk space by being overwhelmed with log data. However, for systems that must never discard log data, or which use external processes to transfer it and reclaim space, keep_logs can be employed.
Severity: 
medium
Rule ID:xccdf_org.ssgproject.content_rule_auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action
Identifiers:

CCE-83701-3

References:
cis-csc1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
cjis5.4.1.1
cobit5APO11.04, APO12.06, APO13.01, BAI03.05, BAI04.04, BAI08.02, DSS02.02, DSS02.04, DSS02.07, DSS03.01, DSS05.04, DSS05.07, MEA02.01
disaCCI-000140
hipaa164.312(a)(2)(ii)
isa-62443-20094.2.3.10, 4.3.3.3.9, 4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.3.4.5.6, 4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8, 4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
isa-62443-2013SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12, SR 2.8, SR 2.9, SR 6.1, SR 7.1, SR 7.2
iso27001-2013A.12.1.3, A.12.4.1, A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4, A.12.7.1, A.16.1.4, A.16.1.5, A.16.1.7, A.17.2.1
nistAU-5(b), AU-5(2), AU-5(1), AU-5(4), CM-6(a)
nist-csfDE.AE-3, DE.AE-5, PR.DS-4, PR.PT-1, RS.AN-1, RS.AN-4
pcidssReq-10.7
os-srgSRG-OS-000047-GPOS-00023
ccnA.3.SEC-RHEL6
cis6.3.2.2

# Remediation is applicable only in certain platforms
if rpm --quiet -q audit && rpm --quiet -q kernel; then

var_auditd_max_log_file_action='keep_logs'


AUDITCONFIG=/etc/audit/auditd.conf

# Strip any search characters in the key arg so that the key can be replaced without
# adding any search characters to the config file.
stripped_key=$(sed 's/[\^=\$,;+]*//g' <<< "^max_log_file_action")

# shellcheck disable=SC2059
printf -v formatted_output "%s = %s" "$stripped_key" "$var_auditd_max_log_file_action"

# If the key exists, change it. Otherwise, add it to the config_file.
# We search for the key string followed by a word boundary (matched by \>),
# so if we search for 'setting', 'setting2' won't match.
if LC_ALL=C grep -q -m 1 -i -e "^max_log_file_action\\>" "$AUDITCONFIG"; then
    escaped_formatted_output=$(sed -e 's|/|\\/|g' <<< "$formatted_output")
    LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks "s/^max_log_file_action\\>.*/$escaped_formatted_output/gi" "$AUDITCONFIG"
else
    if [[ -s "$AUDITCONFIG" ]] && [[ -n "$(tail -c 1 -- "$AUDITCONFIG" || true)" ]]; then
        LC_ALL=C sed -i --follow-symlinks '$a'\\ "$AUDITCONFIG"
    fi
    cce="CCE-83701-3"
    printf '# Per %s: Set %s in %s\n' "${cce}" "${formatted_output}" "$AUDITCONFIG" >> "$AUDITCONFIG"
    printf '%s\n' "$formatted_output" >> "$AUDITCONFIG"
fi

else
    >&2 echo 'Remediation is not applicable, nothing was done'
fi

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:true
Strategy:restrict
---
apiVersion: machineconfiguration.openshift.io/v1
kind: MachineConfig
spec:
  config:
    ignition:
      version: 3.1.0
    storage:
      files:
      - contents:
          source: data:,{{ %23%0A%23%20This%20file%20controls%20the%20configuration%20of%20the%20audit%20daemon%0A%23%0A%0Alocal_events%20%3D%20yes%0Awrite_logs%20%3D%20yes%0Alog_file%20%3D%20/var/log/audit/audit.log%0Alog_group%20%3D%20root%0Alog_format%20%3D%20ENRICHED%0Aflush%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_flush%7D%7D%0Afreq%20%3D%2050%0Amax_log_file%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file%7D%7D%0Anum_logs%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_num_logs%7D%7D%0Apriority_boost%20%3D%204%0Aname_format%20%3D%20hostname%0A%23%23name%20%3D%20mydomain%0Amax_log_file_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_max_log_file_action%7D%7D%0Aspace_left%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left%7D%7D%0Aspace_left_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_space_left_action%7D%7D%0Averify_email%20%3D%20yes%0Aaction_mail_acct%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_action_mail_acct%7D%7D%0Aadmin_space_left%20%3D%2050%0Aadmin_space_left_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Adisk_full_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_full_action%7D%7D%0Adisk_error_action%20%3D%20%7B%7B.var_auditd_disk_error_action%7D%7D%0Ause_libwrap%20%3D%20yes%0A%23%23tcp_listen_port%20%3D%2060%0Atcp_listen_queue%20%3D%205%0Atcp_max_per_addr%20%3D%201%0A%23%23tcp_client_ports%20%3D%201024-65535%0Atcp_client_max_idle%20%3D%200%0Atransport%20%3D%20TCP%0Akrb5_principal%20%3D%20auditd%0A%23%23krb5_key_file%20%3D%20/etc/audit/audit.key%0Adistribute_network%20%3D%20no%0Aq_depth%20%3D%20400%0Aoverflow_action%20%3D%20syslog%0Amax_restarts%20%3D%2010%0Aplugin_dir%20%3D%20/etc/audit/plugins.d }}
        mode: 0640
        path: /etc/audit/auditd.conf
        overwrite: true

Complexity:low
Disruption:low
Reboot:false
Strategy:restrict
- name: Gather the package facts
  package_facts:
    manager: auto
  tags:
  - CCE-83701-3
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7
  - auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
- name: XCCDF Value var_auditd_max_log_file_action # promote to variable
  set_fact:
    var_auditd_max_log_file_action: !!str keep_logs
  tags:
    - always

- name: Configure auditd max_log_file_action Upon Reaching Maximum Log Size
  lineinfile:
    dest: /etc/audit/auditd.conf
    line: max_log_file_action = {{ var_auditd_max_log_file_action }}
    regexp: ^\s*max_log_file_action\s*=\s*.*$
    state: present
    create: true
  when:
  - '"audit" in ansible_facts.packages'
  - '"kernel" in ansible_facts.packages'
  tags:
  - CCE-83701-3
  - CJIS-5.4.1.1
  - NIST-800-53-AU-5(1)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-5(2)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-5(4)
  - NIST-800-53-AU-5(b)
  - NIST-800-53-CM-6(a)
  - PCI-DSS-Req-10.7
  - auditd_data_retention_max_log_file_action
  - low_complexity
  - low_disruption
  - medium_severity
  - no_reboot_needed
  - restrict_strategy
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